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SECTION I: BACKGROUND 
This first sect:bnplaces the present work in the 
context of scientific theory in general, and specifically 
of the history of organizational theory. It provides 
definitions necessary for understanding the rest of the 
paper. 
CHAPTER ONE 
SCIENTIFIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 
The conferees encourage research relating speech-
communication theories to the theories and research 
of related areas of study ••• Opportunities 
••• exist to advance speech-communication theory 
and research through amplification and refinement 
of formulations originating in other branches of 
the behavioral sciences and the humanities (Kibler 
& Barker, 1969). 
The growing field of organizational communication, 
which overlaps so many other disciplines, should be a logical 
location for the type of cross-fertilization the participants 
in the conference (above) recommend. However, the diffi-
culties of mastering multiple fields cause inter-disciplin-
ary approaches to receive more paraise than application. 
Yet the lack of such synthesis is a major limitation to the 
growth of the study of organizational communication. 
Studies of communication in organizations usually 
relate one communication variable to another or to an atti-
tude variable. They involve such questions as "Are formal 
and informal channels active at the same time?" "Are •good 
leaders• also •good communicators'?" "Does horizontal 
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communication supplement or supplant vertical communication?" 
After a series of studies, the answer is usually "some-
times." 
The purpose of the material presented here is to 
provide a way out of this dead end by providing a theo-
retical base which relates communication in the organization 
to the nature of the organization itself. 
This first chapter will begin by presenting the 
need for a theoretical basis for science. That is followed 
by a discussion of the requisite parts of a theory--
definitions and scientific laws. Following are criteria 
for evaluating theory, humanistic and scientific. Then 
the deficiencies of current theory of organizational 
communication are discussed in light of the criteria 
presented. 
The paper then procedes to forecast the theory 
that will be presented to remedy the deficiencies discussed. 
The ideas of writers in three main areas--organizational 
technology, environment, and goals--are summarized. 
The chapter concludes with a brief statement of purpose 
for the dissertation as a whole. 
Need for a Theoretical Base 
The basic aim if science is theory. Perhaps 
less cryptic, the basic aim of science is to find 
'gener~l explanations of natural events 
(Kerlinger, 1964, 10). ' 
A scientific field is nothing if it is not empir-
ical--the scientist must get his feet wet, test out his 
ideas in the world of reality. At the same time, science 
is also nothing if it is not theoretical. A random collec-
tion of facts, however thoroughly verified, does not 
constitute a science. 
In some fields such as speech C ornmunication and 
educational research, there seems to be a tendency for 
anyone with a new idea to pracede immediately to run a 
study to try and verify it. Sociologists, in contrast, 
seem to spend more time considering, developing, and ar-
guing about theory. Rather than than doing a new study, 
they often try to bring new insights to existing data, 
an approach which leads to considerable re-hashing. 
A balance between new work and the thoughtful con-
sideration necessary for theory-building is what is nec-
essary, and that sense is a difficult one to develop. 
Possibly the study of organizational communication has 
failed to develop the theoretical side of science because 
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of a desire for immediately applicable results. Many 
studies are the result of a response to a pressing need 
in some organizational setting, rather than a theoret-
ical interest. 
But the field will continue to be inadequate unless 
these scattered problems can be brought togetherunder 
more general concepts and explanations. Such work is 
beginning to be more widely recognized in other behavioral 
science fields as well. Altman writes: 
Interest in synthesizing knowledge inthe be-
havioral sciences has only recently grown and, 
even now, only a small minority see such work as 
equal in importance to the empirical generation 
of new "facts." But the picture should rapidly 
change ••. Thus, the time may be ripe for 
making the classification of knowledge a res-
pectable area of scholarly contribution and 
one worthy of support and reward (1968, 48). 
The Parts of a Theory 
Inter-related Concepts 
Definition. A theory is a set of interrelated 
constructs (concepts), and definitions, and 
propositions that presents a systematic view 
of phenomena by specifying relations among 
variables, with the purpose of explaining and 
predicting the phenomena (Kerlinger, 1964, ll). 
A theory, therefore, consists of terms, definitions, 
and the propositions that specify their inter-relationships. 
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Einstein (1923, 1936) pictures the ideal science as a 
series of organized layers. The lowest levels are "sense 
impressions" such as readings on dials, color changes, 
sounds, and movements. The upper layers combine and 
explain the direct findings. They are "freely invented" 
by the scientist, but then must be related to and modified 
by sense experiences. 
The aim of science is, on the one hand, a com-
prehension as complete as possible, of the 
connection between the sense experiences in 
their totality, and, on the other hand, the 
accomplishment of this aim by the use of a 
minimum of primary concepts and relations (83). 
The Paradox of the Hierarch_y of Concepts . But though 
a science is built in layers, we immediately come to 
a paradox in the relationships among the layers. For 
example, "observations" are supposed to be direct and 
immediate, and theory is supposed to be built on them. ~· 
Yet we must have theory even to make the most straight-
forward observation. What an "instance" is, or whether 
something is an instance of "A" or "B" can only be deter-
mined on the basis of theoretical understanding. 
Without a system, we can no more make meaningful 
observations than we could take dictation in a language 
foreign to us. Kaplan comments 
The proper concepts are needed to formulate 
a good theory, but we need a good theory to 
arrive at the proper concepts •..• Like all 
existential dilemmas in science, of which this 
is an instance, the paradox is resolved by a 
process of approximation: the better our 
concepts, the better the theory we can formulate 
with them, and in turn, the better the concepts 
available for the next, improved theory {1964, 
54). 
The paradox may not always be solved so easily. 
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A much-patched theory may require radical re-thinking and 
revision rather than improvement. But the scientist 
must remember that all parts of theory are inter-relatecs 
and decisions regarding methods and measurements will 
have a bearing on the final generalizations produced. 
Definitions 
Definitions are the first part of a theory. The 
way language is to be used is a very significant part 
of entering any new field of experience. Roger Brown, 
a leading linguist, writes: 
If you go to visit the family that has a pet 
zebra they will teach you his name. If you go 
to live with the Hanunoo or among rice growers 
in this country they will begin by teaching 
you their ninety-two names. If you undertake 
to study zoology your teachers will start out 
by showing you pictures of protozoa, coelenterates, 
hydra, and the like. It is as if every linguistic 
community, parents at home or nationals of 
another country or teachers of a science, adopts 
the same policy toward neophytes: "Let us 
begin by defining our terms." 
The whole point of defining terms is to 
make it possible to go on and say something 
useful employing those terms (1965, 339). 
Bormann divides definitions into two types: 
operational and non-operational (1965, 77). These two 
types will be considered and related to needs of 
scientific theory. 
Operational Definitions. Bormann writes that 
Operational definitions are the basis for 
concepts in the natural sciences. The con-
cept is a kind of a shorthand way of stating 
the operations that would be performed to 
determine specific gravity or temperature 
(1965, 77). 
At one point, the behaviorists seemed to believe that 
the use of the operational definition was the true 
route to making the social sciences truly scientific 
as well. 
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The term defined was to be considered nothing more 
than the operations carried out to test it. For example, 
a "hungry" rat is one at 80% of his normal weight. 
However, in more complex cases, the operational approach 
limits the attempt to discover better tests of the 
variable. Many studies described "intelligence" as 
"what intelligence tests measure" before scientists 
began to realize that the tests themselves c01J.ld be 
inadequate (Tyler, 1965, 10-15). 
Similarly, the strict operational approach does 
not encourage the use of multiple methods'..,of measure-
ment. Since "A" is a certain set of operations, no 
other seems to be needed. But Denzin (1970) strongly 
argues that such a multiple approach is needed for 
social science: 
The combination of multiple methods, data 
types, observers, and theories in the same 
investigation is termed multiple triangualtion. 
While it may be difficult for any single inves-
tigation to achieve this full combination, it 
is certainly possible to utilize multiple data 
levels and methods. 
These remarks suggest a standard for eval-
uation of studies: The greater the triangula-
tion, the greater the confidence in the observed 
findings. The obverse is equally true. The 
conclusion is evident; Sociologists must move 
beyond single-method, atheoretical studies (472). 
But there are still advantages to the operational 
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approach. It forces the investigator to look at what 
actually actually occurs before proceeding to interpre-
tation. Such a step is particularly important in the 
planning of a study based on a theory. In the writing of 
the theory itself, other types of definitions become equally 
important. 
Non-operational definitions. "[N]onoperational 
definitions are of three kinds: (1) conventional defi-
nitions, descriptive definitions, (3) prescriptive defi-
nitions (Bormann, 1965, 77)." 
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A conventional definition simply gives the mean-
ing of the word as commonly used in a linguistic community. 
Descriptive definitions go beyond that to include some 
reference to reality. A linguist could conventionally 
define magical beliefs or spirit beings as their names 
are used among the aboriginals. In contrast, Aristotle 
defining God as the unmoved mover was attempting a de-
scriptive definition. 
The third type of definition is prescriptive. 
This means that it does not prescribe only how a word 
ought to be used--all definitions do that--but how men 
ought to act. An example would be the definition of science 
as a "value-free" activity. Such a definition does not 
mean that people do not call activities involving values 
"science," but that scientists ought to avoid that type 
of contamination in what they do. 
Use of TyPes of Definition. All types of definition 
may find their place in a theory. Simply conventional def-
initions are least useful, since the goal of science is to 
describe reality, but sometimes they make it possible for 
the discussion to proceed. Descriptive definitions are 
central to theory. They should have implications for the 
operational definitions that are used to apply them to 
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empirical work. Prescriptive definitions whould be 
largely confined to meta-theory--that is, our discussions 
about how theory should be made. 
Improvement of Definitions. Several suggestions 
can be provided for the improvement of definitions in 
theory. 
1. The author should offer well-thought-out def-
initions and not assume his meaning is understood. 
2. The author should be aware of previous usage, 
and either maintain the conventional meaning or explic-
itly depart from it. 
3. Definitions of terms should be related to the 
author's understanding of reality, and, if possible, to 
direct experience. That is, there should be implications 
for putting them into operational terms. 
4. Every attempt should be made to clarify the 
definition, both by providing actual examples and "ideal 
types." 
Scientific Laws 
The definitions of a theory are connected into 
a series of scientific laws 
The Nature of Scientific Laws. A law is a univer-
sal statement of the form "All A's are B." Statistical 
laws are similar, but indicate that a predictable 
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percentage of A's are B. But not all statements of this 
form are laws. The first problem is tautology: the 
second, the problem of causation. 
First, to be a law, a statement must not be simply 
a tautology. The terms related must have independent 
meaning. Madden explains: 
[A] law is a universal conjunction of terms 
or variables. The qualification we need to 
add is "independently defined terms or variables." 
Consider the following sentence: 'Only the fit 
survive. 1 Yet if there is no other criterion 
of the occurrence of fitness than survival, 
then the two concepts are not independently 
meaningful and consequently they stand in a 
definitional rather than a lawful relationship 
(1960, 207). 
The point seems obvious, yet it affects many of our 
current studies. For example, Baker (1973) criticizes 
a study by Jain (1973) for exactly this type of problem. 
I am not sure what most of the correlation 
coefficients in the Jain study mean because of 
a contamination problem •••• For instance, 
"supervisors expressing appreciation for the 
subordinate•s work" is represented as an inde-
pendent variable and "expressing appreciation 
for good work done" is represented as a dependent 
variablet (132-133). 
A second problem is the non-causal statement. 
Philosophers of science sometimes try to avoid this way of 
referring to the problem. 
Some philosophers of science, it is true, 
insist that scientists do not bother with the 
notion of cause at all. Cause-and-effect gen-
eralizations, they say, hold only within ranges 
whose limits are unclear and therefore that 
certain unmentioned factors remain constant; 
therefore, scientists disregard the concept of 
causality in favor of the more sophisticated 
notion of lawfulness or functional connection . 
• . • Actually, however, it matters little for 
our purposes whether scientists talk about 
"causes" or "laws" or whatever, since . 
the very same difficulties beset one no matter 
which of these terms he tries to define or 
clarify (Madden, 1960, 201). 
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The classic example of the true, but non-law state-
ment is "All apples in this basket are red." But while 
some authors attack this from the concept of confirmation 
(Scheffler, 1963), and others stress counter-factuals 
(Chisholm, 1955), basically they are all trying to show 
that what is wrong with the statement is that the terms 
are accidentally, rather than causally related. 
Scientific laws, then, must provide causal explan-
ations. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) discuss the parts of 
a causal explanation. It consists of the item to be 
explained, which is either a fact or a lower-order theory, 
the antecedent conditions, and general laws. The item to 
be explained could be logically deduced from the general 
laws and the antecedent conditions. 
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For example, in explaining the striking of a match, 
the antecedent conditions would include the sulfur and 
phosphorus composition of the match, the oxygen in the 
surrounding air, the physical striking, and so forth. 
General laws would include the concept that friction 
produces heat, that the ignition point of the chemicals 
is so many degrees fahrenheit, and others. Obviously, 
a complete causal explanation can never be given. However, 
it is the function of theory to indicate which antecedent' 
conditions are significant, as well as to provide the 
general laws. 
Other Forms of ExPlanation. Two other forms of 
explanation are sometimes offered as part of scientific 
theory. They are called teleogical and historical explan-
ations. The first type, the teleogical explanation, is 
goal or future-oriented. Such explanations as "The rat 
pressed the lever to get a reward," or "the firm expanded 
to make a greater profit," are teleogical. 
The second type, historical explanations, relate 
a present event to the past. Historical explanations 
may refer to events in the history of an organism or 
an institution that led to the current situation. 
But behavior often does not reach the goal ±t 
seeks, and it may not be related to the goal in any 
rational way. And particular historical conditions 
do not produce particular results, either for men or 
institutions. Rovere comments in his biography of 
Senator Joe McCarthy: 
But even if we accept as revealed truth all 
that had been said and all that may be assumed 
about his early life, we are still lacking any 
necessary background for a demagogue of genius. 
Adversity and rejection may scar the soul or 
enlarge it or have no identifiable consequences. 
He could have grown up shy, awkward, compul-
sively industrious, too much mothered in what 
we can picture as the meager conditions of 
life in Grand Chute in the twenties and been 
something very different from what he turned 
out to be: an Outagamie County farmer like his 
father, a respectable dentist in Appleton, a 
priest, a Communist functionary, a burglar, 
a respected public servant in the great Wiscon-
sin tradition, or Joe McCarthy (1959, 82-83)m 
The present author agrees with those who believe 
that teleogical and historical explanations are better 
re-cast in terms of current processes. That is, the 
scientist should refer to present motivations rather 
than to future goals, and the on-going processes begun 
by historical events rather than thee1ents themselves. 
15 
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Criteria for Evallating Theory 
Theories are evaluated in two ways--strictly on 
their scientific value, and humanistically, on the effects 
it is expected they will have on the well-peing of man. 
Social science theories are often particularly subject 
to attack on humanistic grounds. 
Humanistic Evaluation 
Value Arguments in Science. One curious phenomen-
enon in the literature on organizations is that each 
school of thought accuses the others of being the enemy 
of progress, the defender of the status .9:!dQ• Many writers 
also claim severe social, human, and economic costs if 
the views of the others are adopted. In one sense, 
such criticisms are extra-scientific. Scientists have 
long fought for the independence of their minds, the 
right to follow where their facts and theories lead them. 
They point to Galileo and the Inquisition, the adoption 
of the genetics of Lysenko in Russia, and the prostitution 
of science under the Nazis and rightly insist that they 
can owe allegiance to no ideology. 
A typical view is stated by Kerlinger: 
If we said that the aim of science is the better-
ment of mankind most readers would quickly read 
the words and accept them. But the basic aim 
of science is not the betterment of mankind. 
It is theory (1967, 11). 
Both social and other scientists often find the 
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claim that their work is "value-free" a convenient screen 
to hide behind. Gouldner (1969) comments in rather ex-
treme terms. 
Before Hiroshima, physicists also talked of a 
value-free science; they, too vowed to make 
Jno value judgements.- Today many of them are not so 
sure. If we today concern ourselves exclusively 
with the technical proficiencies of our students 
and reject all responsibility for their moral 
sense, or lack of it, then we may someday be 
compelled to accept responsibility for having 
trained a generation willing to serve in a 
future Auschwitz (617). 
Action Implications. We have called the value 
Judgments we are concerned with extra-scientific. Rudner 
describes some of them: 
If it is necessary to make a value de-
cision to have a science before we can have 
one, then this decision is literally prescien-
tific and has not been shown to be any part of 
the procedures of science. Similarly, the 
decision that one problem is more worthwhile 
than another is an extraproblematic decision 
and forms no part of the procedures involved in 
dealing with the problems decided upon (1954, 363). 
However, Rudner believes that problems concerned with 
the application of results are part of the scientific 
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process since they deal with the acceptance and rejection 
of hypotheses. The present author believes that questions 
of the~ of knowledge gained from science are also non-
scientific but nevertheless significant. 
It is these implications for action, rather than the 
weight of evidence, which arouse so much furor. For ex-
ample, the assertion by a prominent psychologist that 
American Negroes are actually hereditarily inferior to 
their white compatriots in intelligence might well be 
taken as a rather uninteresting statistical result. The 
finding, even if true, is based on an average taken from 
such a broad range of scores as to make it impossible for 
us to make any statements about individuals or small groups. 
Further, it is not part of a theoretical statement about the 
nature of intelligence or its heredity. 
But people are, of course, infuriated because they 
believe--probably correctly--that those who accept this 
"finding" will use it to support certain practices which 
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others believe undemocratic and inhumane. And they be-
lieve such practices will not be abolished by the "self-
correcting" nature of science. Criticisms of organizational 
theories are based on similar considerations. 
Organizations control large portions of our lives. 
We are born in them, educated, married, divorced, and 
die in them. Anything that would de-humanize organizations 
or make them harmful to those who work in them or deal with 
them would be very significant to society. On the other 
hand, many projects of the future will require the coop-
eration of many people, and a theory facilitating such 
cooperation could be of immense value. Therefore, we are 
obligated to consider the nature of values and the potential 
effects of a theory pr9posed for organizations. 
Underlying Values. Certain American values underlie 
the philosophical arguments that occur. They include 
(1) the importance of the individual, (2) equalitarian-
ism, (3) a positive value on risk and free choice, (4) the 
value of work and accomplishment, and (5) economic and 
technical progress. 
The value of the individual is reflected in the legal 
maxim that it is better for a hundred guilty men to go 
free than for one innocent man to be punished. Indeed, 
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our whole system of justice in theory is built around the 
importance of both the accused and the humblest victim 
of crime. 'Ihis value is also expressed in the tremendous 
efforts often exerted to rescue a single victim of accident, 
even at great risk to the rescuers. 
Equalitarianism rests on the importance of the indi-
vidual, but emphasizes the rights of all to equal oppor-
tunity (see Boorstin, 1973, chap. 53). It is somewhat in 
conflict with the value of hard work and accomplishment. 
Americans do accord differential respect, but we feel it 
should be earned rather than given. Status in our society 
is supposed to be achieved rather than ascribed (Brown, 
1965, 103). 
Another value in American society is freedom of 
choice and risk. One is not supposed to cling too much to 
security, to the tried and true. Of course this value 
is held within limits--daredevils are not necessarily 
admired--but it is still very real (Brown, 1965, 698-707). 
In recent years, Americans have begun to have some 
doubt and distrust regarding the nature of economic and 
technological progress. Environmental destruction, the 
dissatisfaction of young people, and the apparent inability 
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of technical resources to create desired social change 
have led to devaluation of science and technology for 
their own sakes. Yet the broad, underlying faith in the 
system that has brought so many so much of the world's 
goods remains (see Boorstin, 1973, pt. 9). 
Conclusion. This author believes that the effects 
' 
of a theory, while not directly part of a scientific eval-
uation, should be considered by the scientist. Such an 
evaluation of the present theory will be included in the 
final chapter of this work. 
Scientific Evaluation 
There are also strictly scientific, as contrasted with 
humanistic, considerations for evaluating a theory. They 
involve developing or choosing the best theory from the 
materials offered. 
Given alternative theories, then, how is the scien-
tist to choose among them? The criteria developed below 
are based on Madden (1960, 3-13). 
First, a theory must account for the facts. A theory 
that does not accord with the known facts is obviously 
not adequate. 
Second, a theory must account for as large a group 
of facts as possible. A small, special-purpose theory 
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must yQeld to a more inclusive one. A theory is partic-
ularly valuable if it leads to the prediction of new, 
unknown relationships. 
Third, if two theories seem to account for the same 
set of facts, the one more logically simple is to be pre-
ferred. One must choose the theory with fewer undefined 
terms and unproved assumptions. 
Fourth, a theory should lead to results in publicly 
confirmable studies. This implies that it has psycholog-
ical richness and productivity for the working scientist, 
as well as producing findings that are repeatable. Criti-
cisms of para-psychological theory would seem to be based 
on this criterion. 
Also, the theory should relate to other concepts 
available and not be inconsistent with other facts and 
theories which it does not purport to explain. 
Deficjencies in current 
Theory of Organizational Communication 
In his massive review of studies of organizational 
communication, Redding (1972) advocates a greater use of 
theory: 
[o]ur understanding of organizational communi-
cation will be enhanced if we go beyond the 
traditional categories and look at our subjects 
in a frame of reference of basic theoretical 
concepts (vii)., 
He then then examines organizational communication in 
two ways: 
(1) In terms of certain fundamental "postulates" 
derived from underlying theories of human commu-
nication, but interpreted in the organizational 
setting. • . . 
(2) In b~rms of the over-all "climate" of the 
organization, climate taken in the broad sense 
of assumptions and attitudes influencing the to-
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tal behaviors of the members of the organization (vii). 
While these items have some unifying value) they do 
not constitute "theory" as this work has used the term--
a set of defined terms inter-related by causal laws. Nor 
do his chapter headings or "basic postulates," a miscellany 
of topics and advice such as "meanings not transferred," 
"Feedback," "Anything a potential message," add much to 
a real scientific theory. 
Redding's work is closely based on the existing lit-
erature, and this is intended primarily as criticism of that 
literature rather than of his specific work in gathering 
it. The first point is based on the previous discussion of 
parts of a theory. Too often in the literature, terms are 
not defined and related to experience. For example, Redding's 
definition of "climate" (above) could mean everything or 
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nothing. It is intended to be a descriptive definition, 
but it gives no hint as to how it might be operationalized. 
Also, no definitions are given for the constituent terms, 
such as attitudes, so there can be no building of the heir-
archical structure of science. Also, the items are not 
causally inter-related by a series of laws. 
A third criticism is based on page 20 of this disser-
tation. There it is stated as one criterion of a good theory 
that it account for as large a group of facts as possible. 
A major failing of current theory in organizational commu-
nication its limitation to special areas and communication 
variables. A theory involving a wider group of variables 
would provide a stronger base for the field. 
Forecast of Theory 
The view presented here as an improved, alternative 
theory is based on several groups of writers sometimes linked .. 
together as the "socio-technical school." The authors included 
are from at least three different areas: sociology, social-
psychology, and administration. Their work does not form 
a single body of literature, though there is some overlap 
among the groups. Several, perhaps, would be surprised to 
find themselves in the company of the rest. 
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Within the group, the usage of terms is-inconsistent 
and confusing. For example, there are at least three completely 
different meanings of "bureaucratization" and two for "organic." 
In other cases, different terms, such as "bureaucratic" 
and "mechanistic" refer to the same reality. The authors 
have different areas of emphasis, and sometimes their views 
conflict. Yet a common thread runs through their writings--
that the problems with which an organization is faced deter-
mine its social structure. 
These authors are divided into three major areas 
of concern: environment, technology, and goals. A brief 
summary and forecast of the material in each area is presented 
below. 
Technology 
Technology is defined as both equipment and the know-
ledge needed to use it. The two principal writers in this 
area, Charles Perrow and Joan Woodward, approached the topic 
from different ends. Perrow wrote the chapter on "Hospitals" 
for the HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS (March, 1965). In order 
to bring the material into a usable framework, he tried to 
relate the technology--routineness or non-routineness of 
the work--to the findings regarding the social structure. 
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Later (1970, 78) he bisected the simple routine--non-routine 
continuum with a second one, 'based on whether those excep-
tions which occurred could be provided with solutions 
programmed in advance. 
Nevertheless, much of his work centers on the routine--
non-routine distinction. Work units at the routine end of 
the continuum are predicted to be likeWeber's (1957) bur-
eaucracy. They have firm, heirarchical systems of organization, 
rational-legal authority, and vertical, writte~ systems 
of communication. Units at the non-routine end tend to 
be what Toffler (1970) calls"ad-hocracies," with rapidly 
shifting, oral communication systems. 
Woodward (1965) began with the very practical intent 
of proving the efficacy of the principles of classical 
management in the South Essex firms near the college where 
she taught. However, the results indicated no logical 
predictors of success, until the technology of the firms 
was taken into account. Then they discovered that these 
bureaucratic principles led to success in large-batch and 
mass production firms, but not in others. 
Woodward's results applied to the entire firm. 
However, further investigation of complex firms (Wedder-
burn & Crompton, 1972; Meissner, 1969) showed that they 
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often have units with different technologies and very 
different social structures. Thus a second set of var-
iables was required to explain the structure of the firm 
as a whole. 
Environment 
The two major writers in this area are Paul Lawrence 
and Jay Lorsch. While most of their theorizing centers 
on the relative certainty or predictability of the envir-
onment, they also discuss the time span of definitive 
feedback, and the relative importance of environmental 
sectors (1967, 253), and heterogeneity and differences in 
time orientation in different parts of the environment 
(1967, 93-96). 
Their findings indicate that different organizational 
units deal with different parts of the environment. 
The prime requirement for a successful organization is that 
each unit be differentiated so _as to deal most effectively 
with its own task (technology), and then integrated with 
the rest of the organization. Intermediate or transfer 
units may be necessary to provide the communication to 
accomplish this integration (Lorsch & Lawrence, 1965). 
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Goals 
No single author or group of authors has developed 
an extensive theoretical and empirical interest in organ-
izational goals. Yet students of organizations have 
long pointed out that the deliberate construction and 
manipulation of these institutions is what differentiates 
them from naturally occurring units like the faiuily. 
Perrow (1968, 1972) places the study of goals 
squarely in the sociological tradition. He discusses 
different types of goals, such as survival, product char-
acteristics, and internal characteristics. These goals 
may conflict or displace each other. 
One author (Child 1972b} in this area hardly uses 
the term "goals" at all. He prefers to refer to stra-
tegic choice." He points out that goals operate not only 
in the slack or lee-way provided by a given technology 
and environment, but also in the choiceof technologies and 
environments with which to deal. 
Image and Plan 
One criticism of the socio-technical school is that 
its writers fail to base their work on an adequate view 
of human psychology (Argyris, 1972). In the present paper, 
this psychology is provided by the cognitive view of man 
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(Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). This relates the 
"image" of the technology and environment to individual 
and shared "plans" for carrying out the tas·k.. 
Purpose of Dissertation 
The purpose of the present work is to open up an area 
of theory for the use of communication scholars. This 
is done in four steps. The purposes are as follows: 
1. To present, clarify, and analyze material regarding 





2. To inter-relate these variables by showing where their 
effects occur. 
3. To provide additional material where analysis indi-
cates inadequacies in the material developed by others. 
The rrajor effort in this area involves relat~ the 
psychological and sociological levels of analysis 
through the use of the concepts of "image" and "plan,n 
and how these are shared and maintained by communication. 
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4. To present the implications of the theory for organi-
zational communication, at both intra-departmental and 
inter-departmental levels. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a comment from 
Kaplan on the value of theory: 
To engage in theorizing means not just to learn 
by experience but to take thought about what is 
there to be learned •••. 
Theory is in this respect properly contrasted 
with practice, and "theoria" is contemplation viewed 
as something distinct from action ••• In an enlarged 
context, theorizing may be a very practical acti-
vity indeed and contemplation may be another kind 
of action, neither passive nor disengaged (1964, 
295). 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS OF TERMS 
-· Certain widely and carelessly used terms must be 
defined before the major portion of this paper can begin. 
They include "communication," "organization," and "systems." 
' Other key terms will be defined as they arise in the body 
of the work. 
Communication 
Dance {1970), in reviewing the literature, found 95 
definitions of "communication," with 15 "conceptually 
different components." This section doss not intend to 
repeat his work, but only to provide a guide to usage in the 
present study. 
The New Orleans Conference on Research and Instruction 
of the Speech Association of America {later Speech Commu-
nication Association) stated: 
Speech communication research and related phrases 
were adopted to identify the area principally 
concerned with the scientific investigation of 
messages, their antecedents, and their consequences 
(Kibler & Barker, 1969, 18). 
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The editors later state 
Terms frequently used to characterize the major 
concern of speech-communication processes were 
"linkage," 'coupling," "transaction," "interaction," 
"message/channel," and "nexus." In the end., most 
conferrees accepted "message" (Kibler & Barker, 
1969, 33). 
This quotation gives the reader a strong feeling of 
a connection, "bridging a gap," the partial unification of 
two separate fields. But a feeling is not a definition, and 
some situations are not clear. Therefore, the following 
definitions will be used in this paper. 
Terms Related to Communication 
Message. A message is first of all a physical event, 
separate from both sender and receiver at some point in 
time (see Cherry, 1966, 7, on "sign"). And it must be the 
result of "sending" or the cause of "receiving" behavior. 
Communicative Behavior. Such behavior is of two types: 
a. Sending. The creation or selection of a message, 
an event intended to alter the behavior of another 
organism in specific ways. 
b. Receiving. The acceptance of a message as coming 
from a "communicative alter (Hymes, 1967, 24), or 
as having been produced by beings more or less 
similar to myself and produced with certain kinds 
of intentions (Searle, 1967, 121). 
Information. The "content" of a message--that which 
can be translated from one medium to another. In statis-
tical communication theory, the information in a signal 
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is the degree to which it reduces uncertainty (Cherry, 1966, 
168-218). 
Completed Communication. Completed communication, 
includes both the intentional sending and the receiving of 
a message. 
Intra-personal and machine "communication" are excluded 
from this usage. They are analagous to, but not the same 
as, the "communicaiion" defined here. 
Classifying Communication-
Direction. The most common method of classifying 
organizational communication is by the formal relationship 
' of those giving and receiving it. Categories used are: 
1. Vertical cornmunication--between superior and sub-
ordinate, which is divided into upward and down-
ward communication; 
2. Horizontal communication--between peers; 
3. Diagonal communication--between a superior and 
the subordinate of someone else. 
The main problem with this form of classification is 
that it requires an organization chart which may be non-
existent or extremely misleading. Secondly, it pays no atten-
tion to the type of message, and message is a key variable 
in the present paper's view of communication. 
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Formal and Informal. A second classification differen-
tiates between "formal" and "informal'i communication. In 
some cases this division seems based on direction also; 
communication between subordinate and superior is assumed 
to be job-related while that between peers is not. In other 
cases it is based on content. However, in a creative and 
unstable situation it would be very difficult for an outsider 
to tell what messages were related to the job and what were 
social. 
Messages. Eilon (1966) writes that 
A fairly comprehensive classification system 
might consist of four <limensions: (1) the kinds 
of messages, (2) the area of activity, (3) the 
importance of messages, and (4) the intent and 
impact of messages (268). 
He develops a system only for the first dimension, the kinds 
of messages. He states 
This dimension is restricted to categorizing 
messages into certain types according to their 
form, and to some extent, according to the way 
in which they are triggered (268-269). 
In Eilon•s system, for each message its type and the 
sender and receiver are noted. This allows a picture of the 
communication structure to emerge from the actual system, 
rather than classifying communication in terms of a pre-
conceived and artificial picture. The classifications are 
as follows (Table I ). 
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TABLE I 
Coding Scheme for Messages 
General coding 







R-1 Time triggered report 
R-2 Event triggered report 
S Statement, following an inquiry 
or event triggered 
C Comment 
Details on data collection and 
processing can be added as follows:* 
1-data from availabie records 
2-ad hoc data collection 
3-routine data processing 
4-ad hoc processing 
I-1 Inquiry covered by standing 
procedures 
I-2 Inquiry about a novel situation 
Q-1 Query about problems covered 
by regular procedures 
Q-2 Query for novel situations, or to 
clarify ambiguities and inconsistencies 
P-1 Proposal about proceduresror 
recurrent events 
P-2 Proposal on an ad-hoc issue 
D-1 Decison on procedures affecting 
recurrent events 
D-2 Decision on ad-hoc issues 
H Meeting, the outcome of which may be any or several messages 
above; if the meeting fails, the result in denoted by o. 
T Telephone d1scussion 
*The particular kind of memorandum may be coded in this way, 
such as S-l, C-3, etc. 
From Eilon, 1966, Table l 
Organizations 
Formal Definition 
Organizations are ••• systems which utilize 
energy (given up by humans and nonhuman devices) 
in a patterned. directed effort to alter the 
conditions of basic materials in a predetermined 
manner (Perrow, 1965, 913). 
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The definition above applies to all forms of social 
organization: the family, the traditional farm, or General 
Motors. We are concerned with those called formal organ-
izations, as defined by Etzioni (1964, 3): 
Organizations are social units (or human 
groupings) deliberately constructed and re-con-
structed to seek specific goals (Parsons, 1960, 
17) ••• Organizations are characterized by: 
1. divisions of labor, power, and communication 
responsibilities which are not random or 
traditionally patterned, but deliberately 
planned to enhance the realization of speci-
fic goals; 
2. the presence of one or more power centers 
which control the concerted efforts of the 
organization and direct them toward its goals . . . 
3. substitution of personnel, ie., unsatisfactory 
persons can be removed and others assigned 
their tasks (1964, 3). 
Organizations are contrasted with other social units 
such as the family by the emphasis on planning and goals. 
But the planned activity,and intended consequences by no 
means exhaust the nature of the formal organization. 
Other activities supplement those formally planned. 
Systems 
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An organization was defined above as a "system." 
That simple term is actually a key to new understandings 
of many social phenomena, including organizations. It 
deserves analysis at length. 
We are drilling·holes in the wall of 
mystery that we call nature and reality in 
many locations, and we carry out delicate 
analyses on each of these sites. But 
it is only now that we are beginning to 
realize the need for connecting the probes 
with one another and gaining some coherent 
insight into what is there (Laszlo, 1972, 4). 
Doctors may still quote the old saw that a 
specialist is one who knows more and more about less and 
less until finally he knows everything about nothing. 
A general practitioner, on the other hand, knows less 
and less about more and more until he knows nothing 
about- everything. According to Laszlo (1972), the 
approach of the specialist has been preferred in western 
scientific thought. Finding reality so diffuse and 
intractable, we have carved out smaller and smaller 
pieces which we have attempted to understand. So, for 
example, in communication, we have a host of studies 
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that place the "best" argument in different places in 
a speech. The studies may be soundly done, but the bits 
of knowledge are unrelated. 
But there is an alternative_approach. 
What, then, is contemporary science doing 
about this? It offers a solution which is 
another simplification of the real states of 
affairs, but one that is more adequate to grasp-
ing their more complex nature: it takes them 
in integrated chunks. Instead of looking at 
one thing at a time, and noting its behavior 
when exposed to one other thing, science now 
looks at a number of different and interacting 
things and notes their behavior as a whole 
under diverse influences (Laszlo, 1972, 6). 
Systems--definition. Hall and Hagen (1956) offer the 
following definition of system: 
A system is a set of objects together with 
relationships between the objects and between 
their attributes (31). 
While this definition is general and vague enough to be 
acceptable to other writers, it leaves several questions 
unanswered. 
The first problem is that of the boundary between 
the system and its environment. The same authors continue: 
For a given system, the environment is the 
set of all objects a change in whose attributes 
affect the system and also those objects whose 
attributes are changed by the behavior of the 
system. The statement above invites the natural 
question of when an object belongs to a system 
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and when it belongs to the environment; for if 
an object reacts with a system in the way described 
above, should it not be considered part of the 
system? The answer is by no means definite 
(Hall & Hagen, 1956, 33). 
Undoubtedly in many cases there are obvious, logical 
places for the boundary to be drawn. Events may cause 
infinitely expanding ripples, but there comes a point at 
which the effects of marry different ripples can be safely 
regarded as chance. Still, many times boundary choices 
will make a difference. For example, it is important 
whether clients, patients, or buyers are considered part 
of the organization or its environment. 
Haas and Drabek (1973, 15-16) suggest that two criteria 
be used to separate the organization and its environment. 
First, interaction within the organization is high in 
frequency and similar in content (14). Also, the organ-
ization controls activity within its boundary (15-16). 
Therefore, a salesman and a purchasing agent are part of 
different systems even though they interact regularly. 
The authors indicate that different_ investigators 
could legitimately locate the boundary in different places 
for their own purposes. 
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A second problem is whether certain non-
physical, conceptual "systems" are to be included in the 
definition. Some writers, such as Rapaport (1968, 453) 
say definitely "yes." 
Others point out that two different types of phenomena 
are involved. Kuhn (1971, 106) uses the terms "pattern" 
systems and "acting" systems--those which maint,ain boundaries 
and steady states etc. He states: 
So for the moment, I am extremely skeptical that 
systems analysis, as such, has, or ever will hav,e, 
anything to contribute to understanding pattern 
systems ••.. A Gregorian chant is a pattern 
system, and so is the theoretical structure of 
neoclassical economics. Again, I doubt if any 
generalizations about the one would be applicable 
to the other (107). 
These distinctions will be maintained in this paper. 
General Systems Theory. The general systems theorists 
are the most general of the generalists. They attempt 
to find and define--mathernatically if possible--structural 
similarities among diverse types of systems. As Litterer 
puts it: 
If mathematics can be said to provide a language 
of science, then General Systems may be viewed 
as providing a skeleton of science. It is concerned 
with those generalities of theory that occur in 
more than one specialized discipline and, in fact, 
may not be able fully to be developed within the 
confines o~ one discipline ••• [e.g. homeostasis]. 
We have a structure, a framework that permits 
us to identify some of the general characteristics 
of a theory in a number of specialized fields 
(1969, x). 
General systems theory develops concepts such as 
the following characteristics of systems: 
1. Inter-relatedness of objects, attributes, 
and events 
2. Who1ism 
3. Goal seeking or return to equilibrium 
4. Regulation 
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a. adjustment--the whole can be re-established 
from its parts 
b. control--fixed arrangements for control, 
usually involving feedback 
c. learning--can make new arrangements 
5. Inputs and outputs--receives from the envir-
onment, must produce something "needed by other 
systems" 
6. Transformation--does not deliver to the envir-
onment what it receives 
7. Heirarchy--made up of sub-systems 
8. Entropy--using up energy, becoming disorganized 
9. Differentiation--open systems tend to become 
more complex 
10. Equifinality--beginning state does not determine 
the outcome (Litterer, 1969, 4-6). 
These items picture a system as an entity actively main-
taining its internal state as well as transforming some 
material received from the environment. 
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Mathematical Models. An important part of the general 
systems approach is the use of mathematical models of the 
system studied. Indeed, Rapaport writes 
The main theme of general systems theory is, 
I believe, the explicit fusion of the mathe-
matical approach with the organismic. The key 
task of general systems theory is to show how 
the organismic aspect of a system emerges from 
the mathematical structure (1968, 457). 
The implication might be that a good theory must be 
cast in mathematical terms. But the author adds 
The mathematical model approach to general 
systems theory has one serious, at times crip-
pling, drawback. To define a system, a much more 
precise specification of entities and relations 
is required than our knowledge usually warrants 
(1968, 456). 
And the 1968 president of the Society for General Systems 
Research is even more generous: 
Perhaps just the idea of systems is powerful 
when it gets across. A large part of the battle 
is getting the concept accepted. It is important 
to educate people to be systems-oriented, even 
if a great deal of theory does not get across, 
just so that they appreciate the interactions 
of members of a system and the environment, and 
to be on the watch for such interactions ~bin, 
1971, 11). 
Apparently, then, we have the blessings of those 
who should know about systems in social science for 
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not running too quickly to attain mathematical elegance. 
We can begin by attempting to conceptualize and define 
the organizational system, its boundaries and environment, 
hoping that further experience and research will lead to 
more sophisticated models. 
Implications for Research and Theory. Miller and 
Rice write: 
An open system [such as a formal organization] 
exists, and can only exist, by the exchange of 
materials with its environment. It imports 
materials, transforms them by means of conversion 
processes, consumes some of the products for 
internal maintenance, and exports the rest. 
Directly or indirectly it exchanges its output 
for further intakes, including further resources 
to maintain itself (1967, 3). 
Therefore, any complete organizational theory must include 
the effects of: (1) In-puts; (2) Transformation processes; 
(3) Organizational maintenance; (3) Out-put, of both 
< 
materials and information. 
However, the use of systems approaches does not mean 
that the researcher can never depart from a vague level 
of wholeness. Miller and Rice (1967) stress the importance 
of relating specific environments and technology to internal 
structures and outputs. 
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Likert takes the wrong approach 
Every aspect of a managerial system is related 
to every other part and interacts with it. 
The results obtained by altering a single variable 
or procedure while keeping all others the same 
usually will yield q1ui te different results from 
those obtained when that variable is changed 
along with simultaneous and compatible changes 
in all other aspects of the management system. 
The true influence of altering one aspect of a 
system cannot be determined by altering it 
alone (1967, 123). 
But these remarks beg the question. If we knew already 
what "compatible" changes would be, there would be no 
need to do research. And if a variable is significant, 
then surely one would expect some change from manipulating 
it alone, though of course interactioneffects could 
affect different combinations of variables. 
The systems approach teaches us to look at the 
inter-relationships among a variety of inter-acting 
entities. In encourages, but does not require, mathe-
matical precision. The wholistic approach does not mean 
that specific and inputs and outputs should net be considered. 
CHAPTER III 
HISTORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
The field variously known as organization 
theory, formal organizations, complex organ-
izations, or organizational behavior is clearly 
a multi-disciplinary endeavor. Organizational 
researchers are apt to be sociologists, psycholo-
gists, operations researchers, engineers, polit-
ical scientists, or economists. Small wonder 
that the field is deluged with publications 
applying or advancing theories differing in 
scope and employing a variety of methodologies. 
Such diversity can be a distinct advantage if 
it contributes to the cumulative growth of know-
ledge. It can, on the other hand, be a decided 
disadvantage if organizational researchers talk 
past one another because of a tendency to become 
primarily committed to a par~icular theory or 
methodology (Evan, 1971, l). -
Need for Review 
Wm.le the present paper is devoted to presenting the 
implications for organizational communication of one general 
approach to organizations, this view must be set in the 
framework of other schools of thought. Chapter III provides 
a broad historical review of various approaches, while the 
final chapter includes a more specific critique and comparison 
of the technologi9al-epvi~onmental approach. 
The attempt to define and isolate "approaches" is 
mind-bending, and clearly indicates the chaotic state 
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of the field pointed out by Evan (above). Perrow (1972), 
for example, defines four approaches; Haas and Drabek 
(1973), eight; Scott (1967, 410), three; Sofer {1972), 
ten; Zwerman {1970, 2), only two which are "dominant." 
Problems arise because of the currents, cross-currents, 
eddies, and marshy edges of the stream of thought. It is 
not clear who is to be included, or even where those who are 
clearly contributors belong. The present arrangement 
aims to present some of the historical developments while 
making no pretense of exhaustiveness or perfect logic. 
Writers are divided into two broad groups: The detached 
scientists, who look at organizations from the windows of 
their ivory towers; and the practical, involved management 




The earliest writers on organizations are the founders 
of the "classical management" school. Their writings 
involve both descriptions and prescriptions based on exper-
ience with firms. Their work is often criticized for its 
lack of scientific base and mixture of value and fact. 
Yet as Perrow writes 
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These principles have worked and are still working, 
for they addressed themselves to very real problems 
of management, problems more pressing than those 
advanced by social science (1972, 62). 
Principles. Examples of "classical" principles rele-
vant to communication are given below: 
1. Division of work. (Permits of reduction in 
the number of objects to which attention and effort 
must be directed and has been recognized as the 
best means of making use of individuals and of 
groups of people (20). 
4. Unity of Command. For any action whatsoever, 
an employee should receive orders from one super-
ior only_ •... (24) (Fayol, 1949, from Massie, 1965). 
Classical management theory continues to be a major 
influence both on organizational practice and theory. Koontz 
(1961) places Classical Management theory first in his list 
of six approaches to the study of organizations: 
1. Management process or "classical" 
2. Empirical or case studies 
3. Human behavior or human relations 
4. Social system 
5. Decision theory 
6. Mathematical approaches. 
As Urwick (197~) and others have pointed out, classical 
principles have grown from the experience of working managers. 
Even Stephenson {1968, 83) grants that the knowledge provided 
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by classical management theory is more practical than that 
of the relatively undeveloped social science approach. 
Criticisms. However, Stephenson repeats and affirms 
the two charges most often made against the principles 
promoted by classical management: (1) that they are unclear 
and undefined; and (2) that they are pro-management. 
Urwick (1971) replies that the sin of unclarity falls on the 
heads of the behavioral scientists, with the additions of 
impracticality and an almost willful failure to understand 
the writings of the classicists. 
For example, he explains that the term "organization" 
' 
is used by the classical writers in a ·special sa1ss The 
writers were not unaware of the human factor, but chose 
to concentrate on structure (6). He explains the special 
usage: 
Previous writers on management when they 
used the word "organization" were not writing about 
institutions as a whole or human group behaviour 
at large. They were writing about a special 
aspect of that behavior--the need in any human 
system of cooperation, if unity of action is to 
be maintaine~ for a timely and unambiguous system 
of official communication. That is what organization 
in the technical meaning of that term is about. 
Individuals cannot collaborate unless tpey know 
precisely what is expected of them by the insti-
tution (ll). 
While this statement implies a view of human nature and 
inter-personal cooperation probably unacceptable to many 
other writers, it does clarify the terminology. It seems 
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likely that the confusion over "clarity" is also a semantic 
one. The principles of classical management are intended 
to be clear to the manager faced with a decision. They 
need not be operationalizable for the purpose of scientific 
measurement. Behavioral scien~e concepts, on the other 
hand, while measurable, may be unclear in their implications 
for practice. 
As to the charge that the principles are pro-manage-
ment and anti-worker, Koontz replies that the concepts 
of "good management" are supposed to prevent the kinds of 
frustration and inefficiency which the human relations 
writers attack (1961, 185). Apparently, Koontz would 
accept changes in the principles if experience or practical 
research showed them to be inefficient or psychologically 
harmful to the employees. 
A newer and more serious criticism of the classieist's 
principles comes from some further research--that is, in 
some cases, they simply don't work. Woodward's {1965) 
study was begun to show the efficacy of "good management" 
for organizational success. The researchers not only 
found that many successful organizations did not follow 
classical principles, but that in some instances classical 
principles led to failure. Only when she considered 
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the type of technology involved was she able to make sense 
of her data. The classical organization led to success 
in firms dealing with mass-produced products, and not 
in others. 
Future. Classical management continues to be taught 
and to be useful to the working manager. However, we can 
expect that its principles, like those of classical rhetoric, 
will be refined, supplemented, and limited by the results 
of empirical investigation. 
Scientific Management 
Strong criticism of the classical approach came 
from a recognized giant in the field, Frederick Taylor. 
Zaleznik writes, "No single figure in the history of 
industrialization did more to affect the role of the manager 
than Taylor {1970, ix)." 
"Scientific" management is usually identified with 
time-and-motion study, the use of planning rather than 
rule-of-thumb methods, and close supervision of the worker's 
time and task. Taylor, however, was most insistent that 
scientific management not be confused with such "details." 
He said his system, it its essence, was 
First. The development of a true science. 
Second. The scientific selection of the workman. 
Third. His scientific education and development. 
Fourth. Intimate friendly cooperation between 
the management and the men (1911, 130). 
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Taylor's approach flew in the face of comfortable, 
established ways of doing things, and gave new promin-
ence to th~ engineer and technician over the benevolently 
', _, 
or autocratically paternal manager. He envisioned what 
many feel has now happened--arbitrariness would be taken 
out of the authority system because of the technical re-
quirements of the work. For example, he said that work 
should be assigned as follows: 
The work of every workman is fully planned out 
by the management at least one day-in advance 
and. each man receives in most cases complete 
written instructions, describing in detail the 
task which he is to accomplish, as well as the 
means to be used in the work (1911, 39). 
Taylor is often criticized for his lack of under-
standing of informal work groups. However, his understanding 
of output restriction is as clear as anything to come out 
of the human relations studies. In fact, he even gives 
the workers credit for rationality, though he says restriction 
is not rational--and doesn't occur--under scientific management. 
He discusses two types of "soldiering." The first, natural 
soldiering, is simply a tendency to "take it easy." 
The second somes "from more indirect second- thought and 
reasoning caused by their relations with other men, which 
may be called systematic soldiering (1911, 19)". It is based 
on the following ideas: 
1. That working harder would put other men 
out of work 
2. That they are not rewarded for faster pro-
duction 
3. The use of "rule of thumb" methods (1911:, 19). 
He needed no further analysis, because his system 
involved breaking down each job so that it could be done 
by one individual. His major omission was ignoring 
jobs ~hat required cooperation. Even at the executive 
level, he seems to have felt that coordination whould 
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be taken care of by individual use of "scientific" methods. 
The manager was to be an expert on work methods and a 
planner of tasks rather than a leader of men. One of 
Taylor's famous dicta was "In the past the man has been 
first; in the future the system must be first (1911:, 7)." 
Human Relations 
Mayo. Elton Mayo would emphatically disagree. 
Actually, the human relations school came out of the same 
background as scientific management. By the mid-twenties, 
there was a body of research regarding fatigue, monotony, 
personnel selection, and similar matters of work psychology 
(Sofer, 1972, chapter 3). The famous Hawthorne studies 
(Roethlisberger and Dickson:, 1947) grew directly out of 
this kind of concern. A study had been made; varying the 
amounts of illumination in a work room. Production had 
increased with the improved lighting. It also increased 
in a control room where the lighting wasn't changed. 
Of course, this result was later made famous as the 
"Hawthorne effect." But at that time, the researchers 
were simply puzzled. 
The Hawthorne studies are really two things--the 
studies themselves, and the myth. An excellent critique 
of MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER as a research monograph is 
found in Landsberger (1958). He points out that most of 
the conclusions reported are tentative and that negative 
data is provided to allow the reader to draw his own 
conclusions. 
But it was the myth of the studies, both praised 
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and attacked, that most affected the literature. Mayo 
analyzes the increase in production in the "relay assembly 
test room" as follows: 
The improvement in production ••. is not very 
directly related to the rest-pauses and other 
innovations. It reflects rather a freer and 
more pleasant working environment, a supervisor 
who is not regarded as a "boss," a,"higher morale" 
(Mayo, 1933, 78). 
From this beginning developed the characteristics 
which still predominate in the "human relations" school. 
They include: 
1. An emphasis on the interpersonal skills of the 
supervisor, and training methods to improve them; 
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2. An interest in morale and sentiments on the job, 
and attempts to relate, them to production; 
3. Concentration on the individual or small group, 
less interest in structural and extra-organiza-
tional factors. 
I.ewin. Another.major source for this school was the 
work of Kurt Lewin. Lewin had a broad influence in many 
areas of psychology. While his primary interest was the 
group and the individual's psychological "field," many 
students of organizations, particularly those who became 
involved in the National Training Laboratory, followed his 
ideas. 
I.ewin did many classic studies dealing with the 
formation and effects of leadership in experimental groups. 
He also believed that research could be done in existing 
groups by working with them in a practical, helpful manner. 
Sofer comments 
It is to Lewin and his colleagues that we 
owe the notion of action research, that is, 
the notion of the social scientist as an 
active colleague with administrators in 
planned social change, learning about the char-
acter of social situations by trying to change 
them (1972, 87). 
I.eadership Studies. One major area of study in the 
human relations school·has been that of le~dership. Several 
groups have, in one way or another, broken leadership into 
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two factors--one having to do with structuring the activ-
ities of the subordinate, and one having to do with inter-
personal skills (Stogdill & C,oons, 1957; Katz, Maccoby, 
& Morse, 1950). However, a review by Korman concluded: 
[I]t seems apparent that very little is now 
known as to how these variables rray predict 
work-group performance and the conditions which 
affect such predictions. At the current time, 
we cannot even say whether they have any pre-
dictive significance at all (1966, 361). 
More elaborate theories have attempted to relate 
the characteristics of the leader to tme of the situa-
tion in which he is attempting to lead. Foremost among these 
writers is Fred Fiedler (1967; .¥itchell, Biglan, Oncken, 
& Fiedler, 1970). He indicates that the "climate"--favorable 
or unfavorable to the leader--determines what leadership 
style, a structured or an inter-personally oriented one, 
is most effective. 
Another writer who uses a two-factor theory is Blake. 
In his theory, every organization can be placed on a grid 
defined by the two axes of concern for people and concern 
for production. The ideal firm is very high on both factors. 
He also claims that organizations which he has worked with 
are not only more pleasant but more profitable. This 
theory concentrates on attitudes rather transtructural 
or group variables (Blake & Mouton, 1965). 
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McGregor. Doug McGregor was concerned with leader-
ship and the role of management, but also with thefi.rm 
as a whole. He presented two theories under which- firms 
operates, which he called "Theory X" and "Theory Y." 
"Theory X"seemed to include the assumptions of classical 
and scientific management. 
(1) The average human being has an inherent 
dislike of work and will avoid it if he can .• 
(2) Because of this human characteristic of 
dislike of work, most people must be coerced, 
controlled, directed, threatened with 
punishment to get them to put forth ade-
quate effort toward the achievement of 
organizational objectives. 
(3) The average human being prefers to be directed, 
wishes to avoid responsibility, has rel-
atively little ambition, wants security 
above all (1960, 33-35). 
. . 
"'I'heory Y" was the basis of the new human relations or 
human resources approach: 
(1) The expenditure of physical and mental effort 
in work is as natural as play or rest. 
(2) External control and the threat of punish-
ment are not the only means of bringing 
about effort toward organizational objectives. 
Men will exercise self-direction and self-
control in the service of objectives to 
which he is committed. 
(3) Commitment to objectives is a function of the 
rewards associated with their achievement. 
(4) The average human being learns, under proper 
conditions, not only to accept but to 
seek responsibility. 
(5) The capacity to exercise a relatively high 
degree of imagination, ingenuity, and 
creativity in the solution of organizational 
problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed 
in the population. 
(6) Under the conditions of modern industrial 
life, the intellectual potentialities of 
of the average human being are only par-
tiaily utilized (47-48). 
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Likert. Rensis Likert modifies the Theory X-Theory 
Y pattern four systems: 
(1) the exploit.:Ltive authoritative; 
(2) the benevolent authoritative, 
(3) the consultative, and 
(4) the participative group (1961, 223). 
He places great stress on supportive leadership 
(1967, 47). Apparently he feels that such supervision 
can be best given in the "participative" structure. 
Likert•s work does not allow for differences in the pref-
erences of the worker or in the work to be done (Perrow, 
1972, 122-138). 
Argyris. Chris Argyris has written on a wide 
variety of topics concerned with organizations and organi-
zational change. Much of his work is directed to making 
organizations more "human," allowing the employee to 
develop and use his full potential. He would aim to 
create what he calls the "organic" organization, which 
is characterized by decentralization of dec-
ision-making; an emphasis on mutual dependence 
and cooperation based on trust, confidence, and 
high technical or professional competence; a 
constant pressure to enlarge tasks and interre-
late them so that the concern for the whole is 
emphasized; the decentralization of responsiblity 
for, and the use of, information, rewards, and 
penalties; the responsibility of participants 
at all levels for developing and maintaining 
loyalty and commitment at as high a level as 
possible; and an emphasis on status through 
intergroup and interindividual cooperation 
(1968, 317). 
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However, Argyris, unlike Likert, admits that this 
organization is not the only effective type. Its usefulness 
from his point of view seems to depend on the maturity 
of the workers, whether they are dependant or self-directed. 
Frederick Herzberg. Herzberg takes a somewhat different 
approach to problems of morale and job satisfaction, con-
centrating on the contents of the individual job. His 
theory states that kinds of things affect worker atti-
tudes. 
The first group he calls "dissatisfiers," which 
include "company policy and administration, supervision, 
salary, interpersonal relations, and working conditions 
(1966, 74) ·" 
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Job satisfaction comes from the other group of var-
iables, including "achievement recognition, work itself, 
responsibility, and advancementr(72)." He seems to agree 
with McGregor that people will not only accept but welcome 
responsibility and risk. 
Therefore,the solution to morale problems iis not to 
provide more bowling leagues or a kin~er supervisor, but 
to give opportunities for meaningful work and advancement. 
This process is'sometimes called job enlargement or job 
enrichment. 
Tannenbaum. Tannenbaum is like other human rela-
tions writers in his interest in individual fulfillment. 
But he is centrally concerned with the amount of control 
in organizations. 
His study indicates that the use of participative 
management can increase the total power or control in an 
organization. That is, the situation is a non-zero-sum 
game, where all can win. And, further, when the structure 
is opened up and the control increased, productivity 
increases as well (1966, 91-97). 
60 
In contrast to the writers discussed above who set 
out to improve the efficiency of organizations or the lives 
of their members, there are those, primarily sociologists, 
who study organizations more with the object of understand-
ing them than improving them. 
The Detached View 
There are, of course, many criticisms of the authors 
discussed above. But those to be discussed next would center 
their objections on one made by Charles Perrow: 
One cannot explain organizations by explaining 
the attitudes and behavior of individuals or 
even small groups within them. We learn a 
great deal about psychology and social psych-
ology but little about organizations per se 
in this fashion (1972, 143). 
Weber and His Followers 
Max Weber. The originator of work in this area was 
the German sociologist~ Max Weber. Weber was concerned with 
changes in the entire nature of society over prolonged 
periods of years. He saw the development of bureaucracy 
as one major historical trend. 
He explained what he meant by "bureaucracy" by con-
struction of an "ideal type." And that has led to a tre-
mendous amount of argument as to what relationship this 
concept has, or is supposed to have, to actual organizatbnal 
reality. Yet the very arguments indicate that Weber's 
approach not only intuitively "makes sense" but is a 
useful tool for analysis. 
After careful examination, Rogers (1969) describes 
the ''Ideal Type" as: 
a utopian construct -which is primarily rational 
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and abstract. It is normatively ideal, therefore 
in its conceptual purity it cannot be found empir~ 
ically anywhere in reality. While it does not 
describe a concrete course of action, it does 
describe an "objectively possible" course of action. 
Thus it contains the logical requirements of the 
relevant frame of reference, all the necessary 
properties or features of a concrete act or complex 
of action ( 91) . 
Weber himself explains one use of the-Ideal Type: 
"We can make the characteristic features of the relation-
ship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference 
to an ideal type (1969, 17). 
His ideal type of bureaucracy has the following 
characteristics: 
1. Organization bound by rules 
2. Division of labor and authority 
3. Heirarchy 
4. Roles and norms for each office--holders qualified 
technically rather than by heredity, age etc. 
5. Separation of administration and ownership -- --
6. No rights to a given position--interchangeability 
of personnel 
7.. Use of writing for orders, decisions, rules 
(Weber, 1957, 330-332). 
This model implies a very formal kind of communication, 
largely written rather than oral, and largely downward. 
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Rules and orders are promulgated from the centers of author-
ity and obeyed by those below. The necessity for writing 
implies slow and deliberate action, and the requirement that 
selection of personnel be made impersonally implies that 
communication must be similarly unemotional. 
Weber was largely neglected until the 1940's, when 
his work was translated by Talcott Parsons, himself a 
major figure. Mouzelis (1967) sums up the criticisms 
and positive factors of Weber's approach--putting him 
together with Marx in a group he calls the "classical" 
writers. 
1. The writing shows all-inclusiveness. 
The organization is placed in the general 
social structure. 
2. There is an awareness of differences between 
saying and doing, the formal and informal. 
3. Tfilere is concern for impact on the indivi-
dual's freedom and personality. 
4. The work lacks rigor and precision "which 
is achieved by a more limited and less 
ambitious investigation." 
5. "[T]hey seem to formulate oversweeping 
generalizations which are clearly half-
truths (in the sense that they are only 
valid under certain conditions which remain 
unspecified by classical theory" (35-37). 
The Neo-Weberians. Several divergent groups start 
from Weber. The most consciously identified with him are 
the neo-Weberians. These writers emphasize the bureaucratic 
model as the most important, but not the only, system of 
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production in modern society. They view organizations 
as socio-technical systems, and stress the importance of the 
type of work being done. The pure bureaucracy is best for 
dealing with routine, predictable events. This view will 
be thoroughly discussed in the body of this dissertation, 
under the topic of "Technology." 
The Decision-Making School 
The writers of this school such as Herbert Simon 
and James March are social psychologists. They 
are placed here because they share the detached view, and 
because Perrow, a self-proclaimed neo-Weberian, has adopted 
them (1972, 145-158). 
These writers concentrate on the making of decisions 
in organizations. There are two aspects to this problem: 
1. The individual, and organizational constraints 
on his decisions, and 
2. The division of decision-making in the organi-
zation as a whole. 
The Individual Decision-maker. Weber places great 
emphasis on the role of authority in the organization. 
The bureaucracy is governed by "rat:ional-legal" authority, 
that is recognized as legitimate because it is part of a 
system both superior and subordinate recognize as right 
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and proper. The decision-making school discusses restraints 
caused not by the giving of orders, but by the nature of 
the organization itself. 
In some models of man, the decision-maker is presumed 
to know all the possible outcomes of his choices, and to 
rationally select the one best suited to his purposes, or 
most satisfying to him personally (Taylor, 1965). As opposed 
' 
to this model, Simon (1951, 1960) introduced the concept 
of "satisficing," or limited rationality. 
Satisficing involves not selecting the very best 
alternative, but one that is adequate, or satisfactory. 
The satisficing solution fills the minimum criteria for the 
decision, and involves only a limited search along largely 
predetermined lines. 
What most concerns us here is that it is the organi-
zation that largely determines the criteria and indicates 
the paths of search. This may be done formally, but more 
commonly it is a matter of 
1. History, or trying what worked before; 
2. Vocabulary, or defining the nature of the problem; 
3. Socialization, or the decision-maker has adopted 
the organizational way of seeing things. 
These factors provide considerable control without calling 
for a great deal in the way of orders and authority. 
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Organizational Decision-Making. Like other aspects 
of organizational work, decision-making must be divided 
among organizational sectors. Compatability of decisions 
reached is partially assured by the kinds of individual 
constraints discussed above. However, further problems 
are bound to arise as the different sub-units see the situation 
from a different view-point, and have their own interests 
at stake. As Feldman and Kanter write 
The most complex models of organization decision 
making view the organization as a coalition of 
groups, each with its own goals. Because these 
~oals are not always compatible, aL.major organ-
izational concern is conflict (1965, 641). 
Natural Systems 
Parsons. Branching off Weber's thought in another 
direction are the "natural system" theorists. Foremost 
among these is Talcott parsons, who was mentioned as 
Weber's translator. Parsons shares with Weber a concern 
for the structure of the society as a whole, and classi-
fies organizations by the function they serve for society. 
He lists the following grrupinga: 
1. Economic--business 
2. Political--allocation of power. E.G. some banks 
3. Integrative--arts and laws, political parties 
4. Pattern maintenance--schools and churches 
(1960, 45-46). 
It is difficult to tell where to place different 
organizations in this scheme, and hard to tell what is 
known about them when they are placed. It is hard 
to see how banks are primarily political while polit-
ical parties are not. It is, however, clear what he 
is attempting to set up--a typology of how certain 
functions are performed for the society. He writes 
An organization is a system which, as the 
attainment of its goal, 'produces' an ident-
ifiable something which can be utilized in some 
way by another system; That is, the output 
of the organization is,for some other system, 
an input (1960, 17). 
Mouzelis (1967, 155) criticizes Parsons on the 
grounds that his emphasis on the inter-relationships 
and complementary functions of organizations and the 
integrative effects of values ignores the problems of 
conflict and individual freedom. These criticisms 
could probably also be applied at other natural system 
writers. 
Blau. One writer who has shown some interest in 
communication from a natural system perspective is 
Peter Blau. Th.IB author began his career with a study 
of the Internal Revenue Service (1955). By the formal 
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bureaucratic rules, the men working in the office he 
observed were not supposed _to consult each other about 
problems in their work. In fact, such consultation 
took place regularly, and the communication formed 
a system that could be identified and described. 
His description was in terms of what he called 
"exchange theory." In this view, one must give "social 
Valle such as prestige or deference in return for values 
such as time and advice received. His later works have 
also dealt with unintended consequences of social system 
characteristics. However, he also has begun to consider 
the effects of teclmology and the nature of work done 
on organizational structure (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). 
Blau, along with Scott {1962) also proposes a 
typology or classi£ication system for organizations. 
This is based on who benefits ,from the activities of the 
organization. The types are as follows: 
1. The members or rank and file membership--
mutual benefit associations; 
2. The owners or managers of the organization--
business concerns; 
3. The clients or, more generally, the "public-
in contact," which means the people who are 
technically "outside" the organization 
yet have regular, direct contact with it, 
under whatever label--patient, customer, 
••• prisoner, enemy soldier, student--
service organization; 
4. The public-at-large--commonweal organizations 
(42-43). 
, 
This classification is not specifically integrated 
into the exchange framework. Also, it does not seem, 
on the surface, promising for explaining many differences 
among organizations. The authors claim: 
Government regulations, notably the extreme 
case of nationalization of industry, might 
succeed in making the public-at-large the prime 
beneficiary of a business concern ••• Whether 
such shifts in prime beneficiary are evaluated as 
advantageous or disadvantageous depends on one's 
ideolog~cal position, but there is no doubt that 
they would constitute fundamental transformations 
of business concerns into distinctly different 
types of organizations (1962, 44). 
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But would a nationalized railroad be so completely 
different from one run by "private enterprise?" Experience 
seems to show that they face the same problems. And many 
other government agencies serve specific groups--Veterans, 
the elderly, Indians, the poor--rather than the "public-at-
large." 
Stress and Strain. Haas and Drabek (1973) offer a 
variation on the natural system perspective which they call 
the "stress and strain" view. This is supposed to combine 
cooperative and competitive approaches to the organization 
into a single viewpoint, which would be a ~seful addition 
to this perspective. However, though they present interesting 
analogies and give examples, they do not explain how the 
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researcher- is to diagnose the stresses before they cause 
strain. They claim to be trying to keep their factors in an 
organizational, rather than a psychological frame of ref-
erence) yet a "stress" seems to be essentially a matter of 
negative attitudes between members of different departments. 
Institutional School. Certain writers concerned with 
the organization as a natural system and the unintended 
consequences of decisions are known as the institutional 
school. The writers of this group emphasize the history 
of the organization, view it as a growing--or declining--
whole, and study people's sentiments within the structure 
and toward the institution. 
A leader in the school, Philip Selznick, showed how the 
Tennessee Valley Authority deviated from its officially 
established goals, "bargaining off" some to accomplish others 
(1949). 
Perrow states 
Of all the schools of thought ••• the institu-
tional school is the closee:.to a truly sociolo~ 
gical view of organizations. It combines much 
of the best, and some of the worst, of sociology 
as it exis~ed in the 1950's and the 1960's (1972, 
177). 
Perrow praises the emphasis on the organization as a whole, 
the "expos~" tradition, and the indications that there are a 
variety of organizational types. He criticizes the 
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insignificance of the organizations often studied and the 
"moral ambiguity" of functionalism (also Wollin., 1960). 
The institutional approach lacks implications for the study 
of communication. 
Etzioni. Another important figure in the field of 
organizat:ional sociology is Amitai Etzioni. His books, both 
those he has written and those he has edited (1964., 1968, 
1969) have done much to shape and focus the field. While 
he, too, is indebted to Parsons and the natural systems 
approach, he has his own approach and classification for 
organizations. This is based on the type of pewer used for 
control, and its results. The more coercive the type of 
power, the more alienated are the lower-level participants. 
This approach allows him to pay more attention to 
conflict than many natural system theorists. Also, he 
can operationalize and apply his definition more consistently 
than either Parsons or Blau and Scott. However, his classi-
fication still may not say much about other aspects of the 
organization. 
Classifications. In considering the usefulness of 
classification systems, mention should be made of a study 
by Hall, Haas, and Johnson (1967). These authors classified 
organizations by both the Etzioni and the Blau and Scott 
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typologies. They found that not only were the classifi-
cations difficult to apply unambiguously in practice, but 
that organizations classified together did not seem to 
have other important characteristics in common. 
Ecological Psychology 
A promising approach that is difficult to classify 
is that of ecological psychology. This field is based on 
the study of the "behavior setting." The behavior setting 
is a physical-social-psychological concept, consisting of 
a space-time location, physical objects, and a standing 
pattern of behavior. A baseball game, with a field, bats 
and balls, and rules, is an excellent example of a behavior 
setting. To predict what will occur, the researcher must 
understand the game, not just the previous actions of the 
players (Barker, 1968). 
The study most relevant to the study of organizations 
is BIG SCHOOL, SMALL SCHOOL (Barker & Gump, 1964). This 
study showed that the "lDig school" had proportionately 
fewer extra-curricular behavior settings than the small 
ones. Among other consequences, this led to the students 
in the small school receiving more communications urging 
them to take part in activities, a difference that was 
particularly noticeable for the poor or marginal student 
(Willems, 1964) • 
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The analysis of behavior settings could help provide 
clues to some of the puzzling problems of organizational 
structure, such as the inconsistent effects of over-a11, 
increase in organizational size. Further, understanding 
the standing patterns of behavior, the social "rules", 
so to speak, could give insights into communication behavior. 
Other Approaches 
There is other material related to the study of organi-
zations. One is the general systems approach discussed in 
<: 
Chapter II. Other areas of study, such as attitudes, con-
formity, obedience, persuasion, and obedience, are relevant 
to particular issues,(Sofer, 1972). Those discussed above 
trace the main lines of thought in this area and provide 
the context in which the present theory is offered. 
PART II: SOCIO-TECHNICAL WRITERS 
Is there a convergence? 
According to Hickson (1966), most writers are 
already saying the same thing about organizational 
technology and structure. Quarrels among the major 
writers are either semantic or denominational, such 
as sociologists vs. management writers vs. social 
psychologists. Page ii is a shortened version of his 
summary. 
There is a certain attractiveness to Hickson's 
formulation, but he has done some straining to create 
it. He states that "Theory has converged upon the 
specificity (or precision) of role prescription and its 
obverse, the range of il.egitimate discretion (225)." 
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But some of the writers consider this cause, some delib-
erate effect, and others, a by-product of attitudes held 
by members. 
Remember that an organization is a system which takes 
in material from the environment, subjects it to processing 
ald then returns it -to environment. Most writers are 
concerned with the predictibility or certainty of this 
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some see it in the environment, some in the organization's 
understanding of the materials, ana some in the clarity 
of the organizational goal. 
The importance of these differences for the study 
of communication are clear. In each case the question 
of uncertainty is a matter of information, and is, there-
fore, at least partly one of communication. 
These controversies will be considered in the follow-
ing section. Perrow (1970) writes: 
Structure, technology, environment, goals--
these are the concepts that have been stressed 
in this book. Leadership, interpersonal relations, 
morale, productivity--these concepts have not 
been stressed (175). 
The following three chapters are organized around the rela-
tionship of three of Perrow•s concerns--technology, environ-
ment, and goals--to the fourth concern of structure. 
CHAPTER IV 
TECHNOLOGY 
Since an organization is a system that transforms 
materials, it seems logical to begin with the study of 
organizational technology. 
' Definition and Classification of Technology 
Definition 
In a broad sense, all writers agree that technology 
is what turns input into output. But within that frame-
work there is disagreement and confusion. 
In general terms, Harvey states 
By organizational technology is meant the mech-
anisms or processes by which an-organization 
turns out its product or service. Organizational 
structure refers to properties essentially internal 
to an organization, such as levels of authority, 
as contrasted with essentially external or "setting" 
factors, such as an organization's location or 
environment (1968, 247). 
Hetzler (1969) writes that "techniques, tools, and 
machines are the sum and substance of technology" (161), 
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but "techniques are purely social (163). '' In contrast, 
Trist et. al.(1963, 48) consider the "technology" to be 
only the equipment. 
Litterer seems to share Hetzler's emphasis of social 
knowledge, but he adds a second kind. 
We define technology as knowledge of 
how to do something. Managerial decisions to 
divide or specialize work depends on a knowledge 
of this as a possibility and also a knowledge 
of the various ways work can be divided. Therefore, 
with this definition, managerial decisions are 
also technology. In the very broadest terms, 
then, the organization can be conceived of as 
an entity that comes from two fundamental inputs, 
one social and one technical, leading to the 
current practice of analyzing organizations as 
socio-technical systems (27). 
However, Litterer later departs from the definition 
of managerial knowledge as part of technology. He lists 
three inputs for organizations: (l) "technology . 
engineering and scientific knowledge of how a thing can be 
done," (2) the managerial system, "a knowledge of structure 
and process to guide workers in collective effort," and 
(3) membership (27-28). He specifically excludes machinery 
as an input, stating that it is rathe~ 
"the culmination of social and technological inputs (27)." 
But most writers seem to agree that technology includes 
both knowledge and the equipment to carry it out. A car 
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is of no use to the person who does not know how to drive 
it. On the other hand, the most skillecr machinist would 
be no better off than a complete novice after a plane crash, 
stranded in a jungle without his tools. And knowledge 
of the complex tasks carried out in organizations must be 
shared, or social. 
Different formulations of this idea give some insights 
into what is meant. For example, Blauner writes 
Technology refers to the complex of physical 
objects and technical operations (both manual 
and machine) regularly employed in turning out 
the goods and services produced by industry. 
Technology signifies primarily the machine system, 
the level and type of mechanization, but also 
includes the technical "know-how" and mechanical 
skills involved in production (1964, 6). 
Perrow (1970, 1972, 1965), who is concerned with social 
service agencies as well as businesses, emphasizes the role 
of knowledge rather than that of tools. 
The present paper takes the position that the tools 
of all kinds--including medication, typewriters, and pencils 
as well as machinery--and the knowledge of their use are 
inseparable, and both are equally important parts of tech-
nology. 
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Classifications of Technology 
Classifications of technology vary with the defi-
nitions used. That is, some writers emphasize the machinery, 
others the "know-how," and others the nature of the cooper-
ation. A few writers stress the material processed rather 
than the process itself. 
Knowledge. The primary exponent of the view that 
emphasizes technical knowledge is Charles Perrow, and he 
also offers the most refined classification. He uses two 
dimensions, the number of exceptions to ordinary procedure, 
and the analyzability of the search for a way to deal with 















Roui;.i.Re - -- Engineering -
(1972, 78) 
He further comments 
Note, that if one were discussing only 
routine and nonroutine companies or bureaucratic 
and nonbureaucratic structures, only cells 4 
and 2 would be relevant. These are represented 
by a two-dimensional continuum characterized 
by a broken line ••• However, organizations 
can fall into the categories represented by 
cells 1 and 3 (78). 
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Mechanical Process. Rackham and Woodwa'rd { 1970, 33) 
criticize Perrow because "he classifies technology in terms 
that are themselves social." They prefer a classification 
on the basis of "variety" rather than "exception" {35). 
However, they found variety quite difficult to define. 
They found it impossible to define a "product" satisfactorily 
so that a researcher could count different ones. For example, 
two writers from the same group (Reeves and Turner, 1970) 
studied a factory which made suits to order. Each suit was, 
in fact, slightly different--not only in measurements but 
in style and usually fabric. But these differences could be 
accomodated in a mass-production framework. Other firms 
presented other problems in defining a product. 
Harvey (1968, 252) used a measure of "technical 
diffuseness" which was based on the number of product changes 
in a firm in ten years. This measure correlated .94 with 
the average number of different products produced during the 
ten years. He included only "major" changes, which he defined 
as those that involved some re-tooling, and a change in material 
or design and purpose. It seems that this definition would 
require subjective judgment, and considerable knowledge of the 
technical process itself. 
Woodward's earlier scale (1965) was based on the 
relative "sophistication" of the technology in use. This 
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scale (Table II ) had 12 classifications. Ho-wever, thei~_work,'. 
and that of those following them, has concentrated on three 
broad categories: nit or small-batch production, large-
batch or mass production, and continuous-flow production. 
I 
·-· While.the broad categories-are certainiy useful for 
a rough placement of firms, the variable of "technical soph-
istication" is not clear. The question remains, as to what part 
' . 
_of _1;-!le . syst_em _ ts __ sopr1:is~icated--the men or_ the mactiinas_ •. 
Woodward's group has also begun to use another type 
of classification which should be of particular interest to 
students of communication. After more intensive study of 
batch production, Reeves and Turner (1970) began to focus 
their concept of such firms around the unavailability of 
complete information. In such a firm "techniques must be found 
for planning and control without collecting all the infor-
mation necessary to describe the situation (95)." 
Social Classification. Members of the so-called 
Aston group, from the :uni-vers±ty at Aston, Great Britain, 
which tends to minimize the importance of technology, never-
theless has developed an interesting system of classification, 















(TOTAL FIRMS = 92) 
I I 
Woodward, 1965, p. 38 
TABLE II 
NUMB!R 
OF FIRMS PRODUCTION SYSTEM NUMBER PRODUCTION lNGINURINO OF FIRMS CLASSIFICATION 
PRODUCTION OF UNITS TO CUSTOMERS'REQUIREMLNTS 
II PRODUCTION OF PROTOTYPES 
' 
_Ill_ FABRICATION OF _LARGE EQUIPMENTS _IN STAGES ___ _ 
IV PRODUCTION OF SMALL BATCHES TO CUSTOMERS' 
ORDERS 
V PRODUCTION OF LARGE BATCHES 
VI PRODUCTION OF LARGE BATCHES ON ASSEMBLY LINES 
VII MASS PRODUCTION 
-- __ .. _____ --- ----- -------· ----------- ------
VIII INTERMITTENT PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS 
IN MULTI PURPOSE PLANT 
IX CONTINUOUS FLOW PRODUCTION OF LIQUIDS, GASES. 
Et CRYSTALLINE SUBSTANCES 
X PRODUCTION OF STANDARDIZED COMPONENTS IN LARGE BATCHES 






XI PROCESS PRODUCTION OF CRYS~ALLINE SUBSTANCES, SUBSEQUENTLY 
PREPARED FOR SALE BY STANDARDIZED PRODUCTION METHODS 
I I I I I 




Hinings & Turner (1968) developed four factors from a study 






Structuring of activities--standardization, 
specia11zation, and formalization; 
concentration of authority; . 
Line control of workf1ow--as opposed to impersonal 
control; 
Supportive component--clerks etc. (85-87). 
In a more theoretical vein, Thompson (1967) classifies 
types of internal interdependence as 
1. Pooled--like two independent branches; 
2. Sequential--A precedes B; 
3. Reciproca1--like maintenance and operations{54-55). 
He also has a broad, over-all view of technology, 
classifying organizations as 
1. Long-linked, e.g. an assembly-line 
2. Mediating, e.g. banks, insurance companies, and 
3. Intensive,e.g. hospitals, military teams, custom 
work. · 
While this concept has some interest:ingpoints, many organ-
izations could not be included. Also, it gives no means to 
compare, for example, one bank with another. Essentially, 
Thompson is taking a broad view, like Parsons (1960) of 
the function of the organization for society. He is not 
providing a set of categories for internal analysis. His 
classification of types of interdependence is more useful 
for purposes of this paper. 
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Materials. Another approach emphasizes the nature 
of the materials used. Perrow (1972) combines this approach 
with his concept of knowledge. 
Where tasks are not well understood, generally 
because the "raw material" that each person 
works on is poorly understood and possibly reactive, 
recalcitrant, or self-activating, the tasks are 
non-routine- (166). 
Others pay less attention to the understandibility. 
Rushing (1968), for example, was able to account for 
a great deal of the variance in organizational structure 
simply by looking at the hardness of the material processed. 
He based his approach on the assumption that 
[T]he harder the substance, the more elaborate 
the process required to manufacture a finished 
product from it. As materials in hardness, their 
resistance to altering and shaping operations 
increases; consequently the number and complex-
ity of operations necessary to break materials 
down and shape them must also increase (230). 
Blauner (1964) uses two dimensions to characterize 
products: their uniqueness; and their structural character--
fluid vs. discrete (6-7). He believes this is related to 
the worker's alienation from his work. Woodward (1965, fig. 
11) also considers the fluid vs. discrete character of the 
product in her study-co~organization structure. 
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Conclusion. Most of the systems developed for the 
classification of technology are quite limited and usually 
developed for only a few types of organizations. The most 
clearly developed and widely applicable is that used by 
Charles Perrow, who looks at two variables, the number of 
exceptions encountered and the analyzability of search pro-
cedures. While it would be valuable to have, as suggest~d 
by Woodward, a measure of technology independent of the 
perceptions of the workers, neither they nor anyone else 
has developed such a measure, generally applicable, to date. 
Therefore, at present it is suggested that Perrow's classi-
fication be used. 
Perrow, however, is also aware of the inadequacies 
of current measures of technology: 
To be pure ••• we should focus upon character-
istics that are measured independently of human 
behavior--perhaps the number of items produced per 
minute, the number of occupational specializations, 
or the scrap rate. For a number of reasons, this 
has not proved feasible ••• Failing here, we should 
try to focus upon actual human behavior--detailed 
observations of what is actually done. This, too, 
has thus far been rather unproductive and pro-
hibitively expensive. A "quick and dirty• method 
is to ask people about the frequency with which 
they come across problems for which there is no 
solution ready at hand ••• This has the virtue 
of being an easy method .•• [b]ut is rather 
unreliable ••• (1972, 168). 
86 
Implications of Technology for Structure 
Ideal Types 
Writers about technology have developed specific and 
clearly articulated theories of the implications of their 
variable for organizational structure. In fact, in broad 
outline, there emerges from the literature a pair of types 
illustrating the extremes of technological effects. The 
first is similar to classic Weberian bureaucrachy. The 
second is not uEually named, but Toffler (1970) calls it an 
"ad-hocracy." While as a modern, -western-type organization, 
it has some characteristics in common -with classical bureaucracy 
it is other-wise very different. Its structural differences 
are suited to its different task (Table III). 
There are t-wo criticisms of this over-all scheme. 
The first, oddly, comes from Charles Perrow, -who calls it 
over-simplified: 
[The] most serious problem with the current 
state of the technological view is that it reverts 
to the old dichotomies. By clinging to a routine-
nonroutine distinction, the technological theories 
too often place a caricature of Weber in the 
former and the human relations model in the latter 
type of organization ... Neither the simple 
bureaucratic model nor the human relations model 
is adequate, so a theory -which tells us -which to 
use is not all that useful (1972~ 169). 
TABLE III 
MODERN WESTERN ORGANIZATIONS 
Common characteristics 
1. Separat:ion of administration and ownership 
2. No rights to a given position 
3. Qualifications for position technical, rather than heredity, family etc. 
BUREAUCRACY 
1. Repetitive task 
2. Organization bound by formal 
rules 
3. Formal, specified division of 
labor 
4. Hierarchy! division of authority 
3. Roles and norms for each office, 
authoritatively established 
6. Use of writing for orders, rules, 
and decisions 
7, Structure by "bureaus"--established 
divisions 
AD-HOCRACY 
1, Constantly changing task 
2, Organized by negotiation among 
personnel 
3, Division of labor informally 
developed to meet situation 
4, Little or no heirarchy 
5. Role developed by the occupant 
6, Use of oral communication for 
arriving at and communicating decisions 
7, New groups formed for new tasks 
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A second major criticism is leveled by the Aston 
group (e.g. Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, Macdonald, Turner, & 
Lupton, 1963, 289). They claim that their findings indicate 
that the variables do not co-vary across the spectrum 
from type to type as indicated. Rather, some means of 
control are alternates or substitutes for one another. 
This view will be further discussed in light of specific 
studies bearing on the point. 
Emphases 
Groups. Within this framework of agreement, there 
is still room for difference. Litwak (1961, 1962), for 
example, concentrates on group characteristics. He views 
the ad-hocracy as a set of primary groups. In the earlier 
article, he writes as though the groups are departments 
of a larger organization. The later article apparently 
envisions the possibility of an organization's entire task 
being carried out by primary groups. 
The classic example of the primary group is the 
family--stable, personal, affectionate, with a number 
of activities in common. It is quite different from the 
specialized, impersonal, large bureaucracy. Litwak relates 
the advantages of the primary group for production ~o 
its communication characteristics. 
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[E]verything else being equal, the face-to-
face nature of the primary group grants the fast-
est form of feedback. This speed is further 
increased by the fact that primary group members 
are in continuous touch in many different areas 
of life (diffused relations). Again ••• studies 
in communication suggest that positive affect 
and permanent relations improve the accuracy of 
communication [no studies cited]. In a similar 
manner it can be argued that the primary group 
structure provides greater flexibility once 
~owledge and resources are held equal. For the 
primary group member, because of his face-to-face 
relations and legitimation of a wide range·of 
life problems, can can change decisions rapidly 
and include many contingencies (1968, 472). 
Litwak lists a series of three situations where the 
primary group can be better than bureaucracy. 
1. Where the task is simple. 
2. Where the task is complex and idiosyncratic. 
3. Where knowledge is incomplete (1968, 474). 
Although Lorsch and Lawrence (1965) cast their theory 
in terms of the environment, some of the variables they 
consider would actually come under the present definition of 
technology. Theyconceptualize three dimensions on which 
units or groups can differ from each other, "the time or-
ientation of members, the interpersonal orientation of 
members, and the unit's internal formal structure (471)." 
Each of these should be appropriate to the task. 
They apparently recormnend a non-hierarchical, primary-
type group to deal with an "uncertain" task--perhaps the 
90 
same as Litwa·k• s "complex and idiosyncratic" task. This 
material is further discussed in the following chapter, 
on the environment. 
The Individual. Other writers begin their theory 
with the individual. For example, Willer (in See, 1969) 
writes: 
notes: 
Simplicity and routinization at one extreme 
are necessarily connected, as are variability and 
complexity at the other •.• If actions are 
determined exclusively by rules and orders, then 
these tasks would of necessity be simple and routine, 
for as complexity and variability of tasks increases, 
complexity of role and order structure would 
have to increase until subordinates would have 
to make significant decisions concerning the 
application of both the rules and the orders. 
Tasks which are extremely complex and variable 
lose their predictibility and thus necessarily 
require decisions by subordinates {16). 
Litwak (1961) also considers this view when he 
[I]t can be argued that the separation of policy 
and administrative decisions is inefficient when 
the organization is confronted with non-uniform 
situations. Such separation implies that general 
rules can be laid down a priori to guide admin-
istrative decisions along common lines of policy 
..• [s]uch general rules become impossibly 
complex when the organization faces non-uniform 
situations. Internalizing organizational policy 
and localizing discretion ,(combining administrative 
and policy decisions) would then be more efficient 
(179). 
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Perrow (above, pag~ 75 ), with his emphasis on 
individuals and their exceptions and search procedures, 
also falls in this category. 
Summary. There are, then, two approaches to the 
construction of an "ad-hocracy" type of organization. 
The first emphasizes the purchase or importation of 
ready-socialized individuals with the skill and attitudes 
to work without external rules. A second approach concentrates 
on building up a semi-independent group, which carries 
out tasks cooperatively. 
Studies 
Theory from the writers on technology has been well 
based in empirical work. Several groups of researchers 
will be reviewed here. Then the objections to this line 
of theorizing will also be considered, and some conclusions 
drawn. 
The Woodward Group 
The story of the beginning of the research at the 
Technical College in South Essex seems destined to become 
as much of a classic as the story of the Hawthorne studies. 
The original purpose was to validate classical management 
theory using local firms. 
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The researchers found no relationship between any 
classical principles and their criteria of success. 
This was shocking to a gr~up who had been dedicated to 
teaching these very ideas. They found that 
[T]he twenty firms assessed as 'above average' 
in success had little in common organizationally. 
Seven seemed to be organization-conscious, eleven 
were not. The successful firms included the two 
with a functional type of organizat:bn; this sugges-
ted that in some circumstances people can and do 
work effectively under more than one supervisor. . . 
The twenty firms assessed as "below average" 
in success differed equally widely. Here again 
nine were organization-conscious and eleven were 
not,and those with organic systems outnumbered 
those with mechanistic systems by approximately 
two to one. There were wide variations in the 
size of the span of control at the different levels 
of the heirarchy, and whereas in some unsuccessful 
firms command heirarchies were very long, in others 
they were very short (1965, 33). 
Only by re-considering their data in the light of 
the technology used by the various firms were they able 
to make sense out of their results. As discussed under 
the classification of technology, they grouped the firms 
into 12 groups, based on technical advancement (TableII). 
The three over-all categories were {l) unit, (2) large 
batch and mass-production, and (3) continuous-flow 
production. 
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Some of the structural characteristics were directly 
related to this scale, namely 
the length of the line of command; the span 
of control of the chief executive; the percent-
age of total turnover allocated to the payment 
of wages and salaries, and the ratios of manag-
ers to total personnel, of clerical and admin-
istrative staff to manual wor}~ers, of direct and 
indirect labor, and of graduate to non-graduate 
supervision in production departments (1965, 51). 
Other characteristics, however, were more similar 
at the two "ends" of the scale than they were to the "middle." 
These included 
1. low span of control of first-line supervisors 
(small primary working groups) 
2. Many skilled employees in direct production. 
3. Tend to be more organic (large batch firms 
were mechanistic) 
4, A more clear division into line and staff 
5. Technically competent supervisors 
6. Less formalized control of materials and 
quality 
7. Reliance on oral communication (Batch firms 
use written) 
8. Firms seemed more placid and easier to 
research (60-67). 
Several of these categories seem to fit the pattern of the 
bureaucracy-ad-hocracy distinction, with batch firms being 
bureaucratic and the others "ad-hocratic." For example, 
the unit and continuous-flow firms had small, primary-
type working groups, organic systems, less formal control, 
and used oral communication. Further, their supervisors 
were technically competent and there were skilled employees 
in direct production, indicating the use of inaependent 
judgment rather than rules of procedure. 
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Communication Implications. Certain communication 
practices were related to the technology variables, while 
others were not. For exampE, "organic" systems outnum-
bered "mechanistic" systems two to one, both in success-
r 
ful firms (24). They found that "There was a tendency 
towards written communication in mechanistic systems 
and towards verbal [sic] communication in organic systems 
(24)." So this factor was not very directly related to 
technology, unless.possibly the question of success was 
also considered. 
The researchers did find that large-batch firms 
tended to follow the formal channels of communication. 
One firm which switched to such a system produced def-
inite changes in the communication behavior of their 
superintendents: 
All three production superintendents spent less 
time alone after the changes had taken place, 
and the average number of daily contacts 
increased. They spent more time with people 
senior to themselves, and less with colleagues 
from other departments. They also had less to 
do with their own subordinates. 
. . . 
There was more reading, writing, and filing 
to be done and less time to do it (2_15-~217). 
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No clear case was made for or against "opening 
communication channels"between divisions. The researchers's 
impression was that there were practical advantages to 
letting research and development personnel have some 
involvement in production. On the other hand, such 
involvement created conflict and confusion (138-140). 
Also, "it seemed tha-c in the firms where research staff 
spent some time in the workshops, deliberate attempts 
were made to keep information from them (141)." The 
best relationship between R & D and the rest of the 
factory was found in a firm where the two divisions 
were several miles apart. 
In this firm, physical separation had not 
prevented the establishment of adequate commu-
nication channels. A lot of information was 
exchanged ..• (140). 
There were visits on a guest-host basis between 
R & D and production. This was also the only firm 
where R & D cooperated with sales in interpreting 
technical results. 
Zwerman. Zwerman (1970) replicated the Woodward 
study in the Minneapolis area. He was only able to 
find one failure of one division of a firm ±.n 1966-
67 when he collected his data, so he had to compare 
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"very successful" with "less successful" firms, instead 
of actual successes and failures. The success rate 
was clearly a result of the over-all abundance of the 
environment in this country at that time. 
On the whole, Zwerman's results confirmed those 
of Woodward. Consistent with her findings, he deter-
mined that 
1. There were no organizational correlates 
of operating success; 
2. Ideas of classical management apply to 
large-batch firms; 
3. Size of firm is not related to organizational 
variables; 
4. The type of production technology was 
related to organizational variables; 
5. For each technology, there was an optimum 
form of organization (144-145). 
He did two differences from the British studies: 
1. In Minneapolis, but not in England, the 
size of the labor force was correlated with 
the span of control of the--chd.ef executive; 
2. In England, the span of control of the 
first-line supervisor was strongly correlated 
with the technology, while in Minneapolis 
it was uncorrelated (145). 
Unfortunately, not enough information is given about 
the actual organizational "shapes" resulting in the two 
countries to speculate on the reasons for these differences. 
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Further Woodward Studies. Meanwhile, Woodward's 
group decided to extend their study by concentrating on 
! batch production firms. The reason for this approach was 
given by Woodward in the introduction to the reports: 
The South Essex studies had shown that in 
relating technology to organization behaviour 
there are two clear-cut extremes in the technical 
scale--firms making small units or batches to 
customers individual requirements, and process 
or continuous flow industry--and a large and 
difficult center area in which are found medium 
to large batch production firms and firms with 
the component assembly type of production 
system. Structure and behaviour appear to 
be more consistent and predictable at the 
extremes than at the centre (1970, x). 
Woodward suggests two possible reasons for 
these problems with the "centre" firms: 
1. The measures of technology might be inad-
equate; 
2. In large batch firms, the technology might 
set limits rather than determining the 
form of the organization (xi). 
Since the authors believed that inlarge-batch 
firms the control system might be independent of the 
technology, they were very interested in discovering exactly 
how such control systems worked. One method they used was 
called the "tracer," following an order from first in-
quiry to delivery. 
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One such study was done by Rackham (1970). He 
found a communication system made up of reports and paper-
work that was largely separate from the needs of the tech-
nology. The author comments 
Generally speaking .•. the circulation of 
Issues A and I [preliminary reports] appeared 
to be of doubtful benefit; the marginal utility 
of getting information early being offset by the 
increase in the complexity of the paper work 
system. There is a tendency to judge the effect-
iveness of the firm's communication system by 
the amount of information communicated. Of 
course, it is possible to have too much as well 
as too little information, and by overloading 
the system to reduce the impact of the essential 
communication {135). 
The initial plan provided an "expected" date for 
completion some ten weeks after delivery was required 
(135). Rackham speculates that the presence of some plan, 
any plan, was useful only to reduce anxiety (145). However, 
he made no effort to study anxiety levels in the plant 
at various stages of the work. 
Some very interesting work was done in two large-
batch and one mass-production factory by Reeves and Turner 
(Reeves, 1970; Reeves & Turner, 1972). Woodward describes 
their work as follows: 
Kynaston Reeves and Turner •.• identify the 
inability to comprehend the production system in 
its entirety as the defining characteristic of 
batch production. In conditions of high uncer-
tainty it is impractical or uneconomic to collect 
enough information to know what is happening 
at any given moment in time. The result is 
that people working at different points in the 
system have access to only limited amounts of 
information and therefore different conceptions 
of what the total system is like (1970, 242). 
Apparently the mass-production factory was orig-
inally included under the mis-conception that it was 
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a batch production organization. The work was the 
production of suits, made to individual order and routed 
through in weekly "batches." Yet the differences in the 
suits did not actually "make a difference" as far as 
the production system was concerned. They were, in fact, 
mass-produced. 
In this case, the control system was very simple. 
Each week's suits were assigned a color, and those of 
a given color were supposed to be done first. The colors 
were prominently posted (115-117). The foremen apparently 
spent most of their time doing repairs on garments returned 
from inspection rather than supervising. There was a 
small "order seeking department" for locating overdue 
garments. 
In contrast to the suit factory, the two true 
large-batch factories were quite similar to each other. 
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Meetings were held daily to discuss shortages and infor-
mation from sales about pressing customer needs. "Brogress 
chasers" did much of the work to see if shortages were 
being met. These employees were free-ranging (84). 
Foremen had to do much scheduling in their own areas, 
and many problems were worked out at the shop-floor 
level (85). 
The authors also propose a relationship between 
internal technology and the external environment. 
In many respects the complexity of the pro-
duction systems in the two batch production 
firms was a function of their market position 
and the nature of the products they were manu-
facturing. The fact that they were making their 
products in discrete batches ... was a function 
of the level of market demand for their products 
( 8 7) . 
Further, the nature of "the market" was colored by 
the perceptions of management. For example, one firm 
felt that it had to "meet all customer demands from the 
home market, including the development and modification of 
products to meet customer requirements (87)." 
Apparently Woodward's group concluded that both their 
initial speculations were true to some extent. They have 
not yet developed an adequate description for the technology 
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of large-batch firms, and such firms do have a certain 
amount of lee-way in the establishment of a control system. 
They conclude that 
The managers responsible for batch production 
firms can make deliberate decisions which may 
result in their firms being either more like 
continuous flow production firms from a struct-
ural and organizational point of view or more 
like unit production (Reeves & Woodward, 1970, 
39). 
Harvey--Technological Diffuseness. Harvey's study __ _ 
(1968) is mentioned here because he claims to have 
measured product changes, the approach Woodward's group 
claimed was impossible. He identified technical diffuse-
ness with the number of product changes in the last 
ten years (252). He considered that a change had to 
require some re-tooling before he would count it. 
His findings were that the less changeful the tech-
nology, the more likely the following were to increase: 
number of specialized sub-units, number of levels of 
authority, ratio of managers and supervisors to total 
personnel, and degree of program specialization. These 
' 
findings held even with size controlled in the 43 industrial 
organizations studied (247). 
These findings indicate that the more routine or 
less changeful organizations were more bureaucratic; 
that is, they had more rules and a more definite hierarchy. 
102 
The reason for the greater number of specialized sub-
units is not clear, but possibly a more routine task be 
broken down more not only at the individual level but 
also for groups. Later the possibility will be considered 
that a pre-established program requires less coordination • 
. 
One of Harvey's variables, "program specification" 
deserves consideration in more depth. He defines this 
factor as including: 
1. Rule programrning--the formalization of duties 
and responsibilities; 
2. output programrning--formal steps for transform-
ing the raw material; 
3. Communication programrning--the sp~cification 
of the structure, content, and timing of commu-
nication within the organization (250). 
He claims that this entire factor increases with "tech-
nical specificity." He calls this finding a "considerable 
departure" from Woodward and precedes roundly to criticize 
her findings. 
Concerning the implications of technology 
for program specification, Woodward presents some 
rather weak evidence to suggest that organization 
at both ends of the scale is more flexible and less 
subject to formal specification than it is in the 
middle range of the scale. Apart from questions 
about the quality of evidence Woodward's findings 
seem questionable on at least another count. 
It will be remembered that Woodward found that the 
ratio of managers and supervisors to total personnel 
and the number of levels of authority both increases 
with increasing technical complexity (250). 
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Certainly the conflict of evidence regarding the contin-
uous flow firms cannot be overlooked. But Harvey does not 
consider the possibiiity that supervisors in a sophisticated 
setting may act as consultants and advisers rather than 
enforcers of rules (see Blau and Schoenherr, l97l). It is, 
of course, possible that he and Woodward were looking at 
different variables--a possibility increased by the all-too 
common use of different definitions. 
Coal-mining Methods 
An often-cited study was conducted by Trist, Higgin, 
Murray, and Pollock (1963), comparing alternative methods 
of organization for coal-mining. Unfortunately, the study 
tells us more about coal-mining, and less about coal-mining 
groups, than we might care to know. 
Under the-old, manual system, miners worked largely 
alone, carving out a ''room 11 and doing the associated work 
(49). An area to be mined was "given" or "bid" by a working 
group. With the introduction of machinery, management de-
veloped the "conventional longwall" system, based on the 
"principle of one man--one job (13)". Such a bureaucratic 
division of labor would only have been appropriate for a 
routine task, and coal-mining is both varied and dangerous, 
requiring close cooperation and social support. 
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Essentially, the "composite long--wall system.," -which 
-was adopted, -was in some -ways a return to old methods. 
The men formed an autonomous group of forty to fifty., and 
-were able to share dangerous or difficult tasks or to help 
out -when one part of the job {such as timbering) -was behind. 
This also gave them an appreciation for the nature of the 
total task and the importance of each part. 
In spite of all the details about gates and machines 
and -work vocabulary, -we have almost no picture of ho-w these 
groups actually assigned their tasks or communicated intern-
ally. It is possible that, in spite of their size, they may 
have been very much like primary groups., -with close personal 
bonds and:la.milial relationships. 
Supervision 
Some studies concentrate on the area of administration 
and supervision. One collection of studies in this area 
(Dubin, Homans, Mann, & Miller, 1965) notes that "All of 
us emphasize technology as an important influence on productivity 
and supervisory practices (viii)." 
Their claims throughout are modest and circumscribed. 
Homans points out, for example, that by maximum effort, 
workers might be able to increase their output 20% to 60% 
(1965, 55). The effects of supervision can only extend to 
this portion of improvement. He is speaking in general terms, 
and does not go into the possible effects of supervision 
on absenteeism, turnover, and quality. 
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Fensham and Hooper ( 1964) studied the change-over 
to automatic looms in two mills of one company in England. 
While this is another study that tells more about machines 
than about people, the authors do have some theoretically 
relevant conclusions in the area of supervision. Because 
of the increased speed of the machines, supervisors had to 
pre-plan to see that not loss of production occurred through 
lack of materials. Also, there had to be swift communi-
cation to see that errors or breaks were swiftly repaired 
(35). 
The supervisor also seemed to serve more of an inte-
grating or inter-departmental communication function under 
the new system. 
Because the weaver is so much more tied to a 
geographical location that the overlooker, it 
was almost inevitable that the overlooker would 
develop communication contacts more readily than 
the weaver (194). 
Probably the occurrence of occasional "emergency" 
situations created different supervisory relations, sim-
ilar to those found in the study by Emery and Marek (1962). 
In this case, a power plant was increasingly automated over 
a period of years. As the jobs became more complex, with 
a decreased tolerance for disturbances, the worker called 
in the supervisor when there was trouble. There was little 
that could be routinely checked or supervised (24). 
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Technology and Attitudes 
Blauner. Blauner is the frst to intensely relate 
technology to the attitudes of the workers on the job. 
His interest is clearly industry, and he studies four 
different types: chemical (continuous flow), printing 
(craft), textiles, and assembly-line firms. Like other 
students of industrial technology, he did spend some personal 
time finding out what these people actually did, rather than 
taking information solely from questionnaires. He also 
took some information from other studies. 
However, his concern for individual feelings, the 
impressionistic nature of his work, and his overlooking the 
question of economic effectiveness, give his work quite 
a different slant from other technologists mentioned so 
far. 
Blauner's key concept is "alienation" 
Domination, futility, isolation, and discontent 
are each aspects of the general condition of 
alienation, a leading perspective in modern 
social thought (vii). 
Unlike some writers who describe the technical process 
at length for its own sake, Blauner attempts to give the 
"feel" of actual work in the establishments studied. He 
believes that lack of control over the immediate conditions 
of work leads to the greatest alienation. And he concludes 
that alienation increases 
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1. When the product is less unique 
2. When the worker works on a smaller part of 
it 
3 . When the sphere of responsibility is more 
restricted (23). 
These conclusions indicate that the bureaucratic structure 
has a human cost, a problem that will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter. 
He finds the continuous-flow firm to decrease alien-
ation compared with other types of blue-collar work. He 
believes the worker has considerable responsibility, can 
see the process as a whole, and even has the freedom to heat 
a can of soup on the job. The worker takes the responsi-
bility of calling the supervisor in case of an unusual 
- occurrence--a finding consistent with that of Eme:ry · and 
Marek (1962) in a highly automated electric plant. 
The Affluent Worker.Actually, this work and the 
next are so similar that they should be reviewed together. 
Both (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, & Platt, 1968; Wedder-
burn & Crompton, 1972) are comparisons of a small group of 
factories, exhibiting different technologies, located on a 
single site in Britain. Both concentrated on obtaining 
information on worker attitudes regarding their work, their 
supervision, and the company. 
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.The first study (Goldthorpe, et. al., 1968) was 
intended to be the first part of a study of the "embourge-
oisment" of the well-paid worker. That is, the authors 
wished to find out if workers whose income approached white-
collar levels would begin to adopt middle-class attitudes 
and values as well. To find the most favorable instance 
for the occurrence of such a value shift, they selected 
only married, male workers between 21 and 46 for their 
sample. They did not compare the actual attitudes of 
middle-class employees. 
They determined that the values held by the workers 
regarding their work could be summed up by the term 
''instrumental (l)". They place great stress on the fact 
that the workers regarded their job as a place they earned 
money to do other things with, rather than as intrinsically 
satisfying for its social or achievement characteristics. 
It seems clear, however, that while workers had struck 
this bargain of work for money rather than satisfaction, 
they were not entirely happy with it. Most said they would 
prefer jobs with more skill and independence (15). And they 
had other values. For example, most said they would not 
like a promotion to foremen, not for reasons of money or 
prestige, but because they felt the work was intrinsically 
unpleasant (123). 
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Goldthorpe et. al.further claim to differ from the 
"technical implications approach" (e.g. Woodward., 1965; 
Blauner., 1964) in beginning with the meaning of the work 
to the worker (see Bechhofer., 1973., 138). They claim this 
meaning explains why their process workers, in contrast 
to those studied by others, were actually~ satisfied 
than those working in other types of technology (73). 
That is., the workers were dissatisfied with the instru-
mental bargain they had struck. 
However., they offer in a footnote (76) that the 
process workers they studied were peculiarly isolated and 
scattered over the plant, in contrast to those studied 
by Woodward and by Blauner, whos workers apparently could 
spend much of their time together. It is possible that 
Goldthorpe simply had a deviant case--one in which some 
other characteristic temporarily outweighed the expected 
effect of technology. Also., it could be that the nature 
of the work was analyzed in sufficient detail, and that 
in some way this process plant was different from others 
placed under that classification. 
Wedderburn and Crompton. Wedderburn and Crompton 
(1972) found such detailed study necessary in their 
110 
investigation of plants with different technologies. The 
two plants called Works A and B were both classified as 
Woodward's class IX, "continuous flow." But the authors 
found the attitudes of the workers regarding their work 
and the company were quite different. 
After closer consideration, they found that the 
working situation was very different in the two plants. 
The continuous flow in Works A could continue for several 
months or more with no significant change. In works B, 
changes could come within weeks, requiring stopping, setting 
up, and contact with the supervisor. The uncertain nature 
of the technology deprived the workers of the opportunity 
to do their own self-pacing, and required their constant 
attention on the task (80-81). 
The authors found that the workers in Works A did 
have the attitudes expected for process work~rs, approving 
of their supervisory system arrl taking a "teamwork" view 
of the organization (57). Those in Works B were more like 
workers in batch factories. 
They also found other differences related to the 
actual nature of the work being done. For example, within 
Works B, there were differences between those who worked 
on the chemical processing, and those who packaged, inspected, 
and warehoused the final product (85). The latter, of course, 
were batch-type jobs. 
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Like Goldthorpe et. al. (1968) they found the workers 
had instrumental attitudes to their work. This similarity 
occurred even though their workers were more traditional and 
less mobile than the "affluent workers," and might be ex-
pected to show more traditional atitudes {146-149). It is 
not clear what Wedderburn and Crompton feel are the more 
"traditional" attitudes toward work held by workers since the 
industrial revolution. 
As noted above, the findings of Wedderburn and Crompton 
regarding process workers agree with those of Woodward 
(1965) and others, and conflict with those of Goldthorpe 
et. al. One apparent solution for this problem, used by 
them, is a more careful.. analysis of the technology. A 
system for such analysis has been developed with extreme 
thorougru:iess by the author discussed next (Meissner, 1969). 
Meissner 
Sources of Conflict in Theory. Meissner (1969) offers 
the proposition that much of the difference between the 
"human relations" school and the technologists comes from 
the different research settings they used. He writes 
In what kinds of industrial settings did 
research take place that followed these two ori-
entations? The human-relations researchers 
went to places in which work was done on compar-
atively small work pieces, easily carried to 
a workbench by hand. ,The work consisted of the 
assembly of small pieces or machining operations, 
both carried out independently on separate work 
stations. These assembly and machine shops were 
comparatively quiet, and workers could, at least 
to some extent, walk around from time to time. 
In short, human relations men in search of Homans• 
"favorable instance" found what they were looking 
for. And so did researchers intent on describing 
the fo.rmal technical demands of work and its 
consequences: They went to steel mills and 
automobile plants, where the massive array of 
integrated machinery is the most obvious and 
overwhelming fact of industrial life (6). 
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Meissner•s approach was to expand the range of possi-
bilities by including all cases of types of industrial 
production from the literature. He does not consider 
other types of work, but within his limited area he ana-
lyzes a wide variety of settings. 
In his analysis, the author considers three classes 
of variables. 
First, there is the technology of work places. 
Technology has two dimensions: conversion 
operations and transfer operations. Variation 
of each is seen as a progression of technical 
change: at each stage an additional component 
of work is performed by machines rather than 
by men {40). 
His second set of variables involves technical con-
straints on behavior, which he puts in five categories: 
space, function, time,and perception. 
Variations of these contraints is described by 
a composite of several combined dimensions 
(40-41). 
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Finally, he relates these technological variables 
to the dependant variable of the workers social behavior: 
Sharing of combinations of technical resources 
is noted as a defining condition of cooperation. 
By reference to the outcomes of which technical 
processes are designed, both cooperation and 
communication are distinguished as being either 
technically required or technically permitted. 
our first interest is whether required and 
permitted cooperation occur alone or in combination. 
variation of required cooperation is further 
distinguished by the distribution of cooperative 
acts over time. Differences in communication 
are analyzed in terms of varying combinations of 
communication means and linkage networks. 
Technical and nontechnical :resources as bases 
of control of technical performance and non-
technical behavior are characteristics of types 
of influence. The symmetry of technical in-
fluence is seen as reversible or irreversible 
within the limits of an operation cycle (41). 
Communication Implications. Meissner is unusual 
for a socio-technical writer in that he gives considerable 
attention to communication in his study. Again, he is 
concerned with what happens within the work crew, and 
not such matters as how orders are received from above in 
the heirarchy. He begins by listing five properties of 
fully sufficient communication, particularly technically 
permitted communication: "gestures, facework, literacy, 
completion of unit of discourse, and choice of partner 
(210)." 
He then relates these to each of the four levels 
of technology he has developed. 
Level A--heavy hauling: Full communication 
in teams. 
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Level B--handwork. Constrained nontechnical 
communication. All the Hawthorne studies 
were in handwork settings. At this level, 
communication is not technically required, 
but tends to develop in ""floating" networks, 
rather than within a single team. 
Level c--machine line. Technical communication 
without words. 
Level D--automation, or what others call continuous-
process. Close/remote communication re-
lations. Workers have close, full non-
technical communication with their imme-
diate team, remote communication for tech-
nical reasons with others by sign and 
machine (209-222). 
This detailed analysis of the task requirements 
and the need and opportunities for communication and 
inter-action gives exciting implications for the analysis 
of other settings. Meissner himself relates some of his 
findings to those of others in the field. 
He finds an implied difference with the findings 
of Woodward (1965), who found a steeper heirarchy and 
greate~ proportion of indirect workers with the increase 
in technological sophistication (52-59). Meissner writes 
In contrast, our data indicated that the workers 
discretion, so far as it was determined by the 
technology of man-machine relations and their 
constraints, was greater at both ends of the 
scale ( 244) • 
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He attempts to reconcile this difference by suggesting 
the jobs of supervisors, particularly foremen, ~y be 
quite different in different types of product~on. Thus 
the higher percentage of foremen and staff in sophisticated 
industry may be concerned more with paper-work and less 
with direct control of their workers (244). This analysis 
is similar to the discussion of Blauner (1964, above). 
It also suggests that the work of the foreman deserves 
the same type of careful observation and analysis Meissner 
has given the laborer. 
Meissner recognizes certain similarities between 
his work and that of Blauner (1964), in that both are 
concerned with such factors as the worker's attention 
level, pace, and freedom to move (Meissner, 1969, 249). 
However, he criticizes Blauner's failure to consider the 
many types of technology in a single industry or even 
a single workplace. For example, by considering capital 
investment per production worker for an industry as a 
whole, Meissner claims "we have an equivalent to the 
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'ecological fallacy"' (249). Meissner is asking for 
the kind of detailed analysis which he himself provides. 
Summary. While Meissner's analysis is limited to 
the production of goods in industry, within that setting 
he considers a wide variety of situations. He shows that 
authors have partly based their conclusions on special 
characteristics of the work-places they have studied 
and not considered the general problem of the opportu-
nities and requirements for communication and other 
forms of social ~ehavior. Meissner analyzes actual 
studies of industrial work, and develops a typology 
of settings which he relates to the communication patterns 
in them. 
Chapple and Sayles 
Chapple and Sayles (l96l)take to an extreme the 
analysis of work, believing that the manager can be timed 
like those in the more usual work-study job. They take 
the search for stability as the main job of the mana-
ger (79), overlooking the possibility of other types of 
tasks. Where exact stability cannot be provided, they 
look for statistical regularity: 
Just as the frequency of telephone calls 
or machine breakdowns can be predicted, so the 
reactions of particular personalities in partic-
ular situations can be predicted with statis-
tical regularity ••.• Althought the actual 
moment in a given day the superintendent will 
have a problem with a certain subforeman cannot 
be pinpointed, the frequency of occurrence and 
the time spent can be estimated within specific 
limits (62). 
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This approach ignores the needs for changes in 
established processes because of market change, techno-
logical change, or desire for imporvement. It also 
fails to provide even for the routine situations it 
claims to cover. For example, it may be predictable that 
in a large plant some ten employees will become alcoholics 
during a given year. But for their ten foremen that 
predictable occurrence will create an unpredicted drain 
on their time. 
Nevertheless, the authors do make some good points. 
For example, their findings and recommendations regard-
ing the foreman's span of control are similar to those 
of others concerned with technological implications. 
But they state them in an extremely straightforward way 
that clarifies what others have said. 
The span of his control •.• depends not on 
the number of people to be supervised but on 
the frequency and duration of disturbances within 
his work-flow unit and the length of time- re-
quired for him to correct them. Thus, two 
considerations need to be made in planning his 
job; the ease with which disturbances can be de-
tected and the freedom he has to do something 
about them ( 73). 
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They also provide a very interesting explanation of 
the value of unions. Most authors seem uncomfortable 
with unions, even listing union activity as a sign of 
low morale. Some list its value for those interests of 
workers and management which are in conflict. Chapple 
and Sayles consider it an instrument of communication. 
[c]ollective bargaining can help the organ-
ization by providing a compensatory channel 
and, thereby, a potentially more stable environment. 
Unions become a real part of the organizational 
structure as employee-unior members contact their 
leaders, who, in turn, interact with various 
members of management. The effect resembles 
Perrow 
that of the addition of any new organizational 
component such as a ne~ staff department or a 
new level on the line (1970). 
A significant piece of intellectual piece of intell-
ectual history is told by Charles Perrow (1973). Perrow 
had been aware of the work of Woodward, but he developed 
his own point of view from a field study {Street, Vintner, 
& Perrow, 1966). He describes the experience as follows: 
We were ••• to study seven juvenile correctional 
institutions, focusing upon the contrast between 
custody and treatment •••• It was during the 
course of this project that I became convinced 
that the goals of the organization, say custody 
of ~sic] therapy, were not the independent 
variables. Nor were the strategies of the top 
leadership, let alone their personalities. 
Instead, I began to to feel, along with others 
on the project, that it was the set of beliefs 
about the nature of delinquents held by members 
of the organizations that were the major deter-
minants of structure and goals, and even, to an 
extent, the leadership styles and strategies. 
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If you believe that the main problem with delin-
quents was that they had not been taught to respect 
and obey adults, then you selected techniques 
of rehabilitation consistent with the "nature 
of the raw material." ••• Your goal was still 
to rehabilitate. If you believed, on the other 
hand, that delinquents were suffering from 
intra-psychic problems that were rooted in their 
childhood experiences, you adapted, as best 
you could, psychoanalytic techniques and tried 
to structure your institution accordingly ••. 
[I]t was not the intrinsic nature of the raw 
material that was at question, but only the way 
the institution defined it (1973, 48). 
While there are clearly similarities between the 
viewpoint expressed above and that of those discussed 
previously, there are significant differences as well. 
Perrow is more willing to consider the perception of 
the participant regarding the task and the organizational 
goal. Some of these differences may be due to his focus 
on social service and voluntary organizations rather than 
industry. 
The study found, as predicted by Perrow•s theory, 
that the organizations whose work was routine--the custodial 
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institutions--had a definite heirarchy, formal rules, and 
a less-educated staff. Those with non-routine tasks--the 
treatment oriented--had highly-professionalized staffs, 
few rules, and little formal structure. There were multiple 
communication channels, and all v~ews were considered 
important as a possible contribution. 
Another significant analysis is Perrow•s article on 
hospitals in the HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS (March, 1965). 
While this involves no field research of his own, it 
is original and creative in re-interpreting the existing 
literature within the technological framework. He concluded 
that "a change in structure in mental hospitals was not 
viable without a change in technology (1973, 50) • " With 
regard to communication, he notes the common complaint 
of writers on mental hospitals that communication in 
these institutions is lacking. 
A high rate of communication in an organization 
is associated with complexity of tasks and a 
raw material that passes through many units, or 
a number of materials that are combined. This 
is not the case with the mental hospital. In 
fact, there is little information to communicate, 
about, compared to most organizations {1956, 927). 
Another study of Perrow•s goes in a different dir-
ection, to explore the kind of question of inter-departmental 
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relationships that will be considered in the following 
chapter on environmental writers. In a study reported 
in 1970, Perrow investigated twelve varied firms. Members 
of different departments ranked the relative importance 
of each department in the firm. Sales was dominant in 
eleven of the twelve (63). 
The relative dominance of the departments was not 
directly affected by the routineness of the technology. 
The author concluded that: 
There are two clusters: technoloqy and struc-
ture, and power and discretion ~nd influence). 
Technology is indeed well related to task 
structure and also related to co-ordination. 
But it is not related directly to the power-, 
and-discretion cluster (73). ' 
~gain, this reinforces the point that technology deter-
mines the structure of individual units, not the total 
organization. 
Perrow's classification of technology is discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Chapter VI contains some of his 
work on organizational goals, and Chapter VII includes 
his classification as part of the final synthesis of the 
-socio-technical view. 
Critical Studies 
Mildly Critical Studies 
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Mohr'-s (1971) approach to technology seems to be 
basically like Perrow's: 
Technology was conceptualized in te:ms of the 
manageability of tasks and materials--essentially 
the predictibility dimension considered at the 
individual job level--and further conceptualized 
in terms of uniformity, complexity, and analyz-
ability (1971, 448). 
Mohr examined 144 work groups from 13 health departments, 
ranging from custodians and laboratory glass washers to 
dog catchers to nurses and physicians (448). He criticizes 
Woodward for using personnel ratios and spans of control, 
saying that their depiction of the social structure is 
"problematic'! (452). The author himself., however, made 
no real attempt to provide an alternative method for the 
study of group or organizational structure. 
His main concern was "participativeness of structure," 
which apparently referred to number of staff meetings 
rather than actual control over job-related decisions. 
He found the following correlations with participative-
ness: manageability of technology,-.18; task interde-
pendence, .31; noise level, -.31. He only notes the first 
as reaching a significance level of .05. He also found 
that "[E]ffectiveness was consistently and substantially 
higher whenever participativeness was high (453)." 
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While Mohr's measures seem to provide a good start, 
"participativeness" in this sense is a variable the casual 
observer might well expect to be relatively independent 
of technology in this range of th~t variable. No pre-
diction can be clearly derived from other authors regarding 
it. Of course, as Meissner could point out (1969), there 
are jobs where groups meetings are almost impossible, and 
others where they are indispensable for effective operation. 
But in the public health field, it may be the more consi-
derate or communication-oriented supervisor who meets -
with his staff and therefore has an effective group. The 
measure could be tapping a factor of general morale. 
Meyer (1968) expands Mohr's criticisms of organ-
izational charts. He studied data-processing sections in 
254 government departments of finance, and found that they 
are quite different from other parts of organ-
izations: they have more levels 0£ heirarchy, 
a wider span of control of first-line super-
visors, fewer employees under the direction of 
higher supervisors, and fewer supervisors re-
sponsible for members who are mainly in super-
visory positions. These findings suggest that 
the consultant's role and horizontal channels 
are institutionalized in automated organizations 
(256). 
That is, the consultant nominally holds a high su-
pervisory status for the purpose of dealing with organ-
izational members from other departments. But his job 
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does not correspond to his title. He is consultant, not 
supervisor. 
Actually, however, Meyer did not find a great deal 
of difference--about 5%--in time spent in supervision 
between managers in data-processing and other divisions. 
And that difference was based on shaky evidence. The 
percentage of time spent was estimated by the division 
head, who may not have known such detailed descriptions. 
Hage and Aiken (1969) also studied 16 health and 
welfare organizations in a midwestern city. They found 
that 
The social structure of organizations with more 
routine work [were] found to be more centralized, 
more formalized, and to have less professionally 
trained staffs, but no relationship with strat-
ification was found. Organizations with routine 
work [were] further found to emphasize goals of 
efficiency and quantity of clients served, not 
innovativeness, staff morale, or quality of client 
services (366). 
These findings are consistent with predictions 
regarding formality and staffing, and intuitively appro-
priate regarding goals. The lack of difference in strati-
fication may be due to the fact that the organizations were 
relatively non-routine. It is possible that the variation 
was not great enough to affect the structure. Or the charts 
may not have shown the true structure. 
Summary. The studies support the relationship of 
routineness of technology and specification of program. 
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The relationship with structure is unclear because of 
definitional problems. The following section will consider 
another possible reasons for for this confusion, and 
a whole group of critics of those considered here. While 
the group just reviewed mildly criticize or modify the 
technological view, the following writers attack its fund-
amental logic. 
Is it all really size? 
There is a bulky literature concerned with the problem 
of size and its effects on structure. It is ably reviewed 
by Starbuck (1965). Most of it has little to do with 
either communication or technology and is not relevant to 
this paper. However, certain writers in this area have 
attacked the technological view and so require consideration. 
Statement of Purpose--Aston. The Aston group are 
members of the Industrial Administration Research Unit, 
College of Advanced Technology, University of Aston, Bir-
mingham, England. Their initial statement of purpose 
gives no special prominence to size as a variable. The 
group was determined to analyze the concept of bureaucracy 
and examine it empirically in a large number of organizations. 
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A survey of the literature on bureaucracy leads 
to an analysis of organizational structure in 
terms of a set of variables (specialization, stand-
ardization, formalization, configuration, and 
flexibility) that are capable of empirical veri-
fication. Comparative studies will establish 
organization "profiles" along these variables 
and relate them to contextual variables such as 
size, ownership and control, charter, and technology. 
The profiles will also allow comparative studies 
of individual and group behavior to be undertaken 
in clear relation to industrial settings (Pugh, 
Hickson, Hinings, Macdonald, Turner, & Lupton, 
1963, 289). 
Pugh {1966) established a very broad charter for the 
group's studies, expressing a need for organizational theory 
that would include both an adequate psychology and a sociol-
ogy of organizations. So far, however, none of their studies 
has considered the problem of individual or group response 
to the structures they found. 
Breaking Down Bureaucracy. Hinings, Pugh, Hickson, 
& Turner (1967) emphasize the need to 11break down" the concept 
of bureaucracy into its constituent parts. They claim that 
"What was originally thought of as a unitary conceptualization 
can be seen to have a number of meanings which can be 
conceptualized as dimensions" {63). Their principal 
empirical finding was the unsurprising fact that larger 
organizations had more full-time specialists. 
A later study investigated 52 organizations in the 
Birmingham area (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968). 
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They interviewed "key informants" (67) on 64 scales, 
based on six dimensions: specialization; standardization, 
formalization; centralization; and configuration, inclu-
ding span of control, height ,of heirarchy etc. (70). 
From factor analysis, they developed the following: 
1. Structuring of activities--standardization, 
specialization, and formalization. 
2. Concentration of authority--increasing 
specialization and increasing dispersion 
of authority. 
3. Line control of workflow rather than imper-
sonal control. 
4. Supportive component--percentage clerks etc 
(85-87). 
Attacking Technoloqy. In a study of both service 
and industrial firms begins the real emphasis on size and 
attack on the technological school (Hickson, Pugh, & 
Pheysey, 1969). The article includes a thoughtful disc-
ussion of the types of technology found in the literature. 
They include 
Operations technology--the equipping and se-
quencing of activities in the workflow; 
Materials technology--materials used in the 
workflow; 
Knowledge technology--knowledge used in the 
workflow (380). 
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Actually, these seem to be different ways of looking at 
the same problem. But analyzing the approaches should 
be valuable. 
The report considers only "operations technology," 
in which the authors include automation of equipment, 
workflow rigidity, specificity of evaluation, and con-
tinuity of throughput. 
The authors did ~ind results related to technology. 
The more the technology is integrated, 
the more activities tend to be firmly structured, 
with specialist departments and formal procedures. 
Where the technology is least integrated ( ••• ), 
authority tends to be concentrated at the 
apex in borads or with the chief executive, 
and workflow activities tend to be directly 
controlled by line management and not through 
staff departments and their routines (387). 
While it is difficult to relate these findings 
to the technological writers, it ,seems possible that 
integrated departments could be routine, and non-integrated 
ones include small-batch and craft firms. This would 
be consistent with the more bureaucratic structures of 
the integrated firms. 
However, the authors stress that size is a stronger 
over-all determinant of organizational activities (387). 
They even argue that the findings of such studies as 
Fensham and Hooper (1964) of the automated power plant 
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may be due to the increasing size, rather than increasing 
technical sophistication of the plants studied. There 
is still the possibility that other approaches to tech-
nology might have led to stronger results. 
The group continued to attempt to relate structural 
variables to "contextual" ones, and conclude that: 
The predictibility of the structural dimensions 
from contextual elements serves as external 
validating evidence of the structural concepts 
themselves. It has now been shown that besides 
being internally consistent and scalable, as 
previously demonstrated, they can also be 
related in a meaningful way to external refer-
ents. Indeed the size of the correlations 
inevitable raises the question of causal impli-
cations. It is tempting to argue that these 
clear relationships are causal--in particular 
that size, dependence, and the charter-tech-
nology-location nexus largely determine structure 
(90). 
In their explanation, they posit a relationship of 
size to structure via technology--size causing more 
repetition and standardization and hence impersonal 
control (91). The implication would be that if repi-
tition occurred because of some other factor than size, 
it would have similar implications for structure. 
While there is no clear, logical development of 
studies from the group, Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings (1969) 
do proceed to develop the promised "profiles" of org-
anizations. 
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This study is an investigation of "structure," 
in which the authors include structuring of activities, 
concentration of authority, and line control of work-
flow. Most writers use the term "structure" to mean 
something like the the Aston group's 'configuration," 
that is, span of control, percentage of staff vs. line 
and so on. 















A dotted line from "Implicit structure" to "Full bureaucracy" 
would look suspiciously like Perrow's "routine--non-routine" 
co~tinuum (p. 75 ). This might support the view that the 
different usages of the term "technological" are alternate 
ways of considering the same problem. 
While this group seems determined to minimize technology 
and break down the unitary concept of bureaucracy, their 
own results do not clearly support these efforts. In addi-
tion, there are critics to be considered. 
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Critics of Aston. The first critics to be consid-
ered are actually members of the group themselves.: Their 
objections develop from further research. In an "abbre-
viated replication" Inkson, Pugh and Hickson (1970) based 
their report on a one-hour interview with one executive 
in each of 14 companies. The concluded that 
The fact that changes in structure were not 
found to be associated with changes in size 
contrasts with the large correlation of 0.69 
obtained in the earlier study of size and struc-
turing of activities (Pugh et. al.1969b). 
This suggests that in the long run increases in 
structuring would parallel increases in size, 
but that in the -shorter term there is a "ratchet 
mechanism" operating, that is, increases in 
size would bring increasing structuring although 
decreasing size would not result in decreasing 
structure. Decreased concentration 
of authority seems to accompany increased struct-
uring of activities (24). 
The authors do not, however, provide information on the 
structuring of firms that increased or decreased in size 
over the five-year period to support their concept of the 
"ratchet mechanism." 
Another member of the Aston group, Child studied size 
and other variables in businesses, labor unions, 
engineering firms, and the original Aston sample {1973). 
He found that "while the broad outlines of formal organ-
ization structures are predictable with a high degree 
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of confidence from a knowledge of organization size (168)," 
other factors need to be taken into account for a satis-
factory model. He concludes: 
[w]hile size, with technology, location and 
environmental variables, predicts complexity, 
the degree of complexity itself has a more direct 
relationship with formalization than does size. 
Size, however, remains the major predictor of 
decentralizat:bn. It is concluded that, in the 
organizations studied, complexity cannot be satis-
factorily predicted or fully understood without 
reference to the economics of scales, but that 
it is neither theoretically convincing nor stat-
istically demonstrable that size in itself is the 
major determinant of formalization (168). 
Child (1972) also defends the unitary, Weberian con-
cept of bureaucracy against his colleagues efforts to 
splinter it. Apparently he believes that the provision 
of certainJatitude for strategic choice by management does 
not destroy the unity of the concept. 
Mansfield (1973), an "outsider," is stronger in his 
attack. He begins with Aston's understanding of Weber, 
then their operationalization of his concepts, and their 
methodology. Regarding Weber he writes 
Weber's second principle stated that a strict 
system of authority was a vital characteristic 
of a bureaucratic system of administration. 
At no point did he suggest, however, that cen-
tralization of decision-making in such a heir-
archy was a characteristic of bureaucracy nor 
did he even make explicit the relationship 
between bureaucracy and centralization. The 
closest he came to such a description was in 
a statement which implied a negative relation-
ship (478). 
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Mansfield indicates that most of the Aston variables 
are not closely related to the things Weber was concerned 
with. They ask, for example, whether a rule book exists, 
but not whether rules are followed, and ignore such Weberian 
factors as career and specialization of management {480). 
He also believes that their factor analysis is 
mis-leading, because 
[N]ot one of the major items considered by the 
Aston group can usefully be considered as 
vector quantities (484). 
Their scales do not indicate length and direction (vector), 
but simply place the variable on a scale (scalar). 
Aldrich (1972b) took a different approach, devel-
oping a criticism of the Aston group based on a "path 
analysis" model. He first criticizes their measure of 
technology, claiming that 
There is a real question as to whether the 
technology measure is not simply acting as 
a dummy variable for manufacturing/non-manu-
facturing (28-29). 
Aldrich feels that the basic Aston data deals with two 
populations of organization. 
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He recommends that further work should be done 
using technology as an independent variable and emphasizing 
theory-oriented analysis. In such wor~, 
Technology also has high causal priority because 
an organization's choice of its technology is 
deliberate and conscious, with other aspects of 
organization design following logically from the 
particular technology chosen (35). 
Then two outsiders rush to the defense of Aston (Heise, 
1972; Hilton, 1972). The article by Heise is more germane 
to the problems we are concerned with--that is, evaluation 
of different approaches to the study of organizations. 
Heise indicates that Aldrich is wrong because he analyzes 
the Aston data in terms of a causal model, whereas they are 
attempting rather to develop a decision model. He explains 
The Aston group state they are applying 
correlation and regression analyses without making 
presumptions about causal dependencies. This 
implies that they are intent on developing dec-
ision models. Thus, if one has no information on 
structure, their results indicate an approximate 
classification can be made in terms of size and 
technology, and size should be weighted much more 
in the transformation of data than technology, 
since size is a better indicator of structure 
(59). 
In a reply to A~drich, Pugh and Hickson (1972) accept 
Heise's view. They write: 
[T]he ~ston studies are consciously decision 
models. They try to estimate atemporally the 
relationships between stable, meaningful char-
acteristics for organizations that have been oper-
ationally defined and measured (273). 
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They add,nevertheless)that Aldrich provides different 
alternatives for consideration as causal hypotheses, which 
make his work "so interesting and such a useful contri-
bution (275)." But if Aston is not interested in causal 
relationships, their work cannot well be used as an attack 
on those who are. 
To the ~idely-flung battle, the latest entrant is 
Peter Blau. In a major study of state employment security 
offices (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971), he determined that 
size had a major relationship with structure, the admin-
istrative component increasing with decreasing size. He 
later found the same effect in state governmental financial 
units. 
Later, recognizing that the study was limited by the 
special problems of governmental bureaucracy (Argyris, 
1972, Chap. 1), he also studied 124 department stores, 
115 universities and colleges, and 1,279 American teaching 
hospitals (Blau, 1972). In this further work, Blau found 
similar results, and so argues with those who discount 
size effects. 
The larger an organization the more differentiated 
it is along various lines. Whether we look at 
heirarchical levels, functional divisions, sections, 
within them, occupational specialities, or geo-
graphical branches, organizations become differen-
tiated into a larger number of them with increasing 
size, and this is the case for very different 
kinds of organizations (4). 
Butthis finding does not account for procedural, rather 
than structural, differences. 
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Summary and Conclusions. Critics, primarily the 
"Aston group," argue that size is the strongest predictor 
of organizational structure and formalization--students 
of communication would be more interested in the second 
variable. Certain of their own later work tends to de-
emphasize the importance of size. 
Even where they and others such as Blau consider size 
important, they are using some form of decision model. 
The causal effects of size, they conjecture, are mediated 
through some other variables which are part of technology. 
Such variables include repetition, standardizatbn, and 
group structure. Therefore, if these variables occurred 
independently of size, they would cause the same effects. 
S~udents of organizational communication would probably 
be more concerned with the direct, causal effects rather 
than the indirect predictor of size. 
A second effort of the group has been to break down 
the unitary of bureaucracy and replace it with separate 
variables. Yet there seems considerable evidence that 
the aspects do co-vary as the Weberians predict. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
It's a very odd thing--
As odd as can be--
That whatever Miss T. eats 
Turns into Miss T. 
--Walter de la Mare 
Organizations are created out of the environment. 
People, tools, information, material, clients--all come 
from the "outside," and some of them become, for a short 
or long time, part of the system. 
The environment may be discussed in two general 
senses. The first is the broad social setting which 
legitimizes the enterprise. This includes such factors 
as the national political ideology, the general economic 
and educational level, and the broaa religious and ethical 
values. Such factors are considered in Chapter VI. 
The other sense, to be discussed in the present chapter, 
is the environment which provides the immediate input 
of information and material to a given organization. 
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A particular concern of the material below is the effect 
of the environment on the organization's internal structure 
and communication. 
Definitions and Classifications 
Definitions of Environmental Terms 
Relations Among Terms. Tagiuri (1968, 22) lists 
quite a collection of terms having to do with aspects 
of the environment [Table IV]. He admits that some of 
his distinctions are arbitrary, but believes that adop-
tion of the proposed usage will improve communication 
among students of organizations. Unfortunately, it still 
is not clear what the referent is for some terms, partic-
ularly his favorite, "climate." 
He writes 
Climate and atmosphere would be put out-
side this whole hierarchy to function as summary 
concepts that refer to the "quality" of other 
environmental aspects, as experienced by the 
actor. 
A particular configuration of enduring'char-· 
acteristics of the ecological, milieu, social 
system, and culture would constitute a climate, 
much as a particular configuration of personal 
characteristics constitute a personality (1968, 
22-23). 
This presents a peculiar mixture of objective and 
subjective, e.g. "as experienced by the actor", terms. 
TABLE IV 
ARRANGEMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TERMS 
BY PROPOSED CONVENTION 
Environment (ecology) 
Ecology (physical, material) 
Milieu (social: actual presence of persons 
or groups) 
Social System (social: relationship patterns 
of persons or groups) 
Culture (social: meaning system; beliefs) 
Field 










Tagiuri does not make clear whose perceptions at what level 
are involved. However, where his conventions are clear, 
the present paper will follow them, The distinctions among 
"milieu," "social system," and "culture" seem particularly 
useful. And it will also be necessary to make clear, as 
Tagiuri points out, whether we are discussing the environ-
ment g_f the organization, or the environment in the organ-
ization. 
Classification of Environments 
Approaches. Litterer lists three approaches to differ-
entiating environments: 
1. By finding unique characteristics of environ-
ments. Like classifying people by hair-color, 
this might be easily definable but not relevant 
to important characteristics. 
2. By trial-and-error. 
3. By variations in a characteristic, such as 
a. Number of custorm:!~s~ or 
b. Pattern of inputs--speed and precision of 
feedback (1969, 195-196). 
He also states that 
Organizations must relate specific actions or functions 
to specific aspects of an environment. Ultimately, ' 
we may be able to identify these specific aspects. 
As a start, we are beginning to see that c11 environ-
ment is really made up of many different environments 
and than the organizations respond differently to each 
(1968, 195). 
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While his emphasis on specificity is valuable, 
t± would be more parsimonious to consider the variety and type 
of individuals and organizations a given organization had 
to deal with as~a characteristic of its environment, rather 
than as separate environments. For example, Argyris (1972, 
21) criticizes the U.S. State Department for being closed 
to its environment because it seems only to stockpile 
paper about other countries. However, it may be that this 
organization survives by effective relationships with 
other parts of its environment, such as the Congress or the 
Executive Office. 
Tagiuri (1965) lists four "problems' in the classi-
fication of organizational environments: 
a. distinguishing between the objective and 
subjective environment; 
b. distinguishing between the person and the 
setting; 
c. determining what aspects of the environment 
need to be specified; 
d. identifying the structures and dynamics 
of the environment (13). 
However, he does not provide solutions to the problems 
he raisesQ 
Complexity. Heydebrand (1973) defines environments 
as more or less complex, along two dimensions: 
1. The differentiation and heterogeneity of 
its aggregate characteristics, e.g., degree 
of industrial diversification, or different 
types and degrees of social differentiation and 
stratification, such as modern educational 
attainment, percentage of white collar labor 
force, percentage in manufacturing, median family 
income, ethnic and religious differentiation. 
2. The second general element is the number 
of other (similar or dissimilar) organizations 
with whom a given organization can potentially 
interact (14). 
Still, this is more a potential set of categories than 
a set of classifications. 
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An interesting typology of environments was developed 
by Emery and Trist (1965). 
1) Placid, randomized--market of classical 
economics. 
2) Placid, clustered--imperfect competition. 
(A given firm needs knowledge of the environ-
ment). 
3) Disturbed-reactive--oligopo1y. (A firm needs 
knowledge of the environment and of what 
other firms know). 
4) Turbulent fields--dynamic properties are 
not just from the actions of other organi-
zations but from "the field itsel.f." It is 
not possible to get complete information 
(21-32). 
However, they only provide the types, not the_variables. 
That is, it is not stated what continua lead to the types. 
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Certainty--uncertainty. Thompsoµ (1967) and Burns 
and Stalker (1961) seem to simply classify environments 
along a dimension of the relative uncertainty they provide 
1le organization. 
The two writers who have been most active in this 
area, ~aul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, still leave some 
confusion in their classification of environments. While 
most of their theorizing centers around the idea of certainty 
vs.uncertainty in the environment, they discuss other 
characteristics. At one point they mention "'Time span of 
definitive feedback,"and "Relative importance of environmental 
sectors (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, 253)." They also mention 
"heterogeneity" and "differences in tine orientation" 
in different parts of the environment (93-96). 
Melcher (1973) comments specifically on the Lorsch 
(1973) paper in the same volume. Some of his criticisms 
are answered in the author's other writings, but his 
point that not all the variables are clearly differentiated 
is good. As he points out: 
Certainty and feedback are not operationally 
distinguishable. Differing degrees of feedback 
are important factors affecting the degree 
of certainty (1973, 197). 
Summary. The following factors from the various 
authors seem to be important for a complete description 
of the environment of an organization: (1) fue number 
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of other organizations, groups, and individuals that must 
be dealt with; (2) ',ihe diversity and heterogeneity of the 
above; (3) their relative power with regards to each other 
and the organization under study; (4) the amount of change 
or stability in the environment; (5) the predictibi1ity 
of the change that occurs. :Further research is needed to 
refine the above factors. 
Organizational Boundaries 
Membership 
To return to the original definition given in 
Chapter II, 
For a given system, the environment is the set 
of all objects a change in whose attributes 
affect the system and also those objects who 
attributes are changed by the behavior of the 
system (Hall and Hagen, 1956, 33). 
And the same authors immediately question if any "object" 
with those attributes should not be considered part of 
the system. A major problem in studying the organization 
and its environment is differentiating the two. 
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Haas and Drabek (1973, 14-16) offer two character-
istics to differentiate system and environment. First, 
interactions within the system are more frequent, and of 
a similar character, Second, actors within the system 
are under the control of that system. 
Aside from the empirical difficulty of recording 
the interactions of possible members to determine their 
frequency and content, how is the researcher to decide 
which interactions are "similar?" A single job--say a 
football coach--could require a wide variety of activities, 
within and without the system. The coach might budget for 
and buy supplies, read about sports, talk to administrators 
or alumni groups, direct scrimmage, and personally counsel 
players. The authors do not indicate if interactions are 
similar in direction, style, content, or effect. 
"Control" seems a fairly neutral sociological term. 
Yet in fact if one is to determine if A controls B, one 
must deal with difficult problems of motivation. Did he 
do it because he was controlled, or because he wanted to 
do it anyway, or because it would please c. Also, methods 
of control are often subtle and difficult to define. 
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An empirical problem is that control is not the same as 
legitimate control. Spies, divided loyalties, and "going 
native" are common enough to create definitional problems. 
Levels of Participation 
Ecological psychology has developed a more sophisticated 
solution than simply labeling people as "in" or "out." 
Instead, for each behavior setting, they define levels of 
participation as follows: 
Zone 1. Onlooker. This is the most peri-
pheral zone. Persons in this zone are within 
the behavior setting but take no active part 
in the standing pattern of behavior; at most they 
are onlookers. They are tolerated 'b!lt not 
welcomed; they have no power ••• 
Zone 2. Audience or invited guest. The 
inhabitants of this zone have a definite place; 
they are welcome, but they have little power 
in the setting; at most they can applaud or 
express disapproval. 
Zone 3 • Member or customer. Occupants of 
zone 3 have great potential power, but usually 
little immediate power. ~hey are the voting 
members, the paying customers who ultimately 
make or break the setting •••• 
Zone 4. Active functionary. Inhabitants 
of the zone have power over a part of a setting, 
but they do not lead it •••• 
Zone 5. Joint Leaders. • • • Persons 
in zone 5 have immediate authority over the 
whole setting, but their power is shared with 
others ••• 
147 
zone 6 •••• Here are included the positions 
of all persons who-serve as single leaders of 
behavior settings ••• (Barker, 1968, 49-51). 
There are two approaches one could take in using 
this type cf scheme for the study of organizational mem-
bership. A researcher could simply take it over, and 
define as "members" those who reached a certain level of 
participation in a certain percentage of the organization's 
settings. Those with lesser degrees of penetration would 
be considered part of the environment. 
A second approach would be to define levels of par-
ticipation with regard to activities of the organization 
as a whole. A crude scale in these terms could be grad-
ually modified with experience and research. Such a 
scale is proposed below: 
Level 1. Resources. These persons provide 
some resource necessary for the organization, 
but are not actually participants. Example: 
stockholders of most medium-to-large firms. 
Level 2. Peripheral participants. These persons 
show more definite commitment, and have potential 
power. However, their major commitment lies 
elsewhere. Examples: rank-and-file members of 
voluntary organizations, clients in certain types 
of poverty programs. 
Level 3. Full-time. These persons have a 
major, usually full-time commitment to the organ-
ization. They include workers, employees, and 
leaders at all levels. 
Even such a rough classification could avoid 
many of the arguments now held, such as the one over 
the "membership" of clients in health and welfare and 
organizations. According to this classification, some 
organizations might have clients as level l or 2 parti-




Even isolating "an organization" as a unit of study 
is difficult in this day of combinations and conglom-
erates. A cartoon in Mexico made the point something 
like this: 
"Go in either door. It's the same building." (The 
P.R.I. is the dominant political party). 
There are many types of dependent and inter-depen-
dent organizations. Yet the question of whether organization 
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A is part of Organization B, or whether Bis part of 
A's environment is very important in deciding such 
questions as the degree of centra1ization. 
Again, we wi11 take a concept, though not an exact 
pattern, from Barker (1968). He bases the degree of 
local autonomy of a behavior setting on the level at 
which the following decision are made: 
appointment of members 
admittance of members, 
determination of fees and prices, and 
establishment of programs and schedules 
(76). 
This material would have to be tested and revised 
for use with organizations, but is suggested that a system 
that controls at least three of the four items be considered 
independent; one controlling two would be a dependant organ-
ization, and one or none would be a part of the controlling 
organization. 
Conclusion 
Writers on the organizational environment have 
usually tried to define whether a person 11 is" or "is not" 
a part of the organization or part of the environment. 
An alternative is suggested here,that of using 1evels of 
participation in the organization rather than a simple 
member--non-member distinction. 
A second problem is defining whether a system is 
an organization or part of another. Again, a suggestion 
is made that levels of independence be determined, based 
on the authority of the system in question in determining 




'I1here are two main statements predicting the rela-
tionships between environment and structure. 'I1he older 
one, by Burns and Stalker (1961) is qualitative but has 
affected many other writers. They use the terms "organic" 
and "mechanistic." The "mechanistic" system is approp-
ri~te to stable environments. 
In mechanistic systems the problems 
facip.gr- the concern as a whole are broken 
- down into-specialisms; Each individual pur-
sues his task as something distinct from the 
real tasks of the concern as a whole, as if 
it were the subject of a sub-contract •••• 
Operations and working behavier are governed 
by instructions and decisions issued by super-
iors. • • • 
Organic systems are adapted to unstable 
conditions, when problems and requirements 
for action arise which cannot be broken down 
and distributed among specialist roles within 
a clearly defined hierarchy. Individuals have 
to perform their special tasks in the light of 
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their knowledge of the tasks of the firm as 
a whole. Jobs lose much of their formal 
definition ••• Interaction runs laterally 
as much as vertically. communication between 
people of different ranks tends to resemble 
lateral consultation rather than vertical command. 
Omniscience can no longer be imputed to the 
head of the concern (5-6). 
These authors seem to related the need for the different 
types of system to the internal informational and 
decision-making characteristics of the organization. 
That is, the organic form allows for greater sharing 
of information which is not needed in the stable system. 
They specifically related the organic form to Simon's 
"non-programmed decision-making (118)." 
Lorsch and Lawrence (1969) are also concerned with 
environmental uncertainty. They related the type of 
information available at the organizational boundary 
to the internal structure. 
In order to relate effectively to its envir-
onment, any organization must have reasonably 
accurate and timely information about environ-
mental changes. This is clearly an easier 
job if the environment is relatively stable. 
The job can be specified in a pre-determined 
set of operating rules. The necessary messages 
can be handled through the traditional superior-
subordinate channels, which may be few and 
restricted but are probably less subject to 
error and relatively inexpensive. Fairly 
short time horizons are usually adequate ••• 
On the other hand, life in an organizational 
unit must become more complex in order to 
deal with an uncertain and rapidly changing 
sector of the environment. To have more 
points of contact with the environment, a 
flatter organization is employed. Formal 
rules cannot be formulated tha~ will be 
suitable for any appreciable time period, so 
it seems better not to rely heavily on them. 
More of an all-to-all communications pattern 
is indicated, which can keep environmental 
clues moving throughout the unit for inter-
pretation at all points .••• The grow~h of 
this necessarily more complex and soph~s- . 
ticated (as well as more costly) communication 
network is fostered by an interpersonal , 
style that emphasizes building strong relation-
ships rather than just accomplishing the 
task, per se (1969, 25-26). 
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Speaking from slightly different viewpoints, the 
two sets of authors come to the same conclusion. Units 
that deal with unstable environment must be flat with 
open channels for internal communication. Those with 
stable environments can rely on the cheaper but slower 
formal channels. 
Internal Differentiation 
One of the clearest ideas that emerges regarding 
environment and internal organizational structure is 
that the organization facing a differentiated environment 
is, or should be, itself differentiated. Thompson (1967, 
70) writes that different departments are established 
to deal with different parts of a heterogeneous environ-
ment. An example would be a foreign division of a large 
firm. He further writes that "the more constraints and 
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contingencies the organization faces, the more its boundary-
spanning component will be segmented (73)." And, finally, he 
discusses at some length relating contingencies of technol-
ogy and environment. 
First, organizations face the constraints 
inherent in their technologies and task environ-
ments •• 
Second, within these constraints, complex 
organizations seek to minimize contingencies 
and to handle necessary contingencies by 
isolating them for local disposition. Since 
contingencies arise in different ways for 
various organizations, there is a variety of 
structural responses to contingencies. 
Third, where contingencies are many, organ; 
izations seek to cb.ster aspects into self-
sufficient units, each equipped with the 
full array of resources necessary to meet 
contingencies. This means, in effect, that 
variables controlled by the organization are 
subordinated to the constraints and contin-
gencies it cannot escape (78). 
Lorsch and Lawrence (1965, 1969, 471) summarize 
their findings as follows: 
The functional units in these organizations 
were each required to cope with quite distinct 
segments of the organization's environment--
sales with the market, research with the 
scientific environment, etc. 
They found that the most successful plants differentiated 
different departments in style and structure, and used 
integrating units to connect them. 
in a historical study of four large U.S. business 
firms, Chandler (1962) discovered that expansion in 
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size and products did lead to the establishment of separate 
divisions. He writes 
if diversity rather than increased size of 
operations lead to organizational inadequacies,~ 
then it becomes clearer why these four companies 
were among the earliest in the United States 
to consider structural reorganization {302). 
This section can also be related to this paper's 
earlier discussion of systems (Chapter II). General 
Systems theory indicates that heirarchy, or sub-division, 
is a characteristic of systems. The advantage of this 
type 1of organization is that it is more flexible. It 
can "degrade gracefully" under stress, returning to its 
constituent parts, while a unitary organization would be 
destroyed. Thus environmental stress would account for 
the unitary, disconnected nature of Resistance groups 
and Communist cells. 
Summary of Theory 
Organizations faced with certain environments 
may limit their information intake and spread it through 
the slow, vertical ·channels. Those with unstable environ-
ments must open channels of communication both internally 
and with the environment. 
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Organizations faced with a variety of environments 
must have differentiated units to deal with them. 




Some studies dealing with the organizational 
environment suffer from confusion in the definition 
of boundaries. For example, Greiner, Leitch and Barnes 
(1968) attempted to improve the functioning of Internal 
Revenue Service district offices by the use of training 
based on Blake"'·s managerial grid. Courageously they 
write: 
[n]istrict climate seemed deeply rooted in 
factors largely outside the control of local 
management. Our findings revealed little change 
in the climates for the eight districts over 
a three-year period. Moreover, those climate 
changes which did take place could not be attrib-
uted to the Grid program (199). 
They believe the environment largely controlled 
the organization (220). However, while the managerial 
grid describes an organization's internal goals and 
leadership, many of the items used to test change had 
to do with dealings with the public. The authors do 
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note that there was some change in internal relation-
ships, but not in the external area of taxpayer relations 
(211). A clearer definition of boundaries could have 
made the study more useful. 
Differentiation and Integration 
Lorsch and Allen (1973) studied differentiation 
and integration in large multi-divisional firms. In 
these organizations, they found that 
In the low performing corporate-divisional 
pairs the more differentiation the poorer the 
integration, while the high performing 
pairs there was a tendency to achieve both 
high differentiation and high integration (67). 
Apparently this synthesis of antagonistic states was 
reached through considerable conscious effort, and a 
tendency to leave alone those divisions that were 
performing well. 
An interesting analysis of the recording industry 
by Peterson and Berger (1971) produced results consistent 
with Lorsch and Lawrence. The authors found that 
record companies were in three parts: manufacturing, 
which was very bureaucratic; sales, a flat organization; 
and production, which was very loosly organized. 
Each producer of popular music is given a great deal 
of discretion to find talent and put together records. 
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However, in the "older" market, including jazz and 
classical records, where the environment is less turbulent, 
the producer has less discretion and does not form an 
independent unit. 
Similarly, Morse and Lorsch (1970) studied four 
organizational units. Two used production lines, two 
did research in communications technology. The better 
plants had social systems that fit their task. For the 
production plant, this involved defined and structured 
formal relationships, formal control~ and a short view 
of time. Relationships for the laboratory were opposite. 
Criticism. The measure developed by Lorsch and 
Lawrence for the measurement of environmental uncertainty 
has, however, had strong attacks(Tosi, Aldag, & Story, 
1973a). These writers correlated the Environmental 
Uncertainty Sub-Scale with "more objective measures" 
taken from Standard and Poor•s Compustat tapes. They 
describe these as follows: 
Three volatility measures were collected .•• 
for each industry and firm ••• The coefficient 
of variation for sales over the past ten years 
was used as a measure of market volatility.-· • 
As a measure of technological change, the average 
ratio of the sum of research and development 
expenditures and capitol expenditures to total 
costs over the past ten years was used ••• 
Finally ... the coefficient of variation of 
earnings before interest and taxes over the 
past ten years (30-31). 
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This study is particularly valuable because it attempted 
to use "hard" data rather than attitudinal or qualitative 
measures of the variables. 
The authors found that the Lorsch and Lawrence 
sub-scale had poor internal reliability, and sections of 
it could not be validly used alone. And correlating the 
scale to the "hard" measures, they found: 
The correlations are low and inconsistent, 
ranging from -.0294 to 0.036. The research 
subscale is negatively correlated with all the 
volatility measures. The manufacturing subscale 
shows low positive correlations, while the market-
ing subscale and the total scale score show 
negative correlations with all the volatility 
measures. In some cases, correlations are 
significantly negative (31). 
As they comment, one cannot even take refuge in the 
usual consolation that the results were "in the right 
direction." 
Reply. Lawrence and Lorsch reply to the criticisms 
by analyzing the contradictory study (1973). They make 
two major criticisms and a lesser one. 
First, they claim that Tosi, et. al.'s "volatility" 
is not equivalent to their "uncertainty." 
First, their measure of volatility would 
increase as a result of periodic fluctuations 
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in sales, etc. which would be entirely predictable 
to experienced managers and, therefore, not a 
source of uncertainty in our terms. 
Second, we used a separate but related 
way of characterizinq uncertainties which is 
not captured in the idea of volatility, namely 
the length of time needed for environmental 
feedback. 
Finally, two of the three indicators of 
volatility are really tied to fluctuations in 
organizational outputs--sales and income--rather 
than inputs. In other words, they reflect 
only those uncertainties that the firms involved 
had not been able to regularize by their own 
actions (397). 
Further, they claim that their measurements are 
justified by a system of "cross-checking" which Tosi et. 
al. failed to provide for theirs. They claim their findings 
were enforced 
(1) by carefully selecting industries for 
sharp contrasts in environmental uncertainty 
based on the general a priori repetition; 
(2) by studying and reporting "hard" economic 
indicators; 
(3) by conducting lengthy structured interviews 
with informants •.. (397). 
Finally, they make a lesser criticism that Tosi 
et. al.used inadequate informants--as few as one, and 
that one not oriented to social factors, and extremely 
broad categories of industries. 
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Rejoinder. Tosi et. al. (1973b) agreed in a rejoinder 
that "volatility" is not the same as "uncertainty," but 
they argue that the two should be highly correlated. 
Further, they claim that "volatility" is widely used in 
finance as a "measure of risk.," and is as "hard"'as other 
economic measures (399). They seem to deny the need •for 
any further "cross-checking." 
Finally, regarding the selection of informants, they 
point out that Lawrence and Lorsch give no guidelines on 
who must be selected as informant., or how they are to be 
oriented. They claim they chose knowledgable executives. 
The situation seems to boil down to the old saw 
"Further research must be done." The attack on measures 
does not invalidate the theory., but renders it "not proven." 
' Work must begin by clarifying the concept of uncertainty 
and relating it to volatility. Lorsch and Lawrence must do 
further testing of their measuring instruments., and use 
the improved instruments to further test their propositions. 
Environment an Information 
Some writers imply that the environment only affects 
the organizatm tll~ough the information members have about 
it. However, an effect may begin before the cause is known, 
and there can be direct, physical effects, from earthquake 
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fire, and flood to petty shop-lifting. But information 
about the environment is significant in affect.ingthe system, 
and two studies relate it to organizational differentiation. 
The first was a comparative case study by Dill 
{1958) of two Norwegian factories of roughly the same 
size. Alpha was a clothing manufacturer, while Beta did 
engineering and contracting. 
Buyers usually came to Alpha twice a year, to order 
clothing stocks for the new season. At Beta, there was 
constant concern for new tasks, developing new relationships 
and products. This affected the internal communication 
system. 
Because the environment of management at Alpha 
was less differentiated, more inputs were directed 
to the firm as a whole. If they did not demand 
uniform action from different work groups, they 
frequently made it difficult to avoid coordinated 
action. A single customer's order might request 
simultaneous deliver of several products; a 
union complaint about incentive rates might 
cause adjustments in all departments {124). 
In contrast, at Beta, a briefing was required 
before different departments could even begin to discuss 
problems. Dill implies that lack of internal communication 
may have a circular effect, making further communication 
even more difficult (127). 
A more recent study by Reeves and Turner compared 
the organization of batch production factories. They 
point out that 
In many respects the complexity of the pro-
duction systems in the two batch production 
firms was a function of their market position 
and the nature of the products they were manu-
facturing. The fact that they were making their 
products in discrete batches .•. was a function 
of the level of market demand for the their 
products (87). 
This complex input requires a complex internal 
communication system. The firms must employ "chasers" 
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to discover where the products are. They also h~ve regulal'.'___ 
meetings to locate and expedite batches that are overdue. , 
Health and Welfare inte.r-dependeucy. Aiken and 
Hage (1968) did a study in quite a different type of 
setting from those above--health and welfare organizations. 
They compared organizations with various numbers of 
joint, cooperative programs with other organizations. 
They found that 
Organizations with many joint programs have 
more active internal communication channels 
(284) 
and 
[o]rganizations with many joint programs have 
less routine technology (289). 
However, their measures are not well thought out. 
For example, their measure of activity in the "communication 
163 
system" is only concerned with non-heirarchical communi-
cation such as committees. And the measure of "routine" 
technology is by questionnaire, and they do not consider 
the possibility of contamination by a morale factor. 
That is, seeing one's work'as "routine" may be a matter 
of low morale, and also related to the lack of innovative, 
cooperative programs. 
Simulation. A different approach, invo1vmgcomputer 
simulation, was taken by Bonini (1963). He found that 
organizations in a simulated variable environment had 
lower costs and prices and higher sales, inyentories, 
and profits than those in stable environments. He did 
not simulate any variables of internal structure. 
Environment and the Aston Group. The industrial 
sociologists at the University of Aston--discussed at length 
in the previous chapter--have a variable in their scale 
which they call "environment." Actually,it is only a 
measure of the organization's direct dependence on other 
organizations (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1969). 
Their original findings indicated that dependent firms 
were more structured, more centralized and less auton-
omous. 
A replication (Hinings & Lee, 1971) 'found similar 
results using the same instruments. 'fuey did find one 
difference. 
[T]here is one finding here which differs 
from the Birmingham study. Dependence is found 
to have a significant and negative relationship' 
to those variables which have been identified 
as conce~ning structure. The more dependent 
an organization is, the less likely it is to be 
clearly structured. But this finding cannot be 
taken at face value due to the relationship 
between dependence ,and size (r=-0.6). For this 
small sample, it is the small organizations 
which are dependent (e.g. branch factories) 
whereas the larger ones are less dependent (e.g. 
legal subsidiaries). Thus, the exact relationship 
between d~pendency and structuring awaits further 
investigation (92). 
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There is no clear relationship between these findings and 
the theories previously offered. 
summary 
The importance of organizational environments is 
widely recognized bµt poorly understood. ~he first problem 
is the failure to draw boundaries between organization, 
both regarding membership and other, related organizations. 
A solution is suggested in terms of levels of membership 
and levels of dependence. 
The second major problem is--tfie lack of classification 
of environments, and a classification is proposed in terms 
of change, predictibility, and heterogeneity. 
Theory is presented which predicts that organizations 
in unstable environments will be flat and open, while those 
in stable environments will be heirarchical. Al.so, 
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organizations facing differentiated environments must be 
differentiated as well. Studies bearing on these points 
were discussed and evaluated. 
CHAPTER VI 
GOALS 
Reasons for Studying Goals 
There are two reasons for a consideration of organ-
izational goals. The first is that the organizational 
goal, like the technology or the environment, may affect 
the organization's communication system. Eisenstadt 
(1965) writes 
[T]he major goals of any bureaucratic organization; 
the place of those goals in the social structure 
of the society, and the type of dependence of 
the bureaucracy on external forces (whether 
clients, holders of political power, or other 
prominent groups) may be of great importance in 
influencing its internal structure (196). 
Such relationships can be direct, as when a goal of 
"democracy" -leads -to open~communi-cation -channels-. 
Or,they may be more subtle. Such goal characteristics 
as clarity, multiplicity, or ease of accomplishment may 
have consequences for the nature of the organization. 
The second reason for consideration of goals is the 
need to study organizational effectiveness. That is, 
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can only evaluate how well something is done in the 
light of what is meant to be done. And any consideration 
of the advantages of different organizational systems--
bureaucratic, ad-hoc, contingent--must deal with the 
prolem of organizational effectiveness. 
Many businessmen as well as social critics are very 
much concerned with the goals to be accomplislEd by 
industry. In a forum article (Bell, Coase, Greenberger, 
& Parker, 1971) Daniel Bell discusses issues regarding 
possible business goals: satisfaction on the job, minor-
ity employment, relative pay, responsibilities to the 
community, the environment, and moral issues (7). Similar 
questions have been raised about the proper goals of 
other types of organizations. 
Even in the most straightforward case, the "goal" 
may prove elusive. A company• s actions may be very 
different depending on whether it regards its goal as the 
production of widgets, turning a profit, or providing 
jobs for the founder and his family. 
Defining and Classifying Goals 
Definition 
Goals are one of the defining characteristics of the 
"formal" organization. There is alw?).ys some element of 
purpose or objective--unlike Topsy, General Motors didn't 
"just grow." Blau (1968) writes: 
The defining criterion of a formal organiza-
tion--or an organization, for short--is the 
existence of procedures for mobilizing and 
coordinating the efforts of various, usually 
specialized, sub-groups in the pursuit of joint 
objectives (298). 
Similarly, Sofer (1972) writes: 
Organizations are associations of persons grouped 
together aroun the pursuit of specific goals . 
• • • 1Mlembers of the organization come together 
to pursue converging or overlapping interests 
rather than because of more diffuse sentiments 
or feelings of mutual belonging. These may well 
develop out of their association, but they are 
not the central reason for the persons being 
assembled together (1). 
But while, for some writers, the "goal" is part 
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of the definition of organization, others consider it 
improper to use the term at all (see Perrow, 1968). In 
this view, only persons can have intentions, and to speak 
of an organizational "goal" is to reify or anthropomorphize. 
Simon solves the problem by re-casting goals into 
his decisional framework. 
It appears convenient to us to use the term 
"organizational goal" to refer to constraints., 
or sets of constraints, imposed by the organizational 
role., that have only an indirect relation with the 
personal motives of the individual who fills the 
role (1964,1). 
This definition, however,creates difficulties because of 
its individua~ psychological approach to what is usually 
considered a social or organizational phenomenon. 
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Furthermore, the implications of Simon's approach are static. 
Clearly, organizational goals persist over some length of 
time. In this sense they can be considered equivalent to 
the equilibrium state of a system--the level which the 
system maintains against environmental pressures. 
However, goals also change. Thompson, for example, 
defines goals simply "intended future dimensions (1967, 
127)." If the goal is achieved, it will no longer require 
organizational effort. In an earlier work, he referred 
to goal changes: 
It is possible ••• to view the setting of goals 
(i.e. major organizational purposes) not as a 
static element but as a necessary and recurring 
problem facing any organization (1958, 123). 
In another forum, this one on systems, {Grinker, 
1967, Deutsch suggests 
Would you put "goal-seeking" between "maintenance" 
and "change"? "Maintenance" means that you main-
tain the physical channel system. "Change" means 
it would have to drift somewhere else. But "goal-
seeking" means that a system in organization moves 
in search of certain things which are not directly 
related to its maintenance (299). 
While this idea is attractive, it is not fully worked out. 
For example, it would not label an animal's search for 
food as "goal-seeking," because what was sought ·was nec-
essary for maintenance. 
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A,more fertile approach comes from Haberstroh, who 
analyzes goal-directed activities in terms of two types 
of control: 
The task analysis comprises a program of means 
activities understood by the participants to 
lead to goal achievement. One way of responding 
would be to adjust the level of resources used 
in these means activities. Let us refer to this 
as "routine control." Another way of responding 
would be to look for a better way of achieving 
goals. This type of activity could take the 
form of inventing new means activities or of, 
altering the system of executive functioning. 
It might be expected that this type of activity 
would only occur in a case of extreme or repeated 
failure (1960, 446). 
This division of goal-related beha~ior allows for contin-
uous goals, future goals, and for the changing of organi-
zational goals. It would even allow for either a more 
psycholog1cal or a more sociological approach to opera-
tionalization. 
Child (1972b) prefers the term "strategic choice" 
to "goals." He points out that choice has to do not 
only with the lee-way provided by environment and tech-
nology, but also with the choice of technology and envir-
onment. 
This very significant paper points out that organi-
zations affect, as well as being affected by, their en-
vironment (4), and at least can expand or contract.their 
environmental contacts. Also, choices'are possible in 
the creation of technology, as shown in the Tavistock 
studies (Miller & Rice, 1967). 
Child summarizes 
We have been concerned with the role of stra-
tegic choice as a necessary element in any 
adequate theory of organizational structure, and 
have suggested that many available explanations 
over-emphasize constraints upon that choice. 
In so doing they draw our attention away from the 
possibilities first of choosing struc~ural arr-
angements that will better satisfy the prior-
ities of those in charge of organizations, or 
indeed of any interested party, and secondly 
away from the exploration of organizational 
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design as a means of reconciling more successfully 
economic and social criteria of performance (17-
18). 
Classifying Goals 
Goal Types. Only two authors have provided sets 
of classifications of organizational goals. One set, 
by Eisenstadt (1965), is primarily a classification of 
organizations by consideration of their over-riding goals, 
and in that sense is parallel to Parsons (1960) economic, 
political, and integrative organizations (45-46). However, 
Eisenstadt recognizes the possibility of multiple or 
changing goals within his classification, which are economic, 
socio-political, and cultural goals. Thus the university, 
a cultural organization--"scientific, educational, or 
literary" --must al so function in the economic and political 
arenas if it is to obtain the funding to survive. 
Perrow presents five classes of goals, based on 
Cyert and March (1963). 
(1) Societal goals. Referent: society in 
general. Examples: produce goods and services; 
maintain order; generate and maintain cultural 
values . . . 
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(2) Output goals. Referent: the public in 
contact with the organization. This category 
deal with the types of output defined in terms 
of consumer functions. Examples: consumer 
goods; business services; health care; education. 
t3) System goals. Referent: the state or manner 
of functioning of the organization, independent 
of the goods or services it produces or its 
derived goals. Examples: the emphasis upon 
growth, stability, profits, or upon modes of 
functioning, such as being tightly or loosely 
controlled or structured •.•• 
(4) Product goals (or, more exactly, product-
characteristic goals). Referent: the charac-
teristics of the goods or services produced. 
Examples: an emphasis upon quality or quantity, 
variety, styling, availability, uniqueness, or 
innovativeness of the products •••• 
(5) Derived goals. Referent: the uses to which 
the organization puts the power it generates 
in the pursuit of other goals. Examples: 
political aims; community services; employee 
development; and investment and plant-location 
policies which affect the state of the ecmomy 
and the future of specific communities (135-
136). 
This broad classification, while lacking theoret-
ical elegance, should provide a better vocabulary for 
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discussing certain problems. For example, certain "human 
relations" writers (Likert, 1967; Argyris, 1972) argue 
that organizations must provide for the personal growth 
of their members. Classical writers, in contrast, seem 
to see the only legitimate goal as the production of 
more and better widgets (see Bell, Cease, Greenberger, 
& Parker~ 1971). This can be seen as a conflict of 
goal types--system goals vs. output goals. 
Goal Diffuseness and Change. However, this improve-
ment in vocabulary does not give the key to organizational 
structure hoped for. Such information as is available 
on this relationship can be classified under two headings: 
goal diffuseness and goal change. 
The two topics are closely related. As is clear 
from the classification system above, organizations have 
multiple goals. They must, at least, aim at their out-
put and their~internal maintenance. The more vague and 
conflicting the goals are, the more likely there is to 
to be some trade-off, or slighting of one goal for another. 
A classic study of goal change was Selznick's (1949) 
investigation of the Tennessee Valley Authority. In this 
work, Selznick introduced the term "co-optation": 
[c]o-optation is the process of absorbing 
new elements into the leadership or policy-
determining structure of an organization as 
a means of averting threats to its stability 
or existence ••.• 
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co~optation tells us something about the 
process by which an institutional environment 
impinges itself upon an organization and eff~cts 
changes in its leadership, structure, or policy 
(13) . 
Selznick apparently believes that co-optation of 
certain elements was necessary to achieve the goal of organ-
icational survival. However, accomodating these new ele-
ments required the sacrifice of certain of the original 
goals, such as services to poor farmers. This trade-
off was easier because some goals were vague, with no 
standards set for their accomplishment. For example, 
"Improve practices of poor farmers" is more vague than 
"Produce fertilizer." 
Selznick uses another term--institutionalization 
for another type of goal change: 
Because organizations are social systems, goals 
or procedures tend to achieve an established, 
value-impregnated status. ~e say that they become 
institutionalized (1949, 256). 
To Selznick, this seems to be generally a positive, stab-
ilizing force for society. "Organizations" are cold and 
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rational; "institutions"--the church, Old Miss, even the 
old family firm--help make our experience richer and more 
meaningful. 
Merton (1967) sees the same phenomenon in a more 
sinister light. He refers to "goal-displacement--in the 
present terminology, a substitution of derived goals for 
putput goals. He sums up one such situation in the term 
"trained incapacity." 
Such inadequacies in orientation which involve 
trained incapacity clearly derive from structural 
sources. The process may be briefly recapitulated. 
(1) An effective bureaucracy demands reliability 
of response and strict devotion to regulations. 
(2) Such devotion to the rules leads to their 
transformation into absolutes ••• 
(3) This interferes with ready adaptation under 
special conditions not clearly envisaged by 
those who drew up the general rules. 
(4) Thus, the very elements which conduce toward 
efficiency in general produce inefficiency 
in specific instances. Full realization of the 
inadequacy is seldom attained by the members 
of the group who have not divorced themselves 
from the meanings which the rules have for 
them. These rules in time become symbolic 
in cast, rather than strictly utilitarian 
(1967, 200). 
Thus the derived goal of following the rules overrides 
the outpit, or quality, goal of providing good service 
to each individual. 
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Studies 
While there is considerable literature in some way 
relevant to the topic of organizational goals, most of 
it is not organized in t~rms of that concept. And rarely_ 
is much new ground broken beyond the early work cited 
above. 
Goal Change 
Crozier and "Bureaucracy." One often-cited work is 
Crozier's (1964) study of two French bureaucracies--one 
a clerical, accounting officeof the government; the other 
a state-owned manufacturing plant. He follows Merton, 
concentrating on "bureaucracy" in what he calls 
the vulgar and frequent use •.• It evokes the 
slowness, the ponderousness, the routine, the 
complication of procedu~e, and the maladjusted 
response of "bureaucratic" organizations to the 
needs which they should satisfy ••• {3). 
However, the government bureau seems actually to have 
been a fairly effective place. While clearly it was gloomy 
and miserable in a physical sense--unsafe and unhygienic 
(33)--only a third of the workers were dissatisfied (21). 
While the department, which was the Paris branch, may have 
been less effective than the provincial branches, it seems 
to have gotten the job done. Apparently the goals--as 
imposed by the legislature--strongly emphasized economy, 
an adequate level of public service, and the absolute 
minimum in employee satisfiers. 
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The manufacturing plant~ afflicted with "ponder-
ousness, routine, and complication of procedures." However, 
it was clear that maintaining employment and satisfying 
employees were important goals for it, not rapid production 
or profit. The plant was required by law to hire from 
certain needy groups--such as war widows--and strictly 
controlled by union seniority regulations in the placement 
and promotion of workers after hiring. Again, one could 
argue that the goals neglected were not important to the 
organization. 
Co-optation in Zambia. A study by Bates (1970) 
shows an attempt to co-opt the mineworkers union of Zambia. 
The leaders were offered prestige and the possibility of 
desireab1e jobs in return for adopting government goals. 
Bates writes 
Instead of an exclusive commitment to advancinq 
the interests of their members in higher wages, 
in their grievances against supervisors, and in 
their desire to work less hard while receiving 
greater pay, the union leaders are asked to 
performtheir duties as conscientious spokesmen 
for the public interest (905). 
But while the government was able to co-opt the 
leadership, that group was not able to bring their organ-
ization along. For example, with a government policy 
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and leadership opposed to strikes and encouraging increased 
productivity, there was a 300% increase in strikes, and 
no evidence of increased productivity (911). 
On the local level, there also seems to be a general 
belief among the membership that even the stewards have 
been co-opted, that they have "sold out (920)". The 
local stewards "believe that by achieving management's 
respect they will win more cases and thus gain the loyalty 
of members (921)." 
Bates indicates that [considering\member goals] 
our data indicate that the Union is relatively 
effective; that it wins cases the members care 
about; and that the local branches, which are 
in closest contact with the members, are as 
effective as the national level of the Union 
(921 ) • 
He relates the failure to achieve the leader's 
goals to the union's social and communications structure. 
The stewards had offices outside the factory gates where 
members with grievances could report to them immediately 
after the shift. This was very effective for sending 
grievance material upward, However, the means for sending 
goal information downward were limited. The only real 
channel was the general meeting--and the miners did not 
attend these meetings when the messages were unpopular 
(916-918). 
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Structure to Support Goals. Quite a different study, 
but with a complementary result, was done by Goldenberg 
(1971). This book is a report of the setting up of a 
residential treatment center for delinquent youths, an 
Office of Economic Opportunity funded project. Goldenberg 
believes that the typical pyramidal organization does not 
allow information to flow upward from those who know the 
situation--in this case, the client--best (92). He also 
believed that organizational structure reflects organizational 
goals, and that the appropriate structure is the key to 
prevention of goal displacement (84). The organization 
was therefore run by a continuing "t-group," intended 
to maintain equality and stress the importance of every 
staff member (158). The organizational structure was 
effective in terms of output criteria, and apparently 
successful in its derived goal of maintaining a certain 
structure. 
Zald and Ash (1966) discuss another type of organ-
ization, the Movement Organization, and how it may modify 
its structure to maintain its goals. They define a Move-
ment Organization as one that wishes to change society (329). 
They cite what they call the Weber-Michels view that 
the original charismatic leadership of such an organization 
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must be replaced, and the organization must become more 
conservative and committed to its own maintenance (327). 
Zald and Ash believe the results can be affected either 
the organization's environment, or by deliberate manipu~a-
tion of structure. 
For example, an organization might change through 
the achievement of its goals in the society, as did the 
abolitionist and women suffrage movements, rather than by 
a change of leadersh'ip(330). Orrthe nature of its goals 
may make an organization relatively immune from pressure 
to change. 
The more insulated an organization is by exclu-
sive membership requirements and go~ls aimed 
at changing individuals, the less susceptible it 
is to pressures for organizational maintenance 
or general goal transformation (332). 
Even the organization that might be subject to outside 
pressure can structure itself so as to maintain its original 
goals. For example, they can keep the leaders low paid, 
and transfer them often so they cannot build up their own 
empires. They summarize 
In short, the militant MO is given a quasi-exclu-
sive structure not only to implement goals, but 
also to maintain them in the face of pressures 
to become more conservative (340). 
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Juvenile Institutions. Goldenberg's Residential 
Youth Center was designed as a substitute for such standard 
institutions as juvenile reformatories and mental hospitals. 
The goals of these institutions have also been studied. 
Zald (1962) was part of the group study later reported 
in Street, Vintner, and Perrow (1966). He analyzed the 
data in terms of those juvenile institutions emphasizing 
custodial vs. treatment goals. He related these goals 
to the conflict within the organization. He concludes 
that: 
Analysis reveals that the level of conflict 
is lower in the in the most custodial institutions, 
and is higher in institutions with mixed goals 
or predominately treatment goals. The pattern 
of staff conflict is found to be lin'J~ed to tre 
power balance in the institution, the degree 
of divergent perspectives among groups, and the 
amount of interdependence and intercommunication 
among groups (22). 
Zald does not make clear why these effects occur. 
One might logically expect the most conflict in those 
institutions with mixed goals, with those clearly dedi-
cated to treatment or custody relatively calm. It could 
be that even the most treatment-oriented must have some 
goal of custody to keep things running and minimally clean 
and safe, and this creates conflicts. Or it could be that 
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treatment institutions were set up somewhat like the 
Residential Youth Center, with no clear heirarchy to 
resolve disputes. Or the difficulty could be the lack 
of a clear technology to translate the goals into behavior. 
Mental Hospital Goals. Scheff (1962) stresses the 
weakness and ambiguity of treatment goals and the ease of 
their displacement in various ,Jards of a mental hospital. 
It was not clear to staff if patients were to be treated 
as "sick people" or "just like anyone else," and there-
fore it was easier to emphasize custodial or maintenance 
goals. 
Other problems were the "regulation of staff be-
havior by outside groups, and the availibility of role 
imagery to structure staff-inmate relations (209)" as 
well as the conflict with the attendants•s need to gain 
status by separating themselves from the patients. This 
seems to be another case in which the goals of the leaders--
here, treatment and equalitarianism--cannot over-ride the 
goals of the lower-level participants. 
Vague Goals and the Environment. Zald and Ash (1966) 
considered the effects of the environment on Movement Organ-
izations. Zald and Dentcn.(1963) considered the environment 
and goal change in the YMCA. 
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The YMCA was origianlly intended to provide spiritual and 
practical help for young, single men in the city. However, 
the goals were always broadly stated, and no particular 
efforts were made to hold to an ideology. Za~d and Denton 
conclude that the 
broadly stated goals and unrestricted c1iente1e 
encourage a wide diversification of programs and 
target populations (214). 
Thus the vague goals provided no means to resist envir-
onmental pressure. 
A vivid example of environmental effects on organ-
izational goals is given in the report of a city Youth 
Commission in a college town (Maniha & Perrow, 1965). 
As background, the authors state 
The organization had little reason to be formed, 
no goals to guide it, and was staffed by people 
who set out to insure a minimal, no-action role 
in the community. By virtue of its existence 
and broad province, however, it was seized upon 
as a valuable weapon by other organizations 
for the pursuit of their goals. In the course 
of being used, the commission became a viable 
organization in its own right with new goals, 
even as its members denied that the no-act:ion 
policy had been compromised (238). 
In this case the vagueness of the original goals gave the 
organization flexibility to seize certain opportunities 
as they arose. 
Simpson and Gulley (1962) studied goals in a broad 
assortment of voluntary associations. They asked whether 
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the organizations were focussed or diffuse in their goals, . 
and whether membership involvement was important to their 
goals. They found that 
[o]rganizations with the widest range of pressure 
will tend to score low on an index of centralization 
of authority, and high on emphasis on membership 
involvement in organizational activities and 
attention devoted to internal communication (344). 
The organizations which needed member support for their 
goals maintained them by devoting a considerable portion 
of their resources to spreading and reinforcing them. 
Goal Conflict. Broad, ambiguous goals, then, can 
' have some advantages for flexibility and survival. What 
about goals which actually conflict? Three studies bear 
on this point. 
The Spanish Empire. Phelan (1960) studied the goals 
of the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy dur~ng the golden 
age. Orders came from church and crown and government 
bureaus. This confusion could be used by the vice-rays 
to gain independence: 
Given the ambiguity of goals and the frequent 
conflict among the standards all the laws could 
not be enforced simultaneously. The prevalence 
of mutually conflicting standards which prevented 
a subordinate from meeting all standards at once, 
gave subordinates a voice in decision-making 
without jeopardizing the centralized control of 
their superiors (47). 
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Phelan points out that the use of several different heir-
archies served both to look after the importance of various 
goals and served to see that information was transmitted 
back to Spain. 
Industry in Communist Lands. Frank (1958-1959) 
finds similar principles at work in Soviet industry. 
A Russian factory has to respond to market conditions, 
( 
buyers, and suppliers just like one in a capitalist country. 
At the same time, it must meet government plans and demands 
of the Communist Party. The management must violate some 
standards to carry out others (10). At the same tim7, 
their superiors have alternatives for evaluation and 
enforcement. Apparently some global factor of over-all 
success is more important than the viol'ation of a given 
law or standard. 
Factories in Yugoslavia have a double heirarchy, 
probably similar to that in Russia. Authority is supposed 
to come from the "worker's collective," which is made up 
of a11 workers, who are represented by a council of about 
30, some decisions being made by a managing board of about 
10. This heirarchy is over a second, normal heirarchy 
with workers at the bottom (Kavcic, Rus, & Tannenbaum, 
1971). 
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Participation by workers is an organizational goal. 
While various factories achieved it in different degrees, 
it was found to be unrelated to such other measures as 
productivity, economic success, or wages--which reflect 
profits. Since these goals are not mutually contributory, 
it may well be that the use of special internal structures 
may insure that each receives some attention. 
Levels of Goals. Most writers in this area pay 
little attention to the problem of determing what organizational 
goals are. Haberstroh gives a tantalizing hint of his 
methodology, indicating that he determined the goals 
of the steel company he studied by "content analysis" of 
internal communication (1960, 44). 
He wrote that 
In the case of Integrated Steel, four 
goals were discovered. These related to cost 
reduction, proquction level, safety, and medical 
care. The safety and production goals are 
formulated in terms of acceptable level by an 
external office. Performance'is measured in 
terms of tonnage produced and frequency of 
injuries •••• The goal of providing adequate 
medical care was departmentalized in a plant 
hospital; and a standard cost system and various 
cost reduction programs were in operation (446). 
He analyzes the safety program in some detail, in 
terms that are of interest to us. The safety program 
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consisted of two parts: time-triggered routine inspections 
and recommendations as well as safety training; and event-
triggered reports and investigations required after every 
accident (446). 
Again, this plant demonstrates the strategy of 
using different units for different, and possibly conflict-
ing goals. In addition, Haberstroh indicates another 
strategy for dealing with conflict of goals. Some goals 
are cast in terms of optimizing--for example,cutting 
costs as much as possible. Others are defined as meeting 
a certain level; for.example, producing x tons of steel. 
When those goals are being reached, no special effort is 
required for them. 
Conclusions 
This has been a disconnected and difficult area of 
the literature to explore and to summarize. However, some 
tentative conclusions can be drawn. 
First, goals should be seen in the broad framework 
of strategic choice. The organization is manipulated to 
achieve certain ends, including the choice of technology 
and environment. 
However, goals are not of primary importance in 
immediately determining organizational social structure 
and communication. 
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articulated goals cannot necessarily be communicated to 
lower-level members or established in the face of technical 
or human problems that oppose them. 
At the same time, within technological limits, goals 
may be significant for understanding organizational struc-
ture. Multiple, conflicting goals may be enforced by 
separate organizational units and separate coITu~unication 
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channels. Internal or derived goals may modi§y the structure. 
When goals are relatively narrow and specific, 
or when the organization places great stress on the goal 
and on communicating it to members, the goal is more 
likely to be carried out. 
On the other hand, broad general goals leave more 
flexibility that may contribute to organizational expan-
sion or survival. 
Now, we turn to the other reason for consideration 
of organizational goals--their relationship to organizational 
effectiveness. 
Effectiveness 
Consideration of organizational effectiveness is 
necessary to evaluate the costs and advantages of different 
organizational structures. 
A major collection of studies of effectiveness 
was made by Price (1968). He writes: 
Effectiveness, the dependent variable of this 
inventory, ma:y be defined as the degree of 
goal-achievement. For example, a prison, 
which has a custodial goal, and which has a 
low escape rate among its inmates, would be 
an effective organization (2 ). 
Again, Price notes, we face the problem of determining 
the organization's goals. 
Types of Effectiveness 
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The inventory includes literature concerned with 
"productivity, morale, conformity, adaptiveness, and 
institutionalization (3)." Price assumes "that these 
variables are generally and positively related to effect-
iveness (3)." He weights productivity most heavily in 
evaluating the results of studies. 
It seems that it would be better to that an 
organization with high morale was effective in reaching 
that derived goal. The relationship to any other goal 
would remain problematic, and, of course, open to inves-
tigation. An author like Blake (Blake & Mouton, 1965) 
argues that one concern have the best of all possible 
worlds--maximum effectiveness in dealing with employees 
§ 
and maximum effectiveness in taks, but that the two are 
independent. 
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Likert (1967), in contrast, seems to contend that, 
over the long run, one can only have high productivity 
in an organization that develops its people. A firm 
can save money and raise profits one year by harsh per-
sonnel policies, but will soon begin to loose effect-
iveness because of lowered morale and increased turnover. 
Goal and System Models. Etzioni (1960) contrasts 
two models for judging organizational effectiveness--the 
goal model and the system model. "the starting point 
of this approach [system] is not the goal itself but a 
working model of a unit which is capable of achieving a 
goal (261) • " 
He summarizes 
A measure of effectiveness establishes the 
degree to which an organization realizes its 
goals under a given set of conditions. But 
the central question in the study of effectiveness 
is not "How devoted is the organization to its 
goal?" but rather, "Under the given conditions, 
how close does the organizational allocation 
of resources approach an optimum distribution?" 
(262) . 
In effect, however, this approach would require first 
a very careful specification of goals, and a decision of 
which was to be maximized and which were only required 
to reach an acceptable level. Although Etzioni does not 
specify it, the multiple variables of such a study would 
require computer simulation, a major project. 
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However, Etzioni does indicate an important truth, 
further discussed by Kelly (1969): One cannot maximize 
all organizational goals. 
The Tas·k Approach treats an organization as 
a sociotechnical system and in concerned with 
the development of optimal organizations within 
which object and vailable resources, both 
human and technical, determine the activities 
to be performed and the methods of work to 
be employed. Three positions illustrative 
of the economic excellence of the task approach 
are: (i) Technology is a major determinant 
of industrial behavior; (ii) Optimal organi-
zation is not a function of personality( ..• ); 
(iii) Generally any attempt to optimize an 
end-product variable will cause other end-
product variables to become increasingly sub-
optimal. Production blitzes are frequently 
achieved at the expense of product mix, 
maintenance, or morale. In this context, the 
major management problem is the definition of 
acceptable margins of suboptimality in sig-
nificant variables (60). 
Conclusion. A study of organizational effective-
ness, or the use of effectiveness as a variable, re-
quires determination of the goals and the margins 
allowed in reaching them. Also, if possible, studies 
should continue over time so that costs and benefits 
carried over from one year to another can be traced. 
Environmental Validation of Goals 
Perrow (1965) writes 
Organ1zations are ~nfluenced-by three factors: 
the cultural system which states legitimate 
goals, the technology which determines the 
means available for reaching these goals, and 
the social structure of the organizat:bn in 
which specific techniques are embedded in such 
a way as to permit goal achievement. The 
three factors are interdependent (912). 
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The environment has previously been considered as pro-
viding specific inputs of material and personnel for 
the organization. The present short section will con-
sider the broader social and cultural setting of the 
organi~ation in relation-to its goals. Woodward's 
(1965) original study was done in the firms of South 
Essex. In more diverse environments, cultural factors 
may override technological ones. 
In discussing societal validation or acceptance 
of goals, we are actually combining several processes, 
such as law, custom, "national character," and values 
under one head. For the purpose of analysis, they 
seem to affect organizations in roughly the same way. 
Organizations also, of course, can in turn affect the 
environment, goals and values of their society. Such 
effects must be kept in mind, even though we are concen-
trating on the firm as receiver. 
Socialization 
How does society validate goals? One obvious 
way is through socialization of its children. Presumably 
if a goal is shared by organizational members and 
outsiders it will not become a cause of contention. 
One classic example would be the goals or ideals of 
frugality and financial success embodied in the "Prot-
estant Ethic." Brown (1965, 460-469) discusses how 
people must receive certain kinds of training to be 
motivated to achieve, and society must also provide 
certain roles, e.g. the entrepreneurial role, for 
economic growth to take place. 
Custom 
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Values may become enshrined in custom. Clarke 
(1969) discusses the change in British employment 
practices in relation to the decline of the individual-
istic values of the nineteenth century. 
To what do we owe the changes in the employment 
relationship? Firstly, of course, what has 
made them possible is the continuing technolog-
ical improvements which have led towards the 
affluent society together with the opening 
up of undeveloped parts of the world. What 
has done most to govern the form [emphasis 
added] of change is the climate of opinion. 
Could the individualism of the mid-Victorian era 
have prevailed to this day it is conceivable 
there would be very high wages indeed, by our 
standards, instead of paid holidays, occupational 
pension schemes, continuous work, and so on. 
This was not to be: the dark side of our nine-
teenth century economy( ••• ), lack of pro-
tection for the distressed, led, both industrially 
and politically, to a reaction against individual-
ism (1968, 171). 
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Where values conflict because of differences in 
culture or interests, attempts are made to enforce one 
over another. Methods include demonstrations, strikes, 
boycotts, and revolution. But if enforcement is to con-
tinue, it often becomes institutionalized in the form of 
law. 
Law 
Such American values as freedom of association, 
equality of opportunity, and freedom of speech have become 
part of law that a company ignores at its peril. Labor 
relations law in the country very sevel:El.y restricts the 
kinds of cqmmunication an employer can have witJh his em-
ployees on certain subjects. Anti-trust law similarly 
restricts communication between firms. 
Such expressions of value may extend into areas 
that seem strange to us. An example is taken from India, 
where a textile firm received consultation assistance from 
Tavistock Institute (Rice, 1963). During that country's 
struggle for independence, great stress was laid on self-
sufficiency and the use of local, hand-made goods, espec-
ially cloth, rather than machine-made luxuries. The image 
of Gandhi at his spinning-wheel became a tremendously 
emotion-charged symbol. Therefore strict laws were passed, 
limiting the mechanized production of cloth. These severely 
restricted the goals and decisions of the company. 
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Even within Britain, Cotgrove and Varnplew (1972) 
found significant differences in regional values. They 
studied "process" industries and found, consistent with 
previous studies, that the work was more "meaningful, 
responsible, and skillful (182)" than ordinary blue-collar 
work. But they concluded 
Marked regional differences in industrial and 
political attitudes were found among process 
workers in highly automated plants. It is argued 
that a major explanation is to be found not in 
the technology but in factors outside the factory 
gates, notably in the process of political soc-
ialization (169). 
Unfortunately, they did not study different types of tech-
nology in the same region, but they apparently believe 
the differences would be in the same direction found by 
others. They would simply be modified by the surrounding 
culture. 
Summary 
In the analysis of goals, then, it must be remembered 
that an organization is part of a culture. The values of 
that culture may affect the goals unobtrusively, when or-
ganizational members and others share and accept them. 
When there is conflict or confusion, the organizat:bn may 
be forced, by law or other methods, to adopt or to abandon 
certain goals. 
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SECTION III: CONCLUSIONS 
Section III provides conclusions for and evaluations 
of the entire paper. Chapter VII examines a widely-recog-
nized gap in organizational theory--an inadequate and over-
simplified psychological base. The chapter then provides 
material, based on the cognitive, information-processing 
approach to p~ychology, that will fill this gap. 
Chapter VIII presents the theory as modified and 
synthesized. The theory is then evaluated according to 
the criteria presented in Chapter I. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE SOCJD -TECHNICAL SYSTEM 
Criticisms of Socioloaical Nealect of Psvchology 
Many writers have criticized sociological theory 
for its over-simplified view of human psychology. Sociol-
ogists devalue individual differences by pointing out 
that an organization can persist even when all its members 
have been replaced. But even this view fails to consider 
that there could be general human psychological character-
istics that affect the nature of organizations. Also, it 
is obvious that there are many people who could fill most 
social roles, that does not mean that all people could do 
so. 
Sociologists. Let us first take this criticism from 
from the view of two indisputably sociological sociologists 
(Bendix and Berger, 1959). These authors quote a colleague 
(Linton, 1945) as follows: 
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I realize that in the forgoing discussion 
of society and culture the emphasis has been 
mainly laid upon the passive role of the indivi-
dual and upon the way in which he is shaped by 
culture and social factors. It is time now to 
present the other side of the picture. No matter 
how carefully the individual has been trained or 
how successful his conditioning has been, he 
remains a distinct organism with his own needs and 
with capacities for independent thought, feeling, 
and action. Moreover, he retains a considerable 
degree of individuality. His integration into 
society and culture goes no deeper than his learned 
responses, and although~in the adult these include 
the greater part of what we call the personality, 
there is still a good deal left over (1945, 22, passim.) 
Bendix and Berger comment 
In this view, culture and society are used as 
explanatory principles, and what they fail to 
explain is left over as a residue, which is indeed 
a "good deal" •.• The trouble with this approach 
is that it conceptualizes only part of the evidence, 
while the "remainder" is left unaccounted for (97). 
While sociologists would undoubtedly express them-
selves in a more sophisticated manner now than in 1945, little 
real progress has been made towards providing a psycholog-
ical foundation for their work. 
Organizational Theorists. Strong criticisms have 
been made by students of organizations. Pugh (1966), for 
example, comments: 
[A] considerable limitation on all major socio-
logical theories of organizational functioning 
is an extremely naive treatment of human moti-
vation combined with a neglect of individual 
differences which are characteristically devalued 
into "personal idiosyncracies (236)." 
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Argyris (1972) criticizes the socio-technical writers. 
Man is not conceptualized as proactive but as 
passive with little influence on the organization. 
The individual is treated as a non-human item 
almost to the point of being conceived of as 
a black box .••• 
Blau, Thompson, Perrow and Goldthorpe et, al. 
imply a concept of man which is very close to 
the one autocratic conservative management 
have [sic] always maintained; namely that people 
prefer to be market-oriented and economically 
motivated (72-73). 
Possibly Perrow took to heart the criticisms offered 
by Argyris at the conference reported in the above book, 
because he, too, indicates a need to take account of the 
nature of people. 
What do we do about the individual in organizations? 
Do we have to more or less ignore him, as Weber 
did, because the alternative is to become mired 
in all his complexities and contingencies. ? 
Organizations are something more than the struc-
tural categories of the Weberian model--the 
skeleton of hierarchy, rules, offices, roles, 
careers, and so on~ If we cannot accept the 
human relations propositions as being adequate 
or plausible, must we ignore individuals? 
(1972, 145-146). 
To "flesh out" the theory of organizations, Perrow 
offers the decision theory of Herbert Simon. But the 
discussion of organizational "constraints" does not really 
explain how they "confine" the mind of the individual worker. 
Another vocabulary and approach is needed for that. 
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Another point about Perrow•s use of psychology is the 
vagueness of his concept of the "view of the material 
to be processed (1972)." He gives a clear picture of 
what he means in several examples, but the opeEationali-
zation of the general principle is unclear. 
In contrast, Woodward (1970, 16) dislikes Perrow•s 
use of psychological concepts entirely. And he himself 
is obviously uncomfortable with his approach to technology 
by "exceptions." He writes "I decided to take a very 
grave risk and utilize a cognitive definition and oper-
ationalization of technology (1973, 52)." 
Before providing an improved view of man for the 
organizational setting, we must make a detour to clear 
up a semantic problem Many discussions of man tn relation 
to organizations center on whether he is "rational.'' 
This requires clarification, provided in the next section. 
Rationality--a Detour 
If we examine closely the "classical" 
concepts of rationality ••• , we see immediately 
what severe demands they make upon the choosing 
organism. The organism must be able to attach 
different pay-offs (or at least a definite 
range of pay-offs) to each possible out-come. 
This, of course, involves the ability to spec-
ify the exact nature of the out-comesu-there 
is no room in the scheme for "unanticipated 
consequences. " The pay-offs must be completely 
ordered--it must a~ways be possible to specify 
in a consistent way, that one outcome is better 
than, as good as, or worse than any other (Simon, 
1957, 245). 
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In the quotation above, Simon gives a clear picture 
of the "rational man" of game theory or classical economics. 
He clearly sees the solutions to a set problem, and single-
mindedly (single-motively?) orders and selects from among 
them. 
Loose Uses of the Term. Thompson (1967), throughout 
his entire list of theorems on the organization, inserts 
the qualifying clause that they serve for firms "operat-
ing under norms of rationality." But he never explores 
the meaning of this concept. For example, he implies that 
purely economic motives are the most compatible with 
"rationality," and that a firm might deviate from his 
predictions because it was more committed to family control 
than to "rationality" (1967, 49)." But Perrow (1972, 
13-15} points out that nepotism can be extremely valuable 
to an individual manager attempting to cover his own 
incompetence. It can even be useful to the firm in an 
industry riddled with industrial espionage and take-overs. 
And even if the owner is only aiming at providing jobs for 
his sons, is that less "rational" than the desire to turn 
a profit? 
Argyris (1972, chap. 5) criticizes those who attempt 
to change organizations by using excessive~y rational 
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approaches, ignoring emotional and psychological variables. 
But his final statement, (123) implies that "rationality" 
is still the ultimate goal to be reached through taking 
account of emotional factors. 
A philosophical dictionary (Grooten & Steenbergen, 
1972) has no listing for "rationality" but two columns 
on "reason." Most relevant to the present discussion 
is the following: 
Reason: the human ability to discover the ground 
of the beings, their causes and end, meaning and 
sense. Reason is sometimes identified with 
intellect, and has then the broader meaning of: 
ability to know the beings and to understand them 
in their essence. Reason is sometimes opposed 
to intellect, and does then not express so much 
the contemplating and recognizing activity 
( ••• ) but rather the searching and progressing 
Reasonipg therefore can be a type of knowledge, 
or the process of problem-solving. Rationality1B some 
cases is opposed to faith; in others, to practical, exper-
iential knowledge. And "rational" analysis does not seem 
to apply at all when entirely new problem areas are developed 
and the options and their effects are unknown. 
Even in a situation set up and defined as a game, 
the "rational" solution may not be the most desirable one. 
The classic case if the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the 
"rational" choice leads to a less than optimal outcome 
for 1::o th parties. 
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About real life, Lindsay and Norman (1972) write: 
If the other side knows that you are rational, 
you may be at a disadvantage •••• The normal 
rules of bargaining assume that each participant 
evaluates the costs and penalties in a rational 
manner, each trying to maximize his own position. 
But if one side is irrational, then the strategic 
negotiations are totally disrupted. If the 
opponent is believed to be incapable of making 
a proper evaluation of costs and penalties or 
if he does not care about them, then strategic 
manipulations become ineffective (582). 
Their examples indicate that the tremendous power possessed 
by terrorists is largely based on their lack of rationality. 
Therefore, a reputation for hard-headedness can lead to 
greater success than one of sweet reasonableness. 
Various terminologies have been used to get around 
this type of confusion. Simon (1957), for example, 
speaks of behavior that is "intendedly rational" (196) 
and of a distinction between "subjective rationality" 
and "objective rationality (278)." 
He summarizes his view as follows: 
The central concern of administrative theory 
is with the boundary between the rational and 
non-rational aspects of human social behavior. 
Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory 
of intended and bounded rationality--of the 
behavior of human beings who satisfice because 
they have not the wit to maximize (1957, xxiv). 
Conclusion. If rational behavior is not the most 
useful or effective, not necessarily that which is free 
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of prejudice or emotional bias, not even possible in 
ordinary life let alone a creative problem-solving sit-
uation, then the concept seems useless to this author. 
We can assume that all persons have reasons for what 
they do, that their actions seem in some way sensible 
in their own eyes. We will seek to understand those 
reasons rather than comparing their actions with some 
vague and arbitrary standard of "rationality." We agree 
with Lindsay and Norman. 
Our basic assumption is that each decision 
does optimize psychological utility, even 
though the bystander (and perhaps the decision 
maker himse~f) will later wonder why'the 
choice was made (1972, 535). -
Cognitive Man 
Criteria for a View of Human Nature 
Since the description of man as "rational" or "irra-
tional" is not adequate for the needs of organizational 
theory, we must establish the criteria that a psychology 
must meet to fill the gaps in the sociological view. 
First, the view must account for individual and 
shared views of reality; specifically, of the materials 
processed, the environment of the organization;~and of 
the organizational goals and the "constraints" they put 
on action. 
Second, it must describe decision-making both 
in routine situations and non-routine ones, and provide 
a vocabulary for distinguishing the two types. 
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Finally, it must provide a framework for explanation 
of the cooperation and docility of organizational members, 
and their more or less frequent uncooperativeness and 
deviance from expectation~. 
Image and Plan 
The approach presented here to meet the above criteria 
centers around two terms: Image and Plan. These are 
defined as follows: 
Plan. Any complete description of behavior 
should be adequate to serve as a set of instructions, 
that is, it should have the characteristics of 
a plan that could guide the act described. 
When we speak of a plan ••• however, the 
term will refer to a heirarchy IDf instructions 
••• A Flan is any heirarchical process in the 
organism that can control the order in which a 
sequence of operations is to be performed. 
A Plan is, for an organism, essentially 
the same as a program for a computer ••• 
Image. The Image is all the accumulated, organized 
knowledge that the organism has about itself and 
its world (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, 
16-17). 
The Image is defined as "organized." That organiza-
tion will be described in terms proposed by Koestler 
( 196 7) • He uses two terms, _"code" and "ma tr-ix~ " 
I shall use the word •matrix' to denote any 
ability, habit, or skill, any pattern of ordered 
behavior governed by a •code' of fixed rules.(38) 
He further explains 
This is perhaps the place to explain why I have 
chosen the ambiguous word "code" for a key 
concept in the present theory. The reason 
is precisely this nice ambiguity. In signi-
fies a set of rules which must be obeyed--
like the Highway Code or Penal Code; and it 
indicates at the same time that it operates 
in the nervous system through 'coded signa1s•--
like the Morse alphabet--which transmits orders 
in a kind of compressed •secret language' 
(39-40). 
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Koestler distinguishes two kinds of problem-solving 
which seem to parallel Simon's programmed and un-programrned 
decisions. Creative problem-solving involves what he 
calls the bi-sociation of two matrices--synthesizing 
two separate areas, such the falling of an apple and the 
movement of the planets. Such a solution not only creates 
a new matrix, it destroys our old image. Routine problem-
solving, even though it may require considerable training 
and skill, sticks to a pre-established matrix of asso-
ciations. 
Koestler elaborates that creativity 
has a revolutionary or destructive side. Asso-
ciative skills, on the other hand, even of the 
sophisticated kind which require a high degree 
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of concentration, do not display the above fea-
tures •••• The skills of reasoning rely on 
habit, governed by well-established rules of the 
game; the •reasonable person•--used as a standard 
term in English common low--is level-headed in-
stead of multi-level headed--adaptive and not 
destructive; an enlightened conservative, not 
a revolutionary; willing to learn under proper 
guidance, but unable to be guided by his dreams 
(1967, 659j. 
It is obvious, incidentally, that the subject need 
not be able to specify the nature of his search or problem-
solving processes. Some problems are s::>l ved by following a 
set of formal technical rules; others by a more informal 
awareness or "knack" (Hall, 1959, 72). 
Relationship of Theory to Criteria 
As a basis for organizational theory, the beginning 
of this chapter required a view of human nature that 
fulfilled three criteria. Let us now investigate the 
cognitive approach to show how it serves these purposes. 
First, the view was to account for individual and 
shared views of reality; specifically, of the materials 
processed, the organizational environment, and the organ-
izational goals. Information about the material to be 
processed or about the environment form parts of the Image. 
The actions or behaviors to be carried out are the matrices 
goal-related constraints are the results of limitations of 
Plans or of matrices. A person may lack the Plan for an 
action, or fail to have necessary information filed in 
a matrix. 
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Some of these matrices may be built up by the infor-
mal observation of a role-model, or by trial-and-error 
(Hall, 1959). But often they will be given in instruction, 
by communication. Lindsay and Norman point out how much 
simpler it would be to get adult humans to work a token 
machine bhan it is to get chimpanzees to do so. The 
researcher could simply tell them to put the chips in the 
machine if they wanted grapes. The authors comment~ 
Language can be conceived of as a method of 
communicating the memory structure of the 
speaker to the memory structure of the listener 
(1972, 44). 
The second criterion is that the psychology must 
describe decision-making and problem-solving both in 
routine and non-routine situations. "Routine" decisions 
are those for which matrices are already available. Non-
routine decisions require-the development of some new pat-
tern. 
This distinction provides aaifferent explanation 
of the advantages of primary-type groups and open commu-
nication in non-routine situations. If creativity requires 
the "bi-sociation" of different matrices, then the more 
people who are brought together, the more likely a 
usable combination will be hit upon. Also, if people 
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relate to each other as total persons, they are likely 
to know each others's odd and unusual matrices which might 
be useful for a given problem. 
Finally, the theory proposed was to account for 
the individual basis of social cooperation--and its occa-
sional failures. Miller et. al. (1960, indicate that 
[H]uman institutions exist primarily for the 
purpose of executino plans that their members, 
as individuals, would-be unable or unwilling to 
execute • • • [ G]roups are li'ke computers, 
90 percent plan and 10 percent image. Individuals, 
on the o~her hand, are about 75 percent Image 
and 25 percent Plan (100). 
It is probable that groups differ not only in the contents 
of their plans and images, but in the relative emphasis 
on the two. 
Perrow (1972) praises Simon's model of man because 
[T]his model makes simplifying assumptions about 
the individual, so that we can get on with 
studying the organization rather than the 
individual. It assumes that the individual 
is not all that rational and that his behavior, 
within limits, can be deliberately controlled 
(14 7). 
That is to say, Perrow will admit the individual to theory 
if he-won't cause any trouble. We know, of course, that 
people generally respond reasonably appropriately to envir-
onmental contingencies. But they do not always do so, and 
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a view that leaves out the possibility of deviance is inad-
equate. Also, there are times a manager wants the best 
possible performance, and not just a reasonably appro-
priate response, and theory should give give some insight 
to this situation. 
In cognitive theory, it is clear that a person might 
not carry out his role because he lacks the appropriate 
matrix, because the plan for some reason makes it inaccess-
ible to him, or because he is following an entirely different 
plan_f~om the one the organization intends. On the other 
hand, he will often be cooperative because he has leanned 
his image of the work from other organizational members, 
and because they share a plan of what is to be done. 
Motivation 
The view presented does not provide a complete account 
of human motivation, and quite likely one is not needed 
for the study of organizations. Lorsch and Lawrence 
(1969, 55-65) used a cognitive view of man, solving problems 
presented by the environment. To this they added the 
three motives studied by McClelland (1961): Need for 
affiliation, "establishing, maintaining, or restoring 
a positive affective relationship with another person (160); 
Need for power, "the control of the means of influencing 
II 




But McClelland never claimed his schema was an 
exhaustive description. The important thing for the 
cognitive analysis is to know the plan and its strength. 
Whatever motivation contributes to that strength can be 
classified by the approach most useful to the investigator. 
Miller • al. provide a picture of problem-solving 
which leads to a concept of motivation. They call it 
TOTE, for 'test-operate-test-exit." This operates on a 
feedback principle. When information from the environment 
is incongruous with expectations, an operation is performed, 






This simple pattern serves for those problems for 
which plans or matrices are already available. When 
creativity is required, the person must plan. 
Planning can be thought of as constructing 
a list of tests to perform. When we have 
a clear Image of a desired outcome, we can use 
it to provide the conditions which we must 
test, and those tests, when arranged in sequence, 
provide a core strategy for a possible Plan 
(Miller et. al., 1960, 38). 
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Lindsay and Norman (1972) examine motivation in terms 
of just this type of failure of expectations, the need for 
action to adjust the environment to the appropriate limits. 
When we come to consider human motivation, one 
dominant· theme emerges rapidly. Uncertainty, 
failure to observe an expected event, a disruption 
in the pattern of otherwise smoothly flowing 
response sequences, an anticipation of the 
inability to cope with a pending event--these 
seem to be basic driving forces (610). 
They continue 
In many types of motivational situations, the 
organism acts as if something were maintaining 
the ongoing cognitive processes, watching for 
potential trouble spots in dealing with the 
environment, and signalling when difficulties 
arise •... So long as things are within sen-
sible limits, it remains quiet. But when some-
thing is encountered that is new or discrepant 
from what is expected or patently threatening, 
it acts like an interrupt mechanism alerting 
the organism to the potential problem and mobil-
izing resources to deal with it. The result 
is a change in the general level of arousal act-
ivation (1972) 611). 
The authors point out that needs may be described 
in terms of specific plans. That is, one "needs" a mailbox 
to carry out the plan to mail a letter, regardless of one's 
attraction to them, or even of one's feelings about the 
addressee or the task. 
Relationship to Communication Classification 
There is a clear relationship between the cognitive 
psychology presented here and the classification of messages 
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discussed in Chapter II (Table II, P• 34). Eilon (1966) 
begins with the category of routine reports, which are 
time-or event-triggered. This is related to the TOTE 
schema, with an e~vironmental input or incongruity lead~ 
ing to acti~n,· in this case the sending of a message. 
Another type of message is the query or inquiry. 
These are divided into two groups. Questions about 
standing procedures are seeking a plan which is already 
in existence. Questions about novel situations require 
the development of a new matrix. As. additional material 
is required, it may be available from existing records 
or by routine data processing--that is, from an existing 
code. Or it may require the development of a new code, 
eitherfor elicitation or processing of the data. 
Solutions are suggested in proposals, and problems 
are settled in decisions. These may either be ad-hoc, 
the development of a plan for a given situation only, 
or they may involve the development of a plan to be re-
used. 
Summary 
The information-processing view of human psychology 
is offered to provide a base for the study of organizational 
social structure. This views helps to explain shared 
images and human cooperation and the failure to do so. 




THEORY AND EVAIDATION 
As discussed in Chapter I, a theory must be eval-
uated in two different ways: 
1. With regard to its scientific validity$ and 
2. In the lightof its probable, practical, human 
effects with regard to our value system. 
The socio-technical approach has been attacked both 
as humanly destructive and as scientifically inadequate 
or invalid. The present chapter first presents and 
summarizes the theory as modified in this work, and its 
implications for the study of organizational communication. 
The theory is then evaluated with regard to the two sets 
of criteria, scientific and humanistic. 
Statement of the Theory 
Introduction 
This theory focuses on organizational "plans" and 
"images" and the -ways in which communication maintains, 
changes, or carries them out. The present paper draws 
together material from several authors into a unified 
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theory for the use of the student of organizational commu-
nication. In the interest of clarity and conciseness, 
assertions are made boldly. If they~are wrong, it should 
at least be possible to prove them so. 
In general, the theory claims that technology--both 
equipment and knowledge--determines the social and commu-
nication structure of the organizational unit carrying out 
a given process. The environment, or the organizational 
image of the environment, determines the inter-relationship 
of such technical units. Goals are modifying factors, affect-
ing the plans used for technology, the environment, and 
the internal structure. 
Definition of Image and Plan 
Since these terms are central to the theory presented, 
the definitions are repeated below. 
Plan. Any complete description of behavior 
should be adequate to serve as a set of in~ 
struction~ that is, it should have the character-
istics of a plan that could guide the act des-, 
cribed. When we speak of a nlan ••• however, 
the term will refer to phierarcpy •of instruc~ 
tions. A Plan is any hierarchical process in 
organism that can control the order in which a 
sequence of operations is to be performed. 
A Plan is, for an organism, essentially 
the_same as a program for a computer ••• 
(Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960, 16). 
The authors make clear that Plans can be shared, and that 
such sharing is probably the essence of human organization. 
Image. The Image is all the accumulated, organ-
ized knowledge that the organism has about itself 
and its world (Miller, et. al., 1960, 17). 
Similarly, organizational members may share an Image of 
their work, their environment, or their goals. 
Technology 
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Technology is the first major factor to be considered. 
As mentioned above, the technology of a unit determines 
its social and communications structure. Technology falls 













To re-phrase this in the terminology above, "routine" 
involves the use of a standard, pre-set plan. An "analyz-
able search" is programmed, and includes an algorithm or 
standard set of steps to reach a solution. An unanalyzable 
search is unprogrammed, involving creativity or at least 
an informal "knack." 
The two extreme ends of the dotted line represent 
two organizational types which are found in the literature. 
The first is clearly based on Max Weber's {1957) analysis 
of bureaucracy. The second, at the non-routine end, is 
usually unnamed (see Bennis, 1966), but TOffler (1970) 
has cotlmed the descriptive name "ad-hocracy." These two 
types are compared in Table III. 
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An important consideration is that a study using this 
approach must include a time dimension. While some studies 
have considered changes in communication patterns over time, 
they usually assume that a stable pattern exists to be 
discovered, that "channels" exist even when not used. 
In the present approach, the stability of channels is a 
major variable that differentiates organizational types. 
Analysis of the Organizational Types 
The following sections analyze the communication 
expected in each of the four organizational types listed 
above. Messages are classified according to Eilon's (1968) 
system, as to whether they are triggered by time or events. 
Routine--Bureaucracy. 
Most messages time-triggered; some event-triggered, 
often for events specified in advance (exceptions). 
Stable patterns of communication, including who 
communicates to whom, who initiates communication, etc., 
over time. 
Considerable written communication, some in reference 
form, such as rule-books. 
Plans broken down in a stable, heirarchical manner, 
with each person higher in the organizational heirarchy 
knowing more of the plan. 
Widely-shared images of process and goals, often 
instilled in initial training or induction procedures. 
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Non-routine--aa-hocracy. 
Event-triggered messages, inquiries. Messages not 
governed by explicit rules. 
Non-written, use of phone or face-to-face communication 
rather than :memo or letter. 
Multi-dimensional communication, patterns and channels 
shift rapidly over time. 
Communication necessary to establish plans; meetings 
to share plans and images. 
Scattered sharing of plans and images; no clear pattern 
of who has what information. Inquiries are necessary to 
determine who has information. 
In a bureaucracy, the information is available because 
the situation is stable. Rules can be written because the 
same situations recur and old solutions can be re-used. 
Similarly, "rules" existing in people can be used again, 
and the heirarchy probably indicates the person most likely 
to have the answer. 
In the ad-hocracy, none of the above applies. Con-
stantly changing situations may call for the expertise or 
creativity of any staff member. New communication groups 
will have to be formed to deal with changing situations, 
and the rapid change and unprogrammed solutions will require 
the speed and flexibility provided~oy oral communication. 
Craft. Perrow {1970, 79) gives as an example of this 
organizational type the ordinary, typical grade school, in 
which the same techniques are applied to all children. 
The present autmr suggests that other organizations run 
by semi-professionals (Etzioni, 1969)--the social-work 
agency, certain hospital wards, the employment agency 
{Blau and Schoenherr, 1971)-would have the same type of 
structure. 
The routine part of the program would call for a 
bureaucratic structure. Such agencies in fact are often 
criticized for adherence to rules in books and the worst 
kind of heavy-handed impersonality. Those exceptions 
that do occur would not be codifiable. The manner of 
handling them would have to be caught, rather than taught, 
and the more experienced personnel would be most likely 
to know what to do. Training for the semi-professions 
emphasizes clinical experience, supervision, and discussion. 
This organizational type would requi~e a large contingent 
of trained supervisors if the lengthy procedure of handling 
exceptions is to be carried out. 
Alternatively, assistance might be provided by staff 
personnel rather than by supervisors. An example would 
be the school which provides resource personnel to either 
assistthe teacher in dealing with the "exceptional" pupil 
or take him fer special processing for a limited time. 
This system seems adapted to the case where the exceptions 
are of different but definahle types. 
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Another type of organization that may fit this quadrant 
is the "continuous flow" manufacturing industry (Woodward, 
1965). It seems that most of the time the work is routine 
and communications consist largely of making time-triggered 
reports at regular intervals. However, when emergencies 
occur, ·they are ~analy~~b~e. and_ :i;equire a "knack" to fix. 
This kind of expertise would be acquired in part by exper-
ience, and such organizations have steep heirarchies 
which would indicate who should have the ability that is 
needed. 
Engineering. Perrow•s example of an "engineering" 
organization in the human-services field is a "programmed-
learning" school. In such a school, exceptions would 
be handled automatically by branches in the program. 
Possibly some hospital wards fit this pattern as well, 
with the program, elaborate b~t specified, built into the 
personnel. For example, a premature nursery might be a 
place of frequent crisis, with emergencies requiring the 
attention of a well-trained, specialized nurse. But 
the indications of emergency, and the steps to solution, 
' 
could be written out if necessary. 
Another example would be the engineering firm, which 
produces varied products which fall within the area of 
previously established know-how. Western Electric is 
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said to claim that no two telephone company central offices 
are quite alike. They must react to exceptions in fitting 
service to, each ci:J:'y, but the steps they must ta'ke are 
clear. 
The staff in an engineering organization should be 
pre-socialized, and know plans, exceptions, and alternatives 
before they begin work. Since plans can be specified in 
advance, there is no need for discussion and negotiation 
to establish common nnes. Workers usually function inde.-
pendently, and even where cooperation is necessary it 
would require little communication. 
Environment 
While the technology of production determines the 
communication patterns of the unit that performs it, the 
organizational image of the environment determines how 
these units fit together. Of course, where units are 
closely related, the technology of the basic process may 
affect the entire organization, as tn the South Essex 
firms studied by Woodward (1965). 
Environmental Types. A homogeneous environment should 
create an internally uniform structure. A heterogeneous 
environment, on the other hand, would require an organ-
ization that is hierarchical-· -formed into sub-units. 
A turbulent, changing environment also requires sub-units, 
but these tend tobe particularly small and self-sufficient. 
(Lorsch & Lawrence, 1965; Lawrencec& Lorsch, 1967). 
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_!~ages. Images with~n a production unit tend 
to be more similar than those of different units. This 
would be modified by the similarity of technology between 
units and by the work of different members within the unit. 
For example, accountants assigned to different divisions 
would still share similar images. The factors discussed 
by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) such as time-span, speed of 
feed-back, nature of rewards, interpersonal orientation, 
as well as Perrow•s (1970) concept of the view of the 
materials to be processed, would be important parts of 
the image. 
Relations among Units. The internal inter-relation-
shi..psof the organization depend, as Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) have shown, on the relationships of the work to 
be done--or, in this paper's terminology, the plans. 
Two sections carrying out a single plan will have to be 
closely connected or integrated. These authors point out 
that integration is easy if the images held by the units 
are similar, difficult if they areoifferent. In fact, 
if the images are very different it may be most efficient 
to create an intermediate unit with the responsibility of 
translating from unit to the other. 
Therefore, different technologies and an environment 
that requires integration will require the organization 
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to pay attention to communication and possibly employ 
specialists to bridge the gaps. Divisions which carry 
out different plans, or different parts of a pre-established 
plan, however, will need only a minimum of communication. 
The form of communication can be established by formal 
rules. Meetings need not include developing or negotiating 
plans, but simply involve sharing facts regarding the 
occasional exception to the previously arranged schedule. 
Goals 
Goals are a different type of variable from the two 
previously discussed--technology and the environment. 
They refer to the intentional, deliberate, planned element 
in organizational structure and functioning. Organizations 
a~e instruments manipulated to particular ends (Sofer, 
1970, 1). But this intentional element, the organizational 
goal, can only operate within the limits allowed by the 
technology and the environment. 
While some have argued that it is not legitimate to 
speak of an organization having a goal, the concept fits 
within the system mode~. We recognize that systems have 
preferred states without endowing them with human intentions. 
We also recognize that several systems may be capable of 
producing the required output. More time and money can 
be spent on training and recruitment, or moa::-e on salaries 
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and other programs to retain existing employees. The 
choice may be made by historical accident or idiosyncratic 
preference, but it may also be the result of a conscious 
attempt to attain a goal. 
Questions. The first question regarding goa~s is 
their clarity or diffuseness. When goals are clear and 
unambiguous, with definite plans for reaching them, then 
they are more likely to be attained. (Zald & Ash, 1966; 
Selznick, 1945}. Vague goals, on the other hand, by 
allowing more flexibility and adaptiveness, make the 
survival of the organization more likely (Scheff, 1962; 
Maniha & Perrow, 1965; Zald & Denton, 1965). 
A second question regarding goals is how they are 
transmitted and maintained. Vehicles for such transmiss-
ion include educational institutions, in-house training, 
organizational development, and conferences. There may 
be times set aside for the specific purpose of re-exam-
ining goals or of re-affirJning them. Or major re-evaluations 
may be forced by environmental changes. 
The third question regarding goals is how widely 
shared they are in the organization. Goals in an ad-
hocracy should be more widely shared than in a bureaucracy, 
because the bureaucrat needs only to understand his 
limited section of the plan. But an organization that 
stresses its goals could run counter to this expectation. 
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Effectiveness. One value of the study of goals is 
their use in considering organizational effectiveness. 
The'researcher must know what the organization is intended 
to do before he can judge success or failure. It is the 
present author's belief that organizational research should 
consider the variable of effectivenesso It is important 
not only to know-that organizations differ, to to find 
the effects of those differences. 
Comparative studies are required to provide this 
type of data. Goals in a single organization are elusive--
if we didn't make as much money as we expected, perhaps 
we increased our good will. But by comparing several 
goals in several organizations we can find the real costs 
arrl real achievements. 
Summary-:of-~od1Ti-ed- B6c--Y:6.:.Eeenri1.ear~Tneory 
1. Organizations are not the result of happenstance 
but are in part deliberately contrived. Goals of groups 
within the organization determines some aspects of structure. 
over the short run, goals can be achieved only within 
the lee-way allowed by technological and environmental 
conditions. But over the long run, there can be strategic 
choice of environments and technologies. 
2. Communication serves to define, spread, and 
maintain organizational and group goals. It serves the 
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same function for images of the environm~nt, technology, 
and the material to be processed. 
3. Organizations differ, and the type of communi-
cation that occurs and is appropriate differs with the 
organizational type. 
4. The study of communication in a given organi-
zation or organizational unit begins with the classi-
fication of that unit. The classification is based on 
the technology of work, defined in terms of the number 
and type of exceptions to standard plans that occur. 
5. Units where there are few exceptions will tend 
to be bureaucratic, with stable communication patterns, 
showing a clear heirarchy, use of written communication 
and rule books, and messages triggered by time. Sections 
with many exceptions will tend to be ad-hocracies, with 
rapidly-shifting patterns of oral communication. 
6. A second factor in determining the nature of 
the organization is whether the exceptions that do 
oacur have programmed (analyzable) solutions. Analyzable 
solutions require well-trained, often professional staff 
who tend to work independently. Unanalyzable solutions 
require a system of consultation with more experience 
personnel, either staff or line. 
I 
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7. The organization's environment determines the 
relationships among the technological units. Homogen-
eous stable environments will produce internally homo-
geneous organizations. Heterogeneous environments will 
produce internally differentiated organizations. Changing 
environments will require organizational change. 
8. Organizational units that are similar in terms 
of inter-personal orientation, time-span of planning, 
rewards, etc. will be easy to link. If units are very 
different, considerable effort in terms of time, expense, 
and special personnel will be necessary if the environment 
requires that they coordinate their efforts. 
Evaluation of Theory 
Humanistic Criticism 
Critics of the practical effects of the socio-tech-
nical approach usually emphasize one of two major points. 
The first is the claim that it will lead to policies 
which cause suffering to the individual, which conflicts 
with the value of promoting human happiness and fulfillment. 
The second is that it will block society's technological 
progress, which is also highly valued. 
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Individual Effects. The first argument made by 
opponents of the technological approach is that it 
justifies a bureaucratic systern--within certain settings--
and that bureaucracies make people unhappy. Such unhap-
'" 
piness is supposed to be a result, or a part of alienation--
a combination of powerlessness, norrnlessness, isolation, 
and self-estrangement (Blauner, 1964, 32). 
Studies have ·indicated that wor'kers in limited, 
repetitious, non-responsible jobs experience lowered 
morale and dissatisfaction. This is particularly true 
of white-collar and skilled blue'collar workers (Susman, 
1972; Legerman, 1972). However, the findings vary 
widely with the background and motivation of the workers, 
the exact nature of the work, and other factors. 
when 
Blauner (1964) claims that alienation increases 
1. The product is less unique 
2. The worker works on a smaller part of it 
3. When the sphere of responsibility is more 
restricted (23). 
One solution suggested for this situation is "job 
enrichment," which is 
the process of allowing the individual worker 
to determine his own working pace; allowing the 
individual worker to serve as his own inspector 
by assigning responsibility for quality control 
to the worker, allowing the individual worker 
to repair his own mistakes; allowing latitude 
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in the choice of methods; and allowing the worker 
to be responsible for his own machine set up 
{Hulin, 1971, 160). 
However, after a review of the literature, Hulin {1971) 
concludes that the results of such programs are mixed. 
A ••• reasonable conclusion would be that 
either positive or negative results may be 
expected from a program of job enrichment and 
the type of result depends to a great extent 
on the motivations of the workforce involved 
( ••• ) (182). 
However, if job enrichment is seen as a useful strat-
egy in a given organization, such a change could be accom-
odated within a bureaucratic framework. Bureaucracy does 
not require Taylorization, and the structure of rules 
and authority could be maintained with enriched jobs. 
Thorsrud (1968) points out that the Tavistock Institute 
humanizes jobs by making work ±.nto meaningful uni ts,- not 
by creating impermanent organizations. 
A similar accusation is that the systems approach 
I 
leaves no room for freedom for the worker. This would 
seem to apply to the bureaucracy, which would have the 
capability for pre-planning and control. Indeed, Exton 
(1972) nms on at such length about the i11 effects of 
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"systems" in industry and their destruction of human beings 
that one expects to find that they also cause. cancer, 
obesity, and tired blood. 
An article by Ericson (1971) counters the views 
advanced by Exton. Ericson claims that only "cybernet-
ically controlled" organizations can truly plan for the 
fulfillment of human values. This view seems as likely 
as Exton"s. 
Argyris (1972) seems to believe that the socio-
technical view's lack of psychological foundations would 
lead to over-looking the human element in any attempt 
at application. He says that "if an activist were to use 
these theories as a basis for change, he would become an 
authoritarian manipulator (viii}." 
Again, this implication does not seem inherent 
in the theory, especially as described and modified in this 
paper. A socio-technical analysis can allow for social 
as well as technical values. 
Another point overlooked by critics of bureaucracy 
is that ad-hocracy also has human costs. Toffler, who 
originated the term, writes 
It is possible that for many people, in 
their organizational relationships as in other 
spheres, the future is arriving too soon. 
For the individual, the move toward Ad-hoc-
racy means a sharp acceleration in the turn-
over of organizational relationships in his 
life • • • The increased turnover of all these 
relationships places a heavy adaptive burden 
on individuals reared and educated for life in 
_ a slower-placed social system. 
It is here that the danger of future shock 
lies (1970, 151). 
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Therefore, it seems that the satisfaction of human 
needs will not automatically be provided by any oroan-
izational system. A theory which provides for a variety 
of systems that allow for individual differences would 
seem the most likely to permit the pursuit of happiness. 
Social Effects. A different criticism made by 
Argyris (1972) is that the technical- school is the enemy 
of progress. Basically, he believes the theory supports 
management against workers, and existing systems against 
improved ones. 
Another way in which these writers have 
become, unintentionally, in favor of manage-
ment is that they have tended to develop 
generalizations about appropriate fit between 
organization and environment that correlate 
with existing criteria of success (73). 
This criticism does apply to many current studies, 
though Argyris seems no more comfortable with union 
activity than the writers he opposes. But the careful 
consideration of goals and effectiveness recommended in 
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the present paper should allow for a thoughtful evaluation 
of the ends an organization is meant to serve. 
Argyris•s criticism of the negative effects of 
existing organizational forms springs from the same 
source as the long-standing criticisms of Mertonll964) 
and Crozier (1964). In their view, bureaucracies serve 
society ill because their rules do not allow for the 
importance of the individual. None of the authors, 
. 
however, have considered the costs of alternative struc-
tures. 
Perrow (1972) counter-attacks with the claim that 
the human resources approach is actually the basis of 
the kind of non-humanistic manipulation of which they 
accuse others. He begins with a brief discussion of 
Maslow•s heirarchy of needs--the theory thathigher needs 
such as belonging and self-actualization emerge as lower 
needs such as physical well-being and safety are satisfied. 
He continues: 
Despite the lack of solid evidence from 
research( ••• ), and the existence of circum-
stantial evidence that there is no clear heirarchical 
ordering of the needs, the theory has proved 
useful for the human relations (human resources) 
movement. It justifies extensive involvement in, 
and identification with, the organization. 
A person who participates in the organization 
only to the extent of the contract, or to the 
extent of what he considers a fair degree of 
effort for the return he receives, is considered 
to be a stunted individual--even though he may 
be self-actualizing outside the organization 
{121). 
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Conclusion. Organizations are powerful instruments 
for good or ill. It is likely that they do, and will con-
tinue to provide fulfillment for some members as well as 
make some unhappy. Those~~~~ are~~ttempting _to make them more 
human need not reject the socio-technical view as incon-
sistent with their purpose. 
Scientific Evaluation of Theory 
rhe next step is to evaluate the theory presented 
with regard to its scientific value and usefulness to 
the study of organizational communication. Thompson 
{1967, vii) writes: 
I believe it is a sign of relative maturity 
when a field begins to focus on patterned 
variations. 
The initial attractiveness of the socio-technical or 
technical implications approach is just that. It offers 
not universalistic prescriptions or or an undigestible 
mass of results, but a pattern of meaningful differences. 
However, an evaluation requires consideration of other 
criteria. In this case, the criteria used are taken from 
Madden (1960). and discussed in Chapter I. 
Accounts for the facts. First, a theory must account 
for the known facts. While there are some studies that 
234 
have been set in oppos~tion to the socio-technical writers, 
they seem to be those that do not take into account factors. 
For example, Hickson, Pugh, and P~eysey (1969) fail to 
recognize tlat different parts of an organization may have 
different technologies. 
In general, the theory is well grounded in fact and 
empirical study, contrasting with the approach of grand 
theorists such as Parsons (1960). Woodward1"s group only 
began to create new theory after they £ound that success 
in companies was not related to the axioms of classical 
management theory. 
The primary attack on the factual validity of the 
theory comes from those, particularly at the University 
of Aston, who claim that the concept of bureaucracy is 
not unitary--that is, that the variables do not co-vary as 
predicted. An early article (Hinings, Pugh, Hickson, & 
Turner, 1967)states their intention of breaking down this 
traditional concept. 
Later, Hinings and Lee (1971) found two groups of 
variables: 
[s]pecialization, formalizat:bn, and standardi-
zation go together on the one hand, and lack of 
autonomy and centralization on the··other (87). 
Their colleague, however, defends the Webe::ian or 
unitary view based on his extension of their study to a 
nationwide sample of organizations~(Child, 1972). 
And Mansfield {1973) criticizes their understanding o~Weber, 
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their operationalization of his concepts, and their method-
ology. 
While further work is needed, it seems likely that 
the theory presented does accord with the facts. 
Accounts for Group of Facts. The second criterion is 
that the theory should account for as large a group of 
facts as possible. The theory presented here first of 
all accounts for a large number of variables within the 
organization--span of control, organizational "shape," 
formality of rules, professionalization, and the direction 
and medium of communication as well as the stability of 
communication patterns. It also includes psychological 
variables usually over-looked in sociological views, including 
level of attention, training, decision-making,. and image 
or accumulation of knowledge. 
By inc1ud:hg all these factors it fills in the gaps 
in other theories, and shows where their predictions are 
likely to apply. For example, it indicates that the prescrip-
tions of classical management, intended for bureaucracy, 
are likely to predict success in firms only in units with 
a routine technology. 
Logical Simplicity. The third criterion is that if 
two theories account for the same facts, the more logically 
simple one--with fewer undefined terms and unproved 
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assumptions--must be chosen. The main rival here would 
be the size theorists (see Starbuck, 1965) who claim that 
that simple, easily defined variable accounts for much 
of the differences between organizations. But even if 
size did account for much of the variance, we would still 
wonder why it did so. And there are several studies (Child, 
197~) that indicate that size is only one of several impor-
tant factors. 
Results. Finally, a theory should lead to results in 
publiciy confirmable ~tudies. This criterion is rather 
subjective in dealing with a relatively new theory. Clearly 
the present author sees rich possibilities for research. 
However, at least in the field of communication, not a 
great deal has been produced. 
Argyris (1972) attacks much of the socio-technical 
work as correlational and atheoretical and as including 
inadequate or incorrect assumptions concerning psychology. 
The present paper is adapted to supply the material missing. 
He also criticizes the lack of experimental studies. 
Many of the writers are sociologists, and accustomea to 
conditions that can be compared but not manipulated. 
But studies based on the theory need not be limited to 
observation if the researcher wishes to attempt change. 
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Communication 
For communication students, the socio-technical approach 
offers certain distinct advantages. First, it indicates 
that the importance of communication itself will ·vary with 
different organizational situations, and indicates where 
and when it is likely to be significant. 
Second, it indicates what type of communication is 
likely to be effective in a given organizational situation. 
Its inclu·~on of multiple variables makes it particularly 
strong for prediction compared to single-variable theories. 
Finally, it provides a truly inter-related set of 
concepts and terms that should allow for the construction 
~fa strong, logical science or organizations and organ-
izational communication. 
Concluding SUmmary 
This dissertation is based on the assumption that 
the advancement of the study of organizational communi-
cation requires attention to the nature of the organi-
zation itself as an entity. To provide.the necessary 
background, the organizational literature in three areas 
has been investigated: 




In each area, the terminology has been clarified and 
the variables under consideration defined. The effects 
of the variables have been examined in light of the appli-
cable empirical literature. Then inadequacies were filled 
by the addition of further material, such as that necess-
ary to provide a psychological foundation. An attempt 
is made to synthesize material in the three areas through 
the use of the concepts of "Image" and "Plan," and material 
from cognitive psychology. 
The conclusions drawn are: First, that the tech-
,;,~ - -
nology of a work unit determines its social structure. 
Units with few exceptions tend to be bureaucracies; with 
many exceptions, ad-hocracies. 
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Second, the demands of the environment--whether it 
is stable, uncertain, or diverse--tend to determine the 
relationship among such units. Finally, within the limits 
provided by the technology and environment, there is some 
part of the inter-action and communication that is the 
result of "strategic choice" or organizational goals. 
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